'SPECIFIC SOCIALISM' AND ILLITERACY AMONGST WOMEN:

A Comparative Study of Algeria and Tanzania

Boutheina Cheriet

Ph.D

University of London

Institute of Education

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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyses the position of women in Algeria and Tanzania, and their marginalisation and domestication through illiteracy.

The choice of Algeria and Tanzania was made in order to highlight the rationale of 'specific socialism', upheld as the official ideology in both countries. The rejection of Marxian 'scientific socialism', and the projection of an endogenous ideology are distinct features of 'specific socialism' in these two countries.

The thesis argues that the discourse of 'specific socialism' is ambiguous and has allowed for the resurgence of conservative trends which threaten to affect women's status as equal citizens. This is manifested in the adoption of regressive family laws in Algeria and Tanzania which endorse women's inferiority.

The thesis demonstrates that, while high illiteracy rates among adult women in Algeria have maintained their marginalisation and domesticity, higher rates of literacy in Tanzania have not necessarily improved their participation record in the country's public processes. It is subsequently suggested that educational solutions to women's marginalisation should be studied in connection with the pertaining specific social conditions, and not taken as panaceas.

In conclusion, it is pointed out that the position of women in society is a cogent catalyst in emphasizing the contingency of social change and the unpredictability of social behaviour.

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Note: All translations of Arabic and French references are this author's

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INTRODUCTION

Preliminary Questions

When initially embarking on this comparative study of illiteracy amongst women in Algeria and Tanzania, the present author was often told that the comparison would be untenable, owing to the historical and socio-economic differences between the two countries. It was more often than not pointed out that the two nations belonged to different cultural entities (Arab World and Africa) and that their contemporary historical developments differed considerably from one another. Algeria's violent war of liberation (1954-1962) and Tanzania's piecemeal transition to Independence (1954-1961) were considered sufficient to question the comparison. Finally, Algeria's relative wealth as an oil-producing country, and Tanzania's lack of mineral resources undermined any comparison.

However, the initial interest in such a comparison was influenced by criteria which differ vastly from the above 'technical' objections. First and foremost, the present author was intrigued by the political and ideological discourse conveyed by the official rhetoric in both contexts. Indeed, there was a repeated emphasis upon a 'specific' brand of socialism in the Algerian and Tanzanian official formulations based on a leitmotive of 'authenticity' rather than contemporary international socialism, and a staunch rejection of Marxian 'scientific socialism'.[1] Hence 'specific socialism'. This formulation is the present author's and not the official appellation.

Secondly, considering the position of women within such a discourse promised an interesting reappraisal of the ubiquitous debate on theory and practice in social research. Was the continued marginalisation and alienation of the majority of adult women from processes of the 'public realm' in favour of the 'domestic realm', a result of contradiction between the theory and practice of the discourse, or was it embedded in its initial ambiguities? Posing such a question necessarily begs a theoretical reappraisal of the hitherto evolutionist and positivist tradition in social science, (at least in its present predominant Western form). This latter rests on a unilineal approach to social change, regarded as being intrinsically 'progressive'. This entails that there is a contradiction between 'infrastructural' and 'superstructural' change, the latter 'lagging' behind the former.[2] But, more importantly, it also means that there is no recognition of the myriad of societies and cultures and their own inner logics and representations of the world. Indeed, we often overlook the fact that the notion of 'progress' has been linked to specific social and historical contexts, namely those of Europe and its evolution through its mercantile, capitalist and imperialist periods. The notion of 'development' today, and its decried 'failures' in a variety of so-called Third World countries (ie. non-Western societies) is testimony to the ethnocentrism of 'progress', and its implicit corollaries; rationalism and secularism.

Thirdly, the provision made for pre-colonial 'authentic' systems of values in the discourse of 'specific socialism' in Algeria and Tanzania promises to draw attention to the often overlooked vitality of local societies and cultures, and their internal dynamics. The caution with

which women's equality has been addressed by Algeria's and Tanzania's 'socialisms' cannot be dismissed at first hand as a 'betrayal of true socialist principles'.[3] It should instead emphasize the mechanisms of local responses to the dominant and sweeping process of 'modernisation' of institutions and norms.[4]

Above all, the most compelling question which initiated the theme of the present thesis, was that of the notion of 'development' and 'education for development' which has grown into an international discourse for the last thirty years. Since its inception in the late 1950s, endless revisions of the 'philosophy of development' have had to be made: this has led to the 'economistic' 1960s; then the less ambitious and 'qualitative' oriented 1970s; and finally, the 'monetarist' 1980s. Beyond the economic vested interests it served at a global level, the whole rationale of 'development' appeared dubious in view of the wide range of societies it purported to affect. The uniformity of the operation thus created a most convenient wholistic ensemble, that of the 'Third World', or the 'South', and addressed it as a mammoth deformity whereby, a myriad of societies and cultures are treated as social 'malformations'.

Consequently, this work identifies a specific problem, in two distintive national contexts of the 'Third World', namely Algeria and Tanzania, in order to draw attention to the improbability of social evolution.

The Object of the Thesis

The purpose of this thesis is to study the continuing marginalisation of Algerian women from major public processes, in view of the high rates of illiteracy among adult women (aged 10+) in Algeria,[5] (notwithstanding a formidable expansion of the educational system, and an egalitarian societal programme). The investigation begged the following query: could illiteracy be accountable for the derisory participation of women in the political and social processes, and could literacy be solution to such a marginalisation? It would have been feasible to limit the study to Algeria, but Tanzania has been taken as a comparator in order to widen the significance of the research. Indeed, Tanzania springs to mind as another 'socialist' experience in Africa for the last twenty years, with a renowned record in the domain of adult literacy, especially among women,[6] and this despite the country's lack of resources. Another question was worth posing at this point in the preliminary comparison. Did the expansion of adult literacy bring about a greater economic and social participation of women in Tanzania? *A priori* the comparison of these two cases looked promising in breaking away from the conventional wisdom of two important themes: women under socialism, and the 'sanctity' of literacy as a social and economic promoting device, whatever the circumstances. However, this author would stress that primary research has been undertaken only in Algeria, while for Tanzania, the researches were limited to secondary sources.

The position of women in Algeria's and Tanzania's societal programmes promises to be a useful catalyst of the ambiguities inbuilt in the discourse of 'specific socialism'. Rhetorically, this latter

attempts to reconcile two different patterns of normative and institutional egalitarianism: that of local pre-capitalist, pre-colonial social organisation, and the more universal ideal of modern socialistic organisation. Where women are addressed primarily as reproducers in the first, the second considers them as producers; and where the first holds them as 'inferior' members of the community, the second regards them as citizens enjoying direct allegiance to the state, as individuals. The individualism of modern citizenry, in general and its more egalitarian form in socialism is perhaps the most devastating antithesis of the traditional position of women as the invisible reproducers.

Accordingly, the present thesis will attempt to demonstrate that the very discourse of 'specific socialism' has permitted the marginalisation of women, despite its overall positive philosophy of progress and egalitarianism. For the very notion of 'specificity' and its emphasis on 'authenticity' has provided ample grounds for the legitimation of conservative claims against prospects of sex equality contained in socialism. Thus, in analysing the condition of women's marginalisation, and in examining existing and tentative solutions, particular attention will be paid to actual social dynamics in their relation to the official discourse of 'specific socialism'.

The Thesis: Structure and Content

The thesis is divided into two parts and comprises five Chapters. The first part is mainly devoted to questions of a theoretical nature and includes a discussion of social theory in Chapter 1, and the rationale of 'specific socialism' in Chapter 2. The purpose is to highlight the

issue of ethnocentrism in social investigation, through a discussion of Marx and Weber and their respective approaches to non-European societies, with a special emphasis on 'Oriental'[7] societies. The question is asked as to what extent they differ or converge in their representation of non-European social formations. A further question ensues as to whether dependency theory, a 'Third World' theory can claim to be Marxist, especially in the light of Marx's positive attitude to colonialism, which can be said to have a more direct bearing on functionalist theory and its thesis of diffusion of modernity. A less inductivist and positivist approach to problems arising from social change has been proposed by Holmes (1965, 1981), especially in the educational field.[8] Accordingly, a statement of the problem under investigation in the present thesis will be made in the light of the Holmesian 'problem(-solving) approach'.

Chapter 2 examines the rhetoric of 'specific socialism' in Algeria and Tanzania. The claims that respectively Islam and Africaness represent the sources of an endogenous brand of socialism is extensively illustrated by official political documents, namely Algeria's societal blueprint, the 1976 Charte Nationale, and Nyerere's writings of the last twenty years.[9] Particular attention will be given to the speeches of late President Boumediene of Algeria, and the recently retired Julius Nyerere of Tanzania in view of their charismatic role in the societal programmes of their countries.

The second part of the thesis concentrates on the adoption and implementation of the societal project, with a view to demonstrating the contingency of social change, and consequently illustrates the

argument on women's continued marginalisation. It comprises the remaining three Chapters.

Chapter 3 attempts to delineate the various social actors and political protagonists at play in the societal programme formulated and adopted by the dominant polity. It gives mainly a comprehensive idea of the process of state and nation building in Algeria and Tanzania over the last 25 years. In this, it puts emphasis on the social interaction between the official agents of change and the wider spectrum of recipients in civil society at large. There will be a particular concern for the dynamism of those on the receiving end of change, whereby an explanation for problematic policy implementation might be found.

The two last Chapters examine the position of women *per se*. Chapter 4 attempts to throw some light on the legal status of women through a discussion of the family laws of the two countries. However, while it was possible for the present author to consult the National Assembly debates which had led to the enactment of the Algerian Family Code in 1984, no such arrangement could be made for Tanzania. Consequently, the Tanzanian data had to be taken from secondary sources. Such consultation promised to be useful in illuminating the prevailing attitudes of the main social protagonists towards women's status and role in society. It will also help to illustrate the inconsistencies of the official discourse of equality contained in 'specific socialism', and the pugnacious role of traditional social actors in retaining tradition in the private realm of the family. Models of traditional kinship structures will be drawn for Algeria and Tanzania, and used as

parameters for the residual valuations of conservative social protagonists who oppose a change in women's domestic status.

Finally, in Chapter 5, a comparative examination of Algeria's and Tanzania's educational strategies is carried out so as to assess women's integration through education in the modernising societal project. Special attention is given to the 1967 Experimental World Literacy Programme[10] in which Algeria and Tanzania have participated. The different results yielded by the programme draw attention to the importance of local social conditions in determining policy formulation. On the other hand, the question of whether a Freirian[11] 'education for liberation' can free women from their alienating domesticity is also posed, through a discussion of Freire's method of 'conscientization' in adult literacy. Local conditions of women's 'oppression' in Algeria and Tanzania might point in the direction of less millenial panacea, be they technocratic or revolutionary, towards more pertinent solutions, albeit imperfect.

NOTES: INTRODUCTION

1. Friedrich Engels distinguished between the Fabian and Owenian versions of socialism as 'utopian', and Marx's appeal for a communistic millenium as 'scientific socialism'. Cf. Engels F., Socialisme Scientifique et Socialisme Utopique, Editions Sociales, Paris, 1971. See Chapter 1 for further details.

2. Objections may be raised to the simultaneous use of Ogburn's notion of 'lag', and Marx's 'infrastructure' (material basis) and 'superstructure' (ideological and legal values), but European social theory has by and large advanced the idea of a gap between theory and practice in social change. As Holmes (1981) put it, "these theorists assumed that change takes place first in one aspect of society and that problems are created because individuals or other aspects of society fail to respond immediately to such change". Cf. Holmes B., Comparative Education: Some Considerations of Method, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1981, p. 10. For a comprehensive discussion of European social theory, see, Etzioni, A. & E., Social Change, Basic Books, New York, 1964.

3. The thesis of betrayal of 'the true socialist ideal' (of scientific socialism) has been entertained by radical scholars of socialist experiences such as Algeria and Tanzania. See Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion.

4. 'Modernisation' is increasingly denounced as a euphemism for 'Westernisation' by intellectuals in a number of countries. For

instance, the recent 'fundamentalist' claims which emerged from Islamic movements worldwide, are the expression of a world-view which takes pride in the comprehensiveness of a distinctive societal programme. Contemporary Muslim scholars have been increasingly critical of the Western world-view in general, and of Western epistemology in particular. Their main target seems to be the methods of conjecture, doubt, relativity and objectivity, which they argue, go counter to the notion of revealed knowledge in Islam. Cf. in particular "Conceptual Crisis in Social and Natural Sciences", in S.S. Husain, & S.A. Ashraf, Crisis in Muslim Education, Hodder & Stoughton, Jeddah, 1979; S. M. al-Naquib al-Attas, "Preliminary Thoughts on the Nature of Knowledge, and the Definition and Aims of Education", in S.M.A. al-Attas, (ed.), Aims and Objectives of Islamic Education, Hodder and Stoughton, Jeddah, 1979; I. R. al-Faruqi, "Islamizing the Social Sciences", in Social and Natural Sciences, edited by I.R. al-Faruqi, & A.O. Naseef, Hodder and Stoughton, Jeddah, 1981. Above all educational, and pedagogical issues seem to have been the centre of interest of Muslim scholars anxious to counteract Western approaches. Cf. The Islamic Education Series volumes edited by Syed Ali Ashraf, for King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, published by Hodder and Stoughton. In addition to the above, titles include: Philosophy, Literature and Fine Arts; Curriculum and Teacher Education; Education and Society in the Muslim World; Muslim Education in the Modern World.

5. Latest national estimates (1982) counted 60.8 per cent of adult illiterate women. See Chapter 5.

6. In ten years (1971-1981) of adult literacy campaigning, Tanzania reduced national illiteracy rates among women from 80 to 26 per cent. See Chapter 5.

7. The term 'Oriental' has been retained in its nineteenth century use designating Middle Eastern (including Muslim North Africa) as well as Asian societies. Marx had studied the repercussions of colonialism on India and Algeria. While Weber concentrated on the Chinese and Islamic intellectual legacies, as well as India's social structure. Both were informed by a comparison of these with European capitalism. See Chapter 1.

8. Professor Brian Holmes is a specialist in the field of Comparative Education at the University of London. His contribution in this discipline is based on the elaboration of an a-historicist method, aimed at stressing the contingency of social change, and the hypothetical nature of solutions to problems arising from change. In this approach, he was inspired by the American philosopher Dewey and his notion of 'reflective thinking' and Popper's hypothetico-deductive method in science, which he brought together in his ensuing 'problem(-solving approach'. See Holmes B., Problems in Education: A Comparative Approach, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1965. And for further references on the evolution of Holmes' methodology, consult his Comparative Education (1981).

9. The 1976 Charte Nationale has been reviewed and extended in 1986, but the 1976 version is used herein. Only where alterations have been dramatic, has the 1986 version been mentioned. As for Tanzania,

Nyerere's main writings will be mentioned since they represent the country's societal blueprints.

10. Cf. Unesco, EWLP: A Critical Assessment, The Unesco/UNDP Press, 1976.

11. The adjective is taken after Paulo Freire, the Brazilian adult education specialist, who adopted an original approach in the field of adult literacy, based on militant critical thinking, rather than the conventional 3Rs. See Chapter 5 for further details.

PART ONE

THEORIES OF SOCIAL CHANGE AND SOCIALIST RHETORIC

CHAPTER ONE: THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

1.1. A First Identification of the Problem

Formulating the problem is seemingly simple. Since Independence, the political regimes in Algeria and Tanzania have pledged to construct socialist societies, whereby, *inter alia* equality of the sexes is guaranteed as a constitutional right.[1] However, more than a generation later, not only is sex equality far from being achieved, but the majority of adult women are relegated to the realm of domesticity by high rates of illiteracy. On the other hand, rather than a linear and progressive emancipation of women, growing resistance to this prospect can be detected (Chapter 3). Indeed, most striking of all is the *de jure* consecration of the inferiority of women in the family laws of each country, not immediately after Independence, but in the 1970s and 1980s (Chapter 4). How can one explicate the departure from the political recognition of full citizenry for women in both countries?

The following sections of this Chapter will illustrate the dilemma through a discussion of conventional theories of social change, in relation to the problem under investigation. The theories discussed are those of the modernisation and dependency schools. A brief historical digression into the paradigmatic precedents of each school, Weber and Marx respectively, will help in so far as it will illustrate the issue of ethnocentrism. Marx's and Weber's insight into societies other than Europe were not only ethnocentric but surprisingly condescending, as each belittled other social formations for not producing capitalism, and for being intrinsically incapable of doing so. Accordingly, the conventional 'parental' connections between dependency theory and

Marxism or at least Marx on colonialism, is questioned. In fact, the present author argues that dependency theory has implicitly, (and most probably inadvertently) broken away from classical Marxism on the role of colonialism, and that liberal modernisation theory has a lot more to share with Marx on the positivity of Westernisation than conventionally admitted.

In view of the aforementioned epistemological traditions, the problem under investigation would be simply interpreted in one of two ways. Either, not enough Westernisation as assumed by modernisation theory, with the corollary that a subsequent formulation of the problem would be that women continue to be marginalised in Algeria and Tanzania since the pre-requisites of a developed Western society have not been met. These should be enforced regardless of local conditions, which are anyway pre-judged to be 'traditional', in the sense that they are static and amenable to change only under the impulse of Western dynamism. Or, too much Westernisation, in the sense of capitalist penetration, which dependency theory has denounced as a generator of underdevelopment rather than development. Accordingly women's marginalisation would be a result of the overall underdevelopment caused by the position of Algeria and Tanzania on the periphery of the world capitalist system.

However, these formulations present the disadvantage of the inductive method in social investigation in that they seek to prove their theoretical model correct, and consequently ignore the subtleties of local responses to extraneous influences. By the same token, they bestow an aura of passivity onto the local social formations;

modernisation by considering them inherently static; dependency by locking them in the perpetual position of 'the oppressed'. On the other hand, their inherent propensity to represent social reality in dichotomous terms allows little room for the examination of social interaction, except in the sense of bestower and recipient. Last but not least, the obsession with the West or international capitalism as a central criterion for measuring social change, denies all other historical epochs and types of social organisation any part in the attainment of present social processes.

As 'development' theories, modernisation and dependency have compressed the history of societies into that of capitalist expansion, thus pushing into oblivion all previous 'civilisational' experiences. The capitalist 'moment' in global history is made supreme either to regenerate or destroy. Hence the dubiousness of both theories of 'development'.

1.2. Marx and Weber Revisited Through the 'Orient': Ethnocentrism and Epistemological Convergence.

The 'Oriental' analyses of Marx and Weber are important to recall because they constitute the substratum for present-day theories of social change in the 'Third World', namely modernisation and dependency theories. It might be objected that there can hardly be a direct correspondence between the 'Third World' and the 'Orient'. Nevertheless, a rapprochement is possible through the medium of their 'observer', and that is by and large the European and Western traditions of social investigation. Given the universalistic fever which had inevitably marked European perception of the rest of the

world in the midst of a triumphant industrial imperialism, it seemed hard for most social observers to admit a different 'otherness' to the newly-conquered. Consequently, this 'otherness' had to be grasped within stereotyped cliches as if to help legitimise the observer's interference. For instance, it is quite significant that scholars as disparate as Marx and Weber in their respective appraisal of capitalism, agreed so much on its 'superiority' over other modes of social organisation and cultures, at the risk of taking ideological stances rather than scientific ones.

Marx was particularly eager to see colonialism destroy the pre-capitalist social organisation of India and Algeria[2] in the hope of regenerating them within a higher stage of historical development. Of the British colonisation of India, he had this to say:

> ...Indian society has no history at all at least no known history. What we call its history is but the history of the successive intruders who founded their empires on the passive basis of that unresisting and unchanging society. The question, therefore, is not whether the English had a right to conquer India, but whether we are to prefer India conquered by the Turk, by the Persian, the Russian, to India conquered by the Briton.
> England has to fulfill a double mission in India: one destructive, the other re-generating - the annihilation of old Asiatic society, and the laying of the material foundations of Western society in Asia.[3]
> (in McLellan, 1978: 332)

Along the same line of argument, Friedrich Engels welcomed the French conquest of Algeria:

> ...the conquest of Algeria is an important and fortunate fact for the progress of civilisation...if we may regret that the liberty of the Bedouins of the desert has been destroyed, we must not forget that these same Bedouins were a nation of robbers...the modern bourgeois, with civilisation, industry, order, and enlightenment following him, is preferable to the feudal lord or to

> the marauding robber, with the barbarian state of society to which they belong.[4]
>
> (in Gallissot & Badia, 1976: 25-26)

Thus, non-European social formations are denied history which they can, nevertheless, join through the self-evident dynamism of colonisation. The argument of Marx and Engels on the 'civilising mission' of colonisation betrays an evolutionary and positivist approach, given that they consider capitalism as a necessary higher stage.

On the other hand, Weber was particularly keen on demonstrating the so-called intrinsic incapacity of 'Oriental' civilisation at inducing capitalism in view of the rigidity of its socio-political structure:

> In the patrimonial state, the typical ramifications of administration and judiciary created a realm of unshakable sacred tradition alongside a realm of prerogative and favoritism. Especially sensitive to these political factors, industrial capitalism was impeded by them in its development.
>
> (in Turner,1978:79)

Weber's analysis of the political and economic structures of Oriental formations (China, India,) as being typically patrimonial complements the argument of Marx and Engels as to the absence of feudalism as a necessary pre-requisite for a subsequent industrial capitalist revolution. What seems to have struck Marx and Weber was the excessive centralisation of administrative structures which they found to be totally at odds with the decentralised and autonomous fiefs of European feudalism. Indeed the large water works developed in India and China were at the root of a strong centralised political and military power, as well as a very large bureaucracy, which caused Marx to talk of 'Oriental Despotism' and Weber of 'Patrimonialism'.

In their discovery that Oriental societies had not developed in the 'evolutionary' fashion that Europe had done, Marx and Weber shared "the view that Oriental societies were socially reactionary and regressive" (Turner, 1978: 77). Although both had operated a sort of 'epistemological rupture' with positivism, Marx with his dialectical development, and Weber with his interpretative sociology, both remained overwhelmingly conditioned by the idea of the inevitability of progress, and the implacable rise of rational, secular industrial capitalism. Indeed, a unilinear construction (of society) is clearly implied in Marx's sequence of class struggles, as well as Weber's idea of rational bureaucracy[5].

Viewing the capitalistic revolution as peculiar to Europe, and as a higher form of social organisation, presents a curious reminiscence of the Comtean stages of the religious, the metaphysical and the scientific. Whilst the Comtean stages purport to be universal, and are to a certain extent oblivious of other cultures, the Marxian and Weberian theoretical positions seem to acknowledge the individual specificities of other formations, but nevertheless to lock them up in a perpetual irrational religious stage, from which they could be salvaged by European intervention.

Marx legitimised the expansion of bourgeois capitalism as a necessary civilising mission:

> The bourgeoisie by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian nations into civilisation. ...It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what calls civilisation into their midst, i.e. to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates

> a world after its own image.
> ...Just as it (the bourgeoisie) has made the country dependent on the towns, so it has made barbarian and semi-barbarian countries dependent on the civilized ones, nations of peasants on nations of bourgeois, the East on the West.
>
> (in McLellan,1978:225)[6]

On the other hand, Weber argued that neither the ethical nor the social economic prerequisites of capitalism could be found in the 'Orient' in view of the contemplative nature of its religious sects, and their lack of asceticism:

> The Occidental sects of the religious virtuosos have fermented the methodical rationalization of conduct, including economic conduct. These sects have not constituted valves for the longing to escape from the senselessness of work in this world, as did the Asiatic communities of the ecstatics: contemplative, orgiastic or apathetic.
>
> (in Gerth & Wright Mills, 1977: 291)

The purpose of evoking Marx's and Weber's views of non-European social formations is to draw attention to the astonishing convergence of hitherto fundamentally different theories of social change. How is it that Marx's 'historical materialism' and Weber's 'interpretative' method could agree so much on the verdict of stagnation and rigidity ascribed to other social formations worldwide? The answer lies in what Igor Kopytoff has called the "social mythology of the observer's culture", which:

> consist(s) of the assumptions and myths about his own society and, by projection, about society in general.
>
> (in Friedland & Rosberg, 1964: 54)

Accordingly, Marx and Weber lived a 'social mythology' heavily permeated by the triumph of capitalism and a sprawling imperialism which shaped their view of the superiority of industrial capitalist organisation, whose rationalism becomes a matter of ethnic and cultural peculiarity.

In his eagerness to see the world hasten its pace towards the communistic millenium, Marx attributed to the 'bourgeois epoch' a unique revolutionizing effect whose expansion was not only desirable but perfectly legitimate:

> The bourgeoisie, historically, has played a most revolutionary part.
> The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. ...It has drowned the most heavenly ecstacies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation.
>
> (in McLellan, 1978: 223)

Marx's admiration for the revolutionary task of the bourgeoisie, which he evidently saw as an objective historical process, had led him to welcome with enthusiasm the colonial and imperialist stages of capitalism. This position ironically brings him closer to structural-functionalist and modernisation theories than to dependency theory, as we shall see below.

Marx's experience of capitalism in Europe led him to project an equivalent process for all societies at large, and thence consider that capitalistic expansion was desirable and necessary for future advancement in all social formations. His description of the role of the bourgeoisie worldwide was clearly positivist:

> The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world-market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. To the great chagrin of Reactionists it has drawn from under the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood. All old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. ...In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and

> narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature.
>
> (ibid : 224-5)

Marx's description of a potential world culture is almost idyllic. This champion of 'dialectical' change seemed to have exchanged the very principle of exploitation upon which his whole theoretical edifice stands, for a conciliatory vision, whereby uniformity is attained, and the contradictions of domination forsaken.

Indeed, it would seem that Marx's sweeping inductions on the uniformisation of capitalism worldwide had cast aside all reference to local and national contexts as living entities with their own social dynamic. Notwithstanding the elaboration of the concept of the Asiatic Mode of Production which helped establish that feudalism was not a universal pre-capitalist feature of all societies, Marx somewhat ignored his own findings and those of Engels and pressed on with the idea of a necessary colonialist intervention as a higher stage for the "barbarian and semi-barbarian" societies. In fact, Marx was true to the nineteenth century European social thought and its predominantly inductivist approach. With regard to the approach of other societies and cultures, no better than the notion of 'Orient' illustrates the stereotypical entities created by this thought, which Marx enjoined:

> We are immediately brought back to the realization that Orientalists, like many other early nineteenth-century thinkers, conceive of humanity either in large collective terms or in abstract generalities. Orientalists are neither interested in nor capable of discussing individuals. ... Similarly, the age-old distinction between "Europe" and "Asia" or "Occident" and "Orient" herds beneath very wide labels every possible variety of human plurality, reducing it in the process to one or two terminal collective abstractions. Marx is no exception. The collective Orient was easier

> for him to use in illustration of a theory than existential human identities.
>
> (Said, 1978: 154-155)

It seems that the same tradition of broad categorisation is being perpetuated in the twentieth century, despite the 'relativist revolution'. It could be found in the huge ensemble of the 'Third World', which is to modernisation and dependency theorists what the 'Orient' was to Orientalists.

1.3. Modernisation and Dependency Theories Reappraised: the False Heirs of Weber and Marx

In their treatment of capitalism and Asiatic societies, Marx and Weber may be considered as the respective pioneers of contemporary theories of dependency and modernisation. Indeed, at first sight Weber's interpretative sociology and his emphasis on meaning rather than causality as well as his insistence on the contingent character of major processes of change[7] directly places him in line with the principles of adaptability and structural autonomy of social systems as claimed by Parsons[8]. On the other hand, Marx's historical materialism based on the dialectical evolution of society (with class struggle as the propellor of change), has admittedly influenced dependency theorists in their endeavour to analyse the causes of 'underdevelopment'. Hence the heavy emphasis on causality and domination within an international, rather than an autonomous national context.

However, there is reason to believe that such unilineal correlations are ill-founded. Indeed, the developments of dependency and modernisation theories will help gauge the extent to which Marxian and

Weberian methodologies have been used in the most *ad hoc* manner. On the other hand, it will be shown that the 'epistemological convergence' between Marx and Weber is again to be found between Marx and modernisation theorists, namely in their advocating 'Westernisation' in lieu of modernisation.

1.3.1. The Two Wings of Dependency: The Search for Independence

The development theory of dependency was first launched by the economists of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) in the mid-sixties. In their endeavour to explicate the persistence of economic underdevelopment in Latin America following World War II, the ECLA group sought it in the international position of Latin America *vis à vis* North American and European capital, rather than in a class struggle either intra-nationally or internationally. Their overall argument is that the expansion of capitalism created a structure of dependence and not of integration of the Latin American economies. Dos Santos summarizes it as follows:

> Dependence is a conditioning situation in which the economies of one group of countries are conditioned by the development and expansion of others. A relationship of interdependence between two or more economies or between such economies and the world trading system becomes a dependent relationship when some countries can expand through self-impulsion while others, being in a dependent position, can only expand as a reflection of the expansion of the dominant countries... .
>
> (in Oxaal et al., 1975: 12)

The position of dependence is understood to be that of an export economy which tends to preclude autonomous industrialisation and manufacturisation. Structures are put at fault rather than the bourgeoisie. The structural nature of dependence and underdevelopment is described explicitely by Sunkel:

> An analytical scheme appropriate for the study of underdevelopment and for the formulation of strategies of development should be based on the concepts of process, structure, and system. It is illegitimate to argue that underdevelopment is a stage in the evolution of a society both autonomous and economically, culturally and politically isolated. On the contrary we postulate that development and underdevelopment are the two faces of the same universal process...and that its geographic expression is translated into two great polarizations: on the one hand the polarization of the world between industrial, advanced, developed, and metropolitan countries and underdeveloped, backward, poor, peripheral and dependent countries; and on the other hand, a polarization within countries in terms of space, backward, primitive, marginal, and dependent groups.
>
> (Ibid: 14)

There are no traces of Marxian analysis in Sunkel's view of underdevelopment and dependence. However, whilst this reformist trend of dependency theory is clearly non-Marxian in its methodology and outwardly non-Marxist in its political stance, the same could not be said, at least immediately, of the more radical outspoken trend of the 'delinkers'.[9] The delinkers amongst dependency theorists sought to enlarge the findings of the early school to other parts of the Third World by demonstrating that underdelopment was actively provoked by capitalist expansion. In this, they not only broke away with the founders of *dependencia*, but also with orthodox Marxism.

> Underdevelopment is not due to the survival of archaic institutions and the existence of capital shortage in regions that have remained isolated from the stream of world history. On the contrary, underdevelopment was and is still generated by the very same historical process which also generated economic development: the development of capitalism itself.
>
> (Frank, 1969: 9)

The process of underdevelopment is alleged to have started in the early days of European mercantilism, especially in Latin-America, and then developed and was further reinforced under colonialism and

imperialism up to the present era which is seen as neo-colonial and imperialist. The plunder of the conquered societies, which Marx welcomed as the 'seed' of bourgeois capitalist revolution in the world, has been denounced by radical dependency theorists as provoking and maintaining an archaic and feudal social economic organisation in the conquered areas. Thus, backwardness, archaism and feudalism were not characteristics which caused underdevelopment, but were themselves caused by capitalism in its colonial and imperialist phase. To put it in the imagery of A.G. Frank, the leading theoretician of radical dependency, underdeveloped areas are "capitalist castles with a feudal facade", where capitalism did not bring about the expected bourgeois revolution in view of the "satellite" position of the dependent society *vis à vis* the long-established capitalist "metropole". Hence, the following hypotheses:

> 1. in contrast to the development of the world metropolis,the development of the national and other subordinate metropoles is limited by their satellite status;
> 2. the satellites experience their greatest economic development and their most classically capitalist development if and when their ties to their metropolis are weakest;
> 3. the regions which are the most underdeveloped and feudal-seeming today are those which had the closest ties to the metropolis in the past.
>
> (Frank, 1969: 9-14)

In view of these hypotheses, radical dependency theorists have prescribed 'delinking' between the metropolis and the satellite as the only way for the latter to develop. They have clearly rejected the positivism of Marx with regard to the 'colonial question' by establishing a new dialectic between exploiter and exploited. One notes for instance the absence of a class analysis in favour of an international market analysis. Instead of the Marxian positive

consequence of the dialectical relation ultimately in favour of the exploited, they put forward a 'negative' dialectic. Accordingly, the exploited can only be freed by the voluntarist action of 'delinking' (rather than through the objective development of the forces of production and the presumed withering of capitalism, as in Marx). Most important of all to the present study is that Marx never sought the independence of the colonised and would not today advise that of the satellite. Instead, we should remember his euphoric pleas for colonial penetration onto formations whom he considered out of the stream of history. Marx's position is in fact astonishingly close to that of modernisation theory usually ascribed to the structural-functionalist school. This is often ignored by radical dependency theorists. For instance, in his scathing criticism of Rostow's 'historical stage approach'[10], Frank said:

> It is explicit in Rostow that underdevelopment is the original stage of what are supposedly traditional societies -that there are no stages prior to the present stage of underdevelopment. ...But all this is quite contrary to fact. This entire approach to economic development and cultural change attributes history to the developed countries but denies all history to the underdeveloped ones.
>
> (Frank, 1969: 18)

Ironically, in using 'historical materialism', Marx had explicitly denied history to the colonies of Britain and France, and enthusiastically called for their Westernisation so that they 'enter history' as it were.

On the other hand, despite its valuable contribution in depicting the dynamics of underdevelopment, radical dependency theory, especially Frank's analysis, fails to "recognise and deal appropriately with the role played by internal factors in the process of underdevelopment,

[making] it very difficult, if not impossible, to devise and formulate more appropriate and effective policy measures for the eradication of the problems with which the underdeveloped countries are beset" (Manghezi, 1976: 30).

In other words, dependency analysts can also be blamed for placing underdeveloped societies on the margin of history by ignoring the dynamics of their internal social structure and the weight of their cultural heritage. Notwithstanding their condemnation of capitalism as a destructive agent, dependency scholars have by the same token elevated it as the principle landmark in the history of pre-capitalist societies worldwide.

1.3.2. Modernisation Theory: Unsuspected Heir of Marx's Ethnocentrism

Establishing a linkage between modernisation theory and Marx could be a farfetched endeavour should one venture to suggest that their approach to social investigation presents similarities. Indeed, the historical premises of the Marxian method, and the avowedly a-historical approach of modernisation and its underlying structural functionalism are a sufficient and potent difference. Suffice it to compare Marx's outlook of social evolution with that of the American tenor of structural functionalsim Talcott Parsons. For Marx:

> The history of all hitherto society is the history of class struggles. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild master and journeyman, in a word oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended either in a revolutionary re-constitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.
> (in McLellan, 1978: 222)

A continuum of social change is embedded in this passage, and an

historical unfolding of successive epochs seems to constitute a central feature of social evolution, thus denoting Marx's holism. This holism is exactly what Parsons rejects. For him:

> Structural analysis must take some priority over the analysis of process and change. ...One need not develop a truly advanced analysis of the main processes of social change in order to make general claims about the structural patterning of evolutionary theory.
>
> (in Hoogvelt, 1981: 50)

The declared a-historicity of Parsons' approach led him to consider society as a system of structures functionally linked to each other in a 'compatible' rather than 'causative' manner. Hence a harmonious evolution of society, which is presumably endowed with a "general adaptive capacity"[11], whereby "social differenciation" is complemented by "integration" rather than settled through conflict. In view of the precedence given to the parts rather than the whole(as in Marx), social evolution occurs by "diffusion" rather than domination or exploitation. The principle of "diffusion" as the process of transmission of social and cultural patterns is important to retain as it becomes the focal point of modernisation theory whereby the attributes of modern society are "diffused" from societies at a higher evolutionary level to societies at a lower one.

Notwithstanding the huge divide between Marxian social theory and that of structural-functionalism, the principle of "diffusion' remains a significant reminder of Marx's view of the missionary role of the bourgeoisie as a 'diffuser' of a world civilisation, that is of a Western one. This is precisely what the proponents of modernisation theory have strived to enforce in the wake of the decolonisation process in the late 1950s and early 1960s, albeit without mention of the role of capitalist expansion. Instead, a dual view of the world was

created; modern and traditional societies; with only the second needing to change by acquiring the attributes of the first. Parsons provided the methodology to distinguish between the two by establishing indices of "modernity" and "tradition". He called his indices "Pattern Variables". The pairing structure of these patterns is supposed to inform us on how a multitude of individuals are supposed to think and behave. C.S. Whitaker interpreted Parsons' dichotomies in the following way:[12]

Context of Action	Tendency of Traditional Society	Tendency of Modern Society
Orientation toward established socio-political institutions, rules, arrangements	Prescription	Innovation
Criteria of role recruitment and allocation	Ascription	Achievement
Criteria of distribution and rewards	Privilege and status	Performance, skill, contribution to objective goals
Quality of official relationships	Diffuse functions, personal loyalty	Specific functions, impersonal loyalty
Sanction of authority	Divine, sacred	Secular
Criteria of membership and participation	Particularistic	Univeralistic

Modernisation theory has adopted this dichotomous vision as the basis of development programmes worldwide whereby all non-industrialised, non-Western societies are 'invited' to become 'modern'. Enthusiasts have suggested that to be modernised is in effect to be Westernised:[13]

> Development will come about only when traditional societies are acculturated by the West - through diffusion of knowledge, skills, values, organisation, technology and capital - until over time its society, culture, and personnel become variants of that which has

> made the North Atlantic Community economically successful.
>
> (in Manghezi, 1976: 20)

We should remember that acculturation by the West had been advocated nearly a century ago by none other than Marx when he referred to the "laying of the material foundations of Western Society in Asia".

Modernisation theory has been criticised for using the Weberian 'idealtype' or logical construct by radical dependency theorists (Frank, 1969) as well as liberal thinkers such as Whitaker who was led to the conclusion that:

> ...The notion of modernisation has involved the conceptualisation of mutually exclusive classes of societies in terms of certain analytical categories, logical constructs, or what Weber called 'ideal-types' - all these being terms for logically alternative principles which the behaviour of people in modern and traditional societies respectively suggests to the mind of an observer. Thus Weber and others all characteristically insist that 'ideal-types' or principles of action they formulated, like all analytical categories or heuristic devices or logical constructs, are not the same thing as reality itself -ie. the actual behaviour of the people concerned. These principles of action supposedly do not, in other words, predict what, in fact, a given people do or will do. Rather, they constitute observations which the mind derives from observing behaviour in an effort to understand its implications. Rather, they constitute observations which the mind derives from observing behaviour in an effort to understand its implications.
>
> (Whitaker, 1970: 8-9)

However, it is argued in the present thesis that modernisation theory has resorted to the device of the 'ideal-type', at least in its Weberian conception, in a travestied manner. As we shall see in the following pages, Weber did not use or intend to use 'logical constructs' in finite dichotomous terms such as modernity versus traditionality. Neither in his constructs of 'traditional and rational authority', did he imply any value-judgement by erecting the latter as

a better state. Each construct is established in its own right and not to exclude the other. Whereas modernisation theory uses modernity and tradition as a finite set of ideal-types, which are not only exclusive of one another, but imply that the traditional is to be superseded by the modern. Hence the birth of the whole conceptualisation of 'development' as the process by virtue of which traditional societies will acquire attributes of modern societies. Since the 'inception' of the concept in the 'Third-World' thirty years ago, the evolution of social processes has been as manifold as the societies and cultures which constitute the 'Third-World', thus refuting the uniformity of 'development' theorising, be it of the left or the right. Hoogvelt made a pertinent remark about modernisation theory, which could be extended to dependency theory. He concluded that:

> ...the formal subject of modernisation theories has never been social change in general, but rather the processes of social change whereby less developed societies become more developed. In other words, modernisation theories have always had a teleological concern with social change.
>
> (Hoogvelt, 1981: 53)

Hence the misuse of 'ideal typical constructs' into value-ridden stereotypes.

In the light of modernisation and dependency theories, the problem under investigation in the present thesis would be construed in a somewhat tautological manner as suggested earlier in this Chapter. Whilst the 'modernists' would blame traditional social organisation alone for the continued marginalisation of women, the champions of 'dependency' would incriminate the satellite position of Algeria and Tanzania in the world economy. Accordingly, solutions to the problem are thus predictable: establish close links with the West so as to

emulate it as in modernisation; or cut ties with Western capitalist metropoles by 'delinking' as in dependency.

Parsons has for instance advocated a Westernisation of the elites of 'underdeveloped areas'[14] through:

> ...The building up, under the 'umbrella' of government, of a strong highly educated and ...technically trained class of people whose primary social status is bound up with occupational careers of the modern type and who thus come to be dissociated from any traditional elite groups in their society. It must in some sense be a functional equivalent of the Western 'middle class'.
>
> (Parsons, 1960: 127)

The 'dissociation from traditional elite groups' is precisely what has not happened after thirty years or so of such remedy in most 'underdeveloped areas'. On the contrary, 'traditional' elites in Algeria and Tanzania have a significant influence on the new 'modern Western elite' as will be shown through the position of women. On the other hand, to suggest that members of the Westernised elite themselves will be automatically and mechanically alienated from the traditional one is a completely unfounded assumption. If anything it betrays a mechanistic determinist approach which has greatly underestimated the dynamics of local social forces in each particular national context of the 'Third World'. And this is what has been omitted from both modernisation and dependency theories:

> Indeed, the fever of historical developments seems to have gripped so many minds that decades have been spent in articulating trans-historical laws and documenting evolutionary universals, stages, and trends, instead of focusing on a discrete range of phenomena to discover the scope, the tempo and the rate of change of specific societies.
>
> (Hermassi, 1975: 3)

The continued marginalisation of women in Algeria and Tanzania, despite the promise of egalitarianism of the official socialist discourse,

therefore calls for a less inductivist and positivist analysis than that provided by modernisation and dependency theories.

1.4. A Second Identification of the Problem

1.4.1. Holmes' 'Problem(solving) Approach'[15]

The appeal of Holmes' approach lies in the rigorous grasp of the 'social problem', when he suggests that the latter arises as a consequence of 'asynchronous change':

> ...for the purpose of analysis it may be assumed that a change (or innovation) can occur in any societal aspect and the task of intellectualisation involves identifying both the change and relevant (and perhaps relative) no-change.
>
> (Holmes, 1975: 89)

The 'change/no-change' notion helps single out the 'asynchrony' and thus formulate what was a broad social issue into a 'problem'. The advantage of such 'intellectualisation' lies precisely in the 'focusing on discreet phenomena' of social change, and consequently promises to break away from 'historicist' interpretations such as those of dependency or modernisation. Social change is not necessarily seen as inevitable or occurring in a given direction, but rather may be contingent. On the other hand, the outcome of change is not 'determined by universal laws of social development' but by specific social conditions. Ample room is thus given to the dynamics of local social forces in contexts involving extraneous agents of change such as colonialism, imperialism or neo-colonial development (such as post-independence nation-building). However, the changes examined in Algeria and Tanzania in the present study present an interesting combination of contemporary as well as historical exogenous factors of social change, overlooked by dependency and modernisation theories in

view of their obsession with the capitalist Western 'moment' in global history.

It is important to point out that the Holmesian methodology is not a theory of social change, as it is primarily concerned with educational issues. However, Holmes is careful to distinguish between issues related to education, and problem-identification in terms of a problem approach analysis of change/no-change in the political, economic, social and cultural sectors.

Holmes suggests that change may occur in any part of the 'institutional, normative or environmental' patterns of society and that several changes are likely to happen. He also points out that "problem-analysis demands that no-change be identified in relation to change" and adds that "for this purpose, it is useful to assume that a particular innovation has been introduced into a static social context" (Holmes, 1975: 89). At this point, it is important to draw a distinction between the instrumentality of the notion of the 'static social context' and the inductivism of the notion of the 'static traditional society' imprinted upon all non-industrial social formations by modernisation theory. It seems that the Holmesian 'static social context' is methodologically expedient, and once the asynchronous change is identified, one has to take into account the dynamics of the 'innovated recipient'. Whereas modernisation methodology takes 'statism' as an intrinsic feature of the object of innovation, (ie. traditional society).

The distinction is of some significance for the present investigation as the processes of nation-building undertaken in Algeria and Tanzania suggest the introduction of a comprehensive innovation; that of national re-construction following decolonisation, and socialist construction as a societal programme; by national political elites. The 'static social context' is roughly that of a neo-colonial socio-economic structure; ie. a poor industrial and manufacturing infrastructure, widespread illiteracy, and a scant written and literary culture.

Following the Holmesian analysis, the innovations which have been taking place since the early 1960s in Algeria and Tanzania have involved a whole process of policy 'formulation, adoption and implementation' which is far from uniform. Normative changes, which obviously inform policy formulation and adoption, do not necessarily "imply that new... values have been successfully allocated or adopted widely" (Holmes, 1975: 91). On the other hand, institutional change "may necessitate behavioural change" so that institutions are run efficiently. However, behavioural change remains controversial as it "does not necessarily follow normative or institutional innovation". Its difficulty lies in its delineation, given that behaviour implies residual beliefs, or what Mallinson (1957) has called "deeply held sentiments", and Myrdal "lower valuations" (Holmes, 1975: 91). The notions of 'residues', 'deeply held sentiments', or 'lower valuations', can be a valuable asset since they promise to help apprehend the so-called 'resisting, traditonal'social actors. Holmes suggests that "some understanding of the success (or failure) of the political process of allocating new or modified values may be gained by comparing

normative, institutional and behavioural changes" (Holmes,ibid : 91).

In Algeria and Tanzania, the innovations have mainly concerned the normative pattern with the formulation of 'specific socialism' as the official ideology, and the institutional one with the creation of a variety of economic, social and cultural structures. Education in both cases has attracted particular attention as a socialisation process in the allocation of new values. These have by and large been informed by the models of 'individual, society and knowledge' broadly designed in the official ideological rhetoric of Algeria and Tanzania. The models roughly provide for a centralised socialist organisation of society (predominance of state-run economic, social and cultural institutions); a socialistic and community-minded individual (as opposed to capitalistic individualism); and modern technologically oriented knowledge. The underlying assumption of the innovations contained in these models is that both male and female individuals are considered equal as they are granted the same constitutional rights as citizens of the state to which they owe allegiance. For the bulk of the population in Algeria and Tanzania, this was probably one of the most revolutionary innovations of all, as a great majority of people are still informed by models of individual, society and knowledge which, by an large, consecrate two different social statuses to men and women. More detailed accounts of these will be given later. Suffice it to note at the moment that women's status is still largely determined by their predominant domestic role of procreators, rather than by their productive role emphasized by the new values.

1.4.2. Weber's 'Ideal-type' versus Modernisation's 'Ideal-reality'.

In proposing to draw models of 'individual, society and knowledge', Holmes relied on Weber's 'ideal-type' or 'logical construct'. Given the controversial use of the device by modernisation theory in the dual patterns of the 'traditional' and 'modern' society, it is worth trying to distance the Weberian conception of the ideal-type from that of modernisation. Indeed, the latter postulates characteristics of traditionality and modernity, and proceeds to capture an awesome variety of societies in them. Weber's construct on the other hand seems more flexible and even more *ad hoc*:

> The theoretically constructed types of conflicting 'life orders' are merely intended to show that at certain points, such and such internal conflicts are possible and 'adequate'. ...Such constructions make it possible to determine the typological locus of a historical phenomenon. They enable us to see if,in particular traits or in their total character, the phenomena approximate one of our constructions: to determine the degree of approximation of the historical phenomenon to the theoretically constructed type. To this extent, the construction is merely a technical aid which facilitates a more lucid arrangement and terminology.
>
> (in Gerth & Wright Mills, 1977: 323-4)

Thus Weber's 'ideal-type' was meant to refer to a rational and logical construction, which does not render reality, but instead helps to simplify and classify it. Gerth and Wright Mills adequately pointed out that Weber:

> ...felt that social scientists had the choice of using logically controlled and unambiguous conceptions, which are thus more removed from historical reality, or of using less precise concepts, which are more closely geared to the empirical world. Weber's interest in worlwide comparisons led him to consider extreme and pure cases. These cases became 'crucial instances' and controlled the level of abstraction that he used in connection with any particular problem.
>
> (ibid: 59)

The degree of abstraction recommended by Weber does not seem to have been attained in modernisation theory which takes 'modernity' and

'traditionality' to be 'realities' of two kinds of societies. Furthermore, modernity is so heavily permeated with the attributes of Western society that it becomes the 'ideal reality' envisaged by 'traditional societies'.

Another major drawback of ideal-types is the tendency to misuse them as cliches:

> There is a danger that they may be used to stereotype individuals and ascribe to all of them the same personality traits and behavioural characteristics.
> (Holmes, 1981: 112)

Holmes also points out the danger that 'ideal-types' will be taken to correspond to reality, when they clearly do not, and should not, given the complexity of reality. Nevertheless, they remain:

> necessary if we are to compare extremely complex situations, analyse certain problems and in particular if we are to compare the aims, hopes, expectations and attitudes of individuals and organised groups in different societies. It may be assumed that they simplify some constituents of national character but they should not be used to stereotype the behaviour of citizens of a nation-state.
> (ibid.: 112)

The Parsonian dual 'pattern variables' of 'tradition' and 'modernity' seem to stereotype behaviour through the dichotomous pairs of 'prescription vs. innovation; ascription vs. achievement; diffuseness vs. specificity; particularism vs. universalism'. Consequently they imply stereotypical psychological dispositions and traits of all individuals of the 'modern' or 'traditional' society'.

In this thesis, the ready-made set of 'tradition vs. modernity' is rejected. Instead 'ideal-types' are made 'context-specific' and are

largely related to the problem under investigation as advised by Holmes (ibid: 121-122).[16] Indeed, in order to comprehend the continued marginalisation of women in Algeria and Tanzania (partly in relation to illiteracy given that in both countries social mobility is more and more determined by educational attainment), an ideal typical normative model of the discourse of 'specific socialism' should be drawn. The purpose of the exercise is to work out likely inconsistencies inbuilt in the discourse, as well as "examine national policies to see how far they are consistent with the most general normative statements and normative laws" (ibid: 118).

However, the discourse of 'specific socialism' rests on more general normative statements. The documents reviewed in this thesis disclose an eclectic discourse based on universal tenants of Fabian socialism; or what Engels called 'utopian socialism'; and more local philosophical and religious traditions (Islam in Algeria and tribal communitarianism in Tanzania). Thus, from the 'actual pattern' of specific socialism as contained in official contemporary rhetoric, we should delve into the more 'pure types' of socialist philosophy on the one hand, and local traditional philosophies on the other hand.[17] Their respective views of 'individual, society and knowledge' might help us analyse points of incongruity which have given rise to the problem of women's marginalisation, and anticipate future outcomes of policy solutions. On the other hand, in the instances of Algeria and Tanzania the constitutional and legislative translations of the societal programme of 'specific socialism' constitute important elements of change. They have however, unleashed the response of a variety of social actors in

the process of formulation, adoption and implementation. As Holmes stated:

> Agreement on aims and policies established in legislation and an overt willingness of individuals to work towards their achievement do not guarantee that appropriate institutions are established or that the psychological traits of individuals will ensure that whatever institution is set up will be run in a way that will ensure that the aims of policy are achieved.
>
> (ibid :129)

However, in Algeria and Tanzania, to the difficulty of the gaps between policy adoption and policy implementation, is added the fluctuating legitimacy of policy formulation, masked by an aura of political unanimity. Indeed, behind the facade of the one-party state and the decision-making process, lie unsuspected and thriving conflicts between different social protagonists of change and no-change. In order to identify them, logical constructs have been resorted to for two main reasons: firstly, in order to avoid entering into the endless debate on whether there are social classes in the Marxian sense in non-capitalist social formations such as Algeria and Tanzania;[18] and, secondly, so as to elaborate 'context-specific' social categorisations more likely to correspond to the local social dynamics. Such constructs will be largely inspired from Germaine Tillion's study of women's social position in the societies of the Mediterranean basin.[19] A more detailed account of Tillion's analysis and the constructs will be given in Chapter 3. But it is important to mention here that the models of the main social protagonists in the change/no-change process were specifically devised for the present research and are therefore completely instrumental. At the risk of being maverick, they nevertheless present the advantage of helping circumscribe the Holmesian 'asynchrony' between stated aims of egalitarianism for women

(new norms), and opposition to them in the form of residual behaviour informed by older norms. Above all, the Tillion models will act as useful catalysts for the unsuspected inconsistencies of the agents of change, and the significant role of the agents of no-change, especially in relation to women's social position.

NOTES: CHAPTER 1

1. Cf. Articles 39, 41 and 42 of Algeria's Constitution (1976); and the Preamble to Tanzania's Interim Constitution, (1965) amended in 1972. See the bibliography for the full references.

2. Marx/Engels, Textes sur le colonialism, Moscou, édition en langues étrangères. This is an undated compilation of their writings on the British colonisation of India, and Algeria's occupation by France.

3. Marx K., The Future Results of British Rule in India, excerpts of the 1850's journalism period, in D.McLellan, Karl Marx: Selected Writings, Oxford University Press, 1978, p. 332. Emphasis added.

4. Engels F., wrote this in the London daily The Northern Star, Vol. XI, 22 Jan. 1848, no. 535, p. 7. Cf. Gallissot R. & Badia G., Marxisme et Algérie: Textes de Marx et Engels, 10/18, Paris, 1976, pp. 25-6.

5. In their compilation of Weber's sociological writings, From Max Weber, Routledge and Kegan Paul 1977, Gerth and Wright Mills suggested that although Weber had explicitly rejected linear evolution in European history, he nevertheless noted the implacable rise of rationalism and secularism, op. cit., p. 51.

6. Marx K., "The Communist Manifesto", in McLellan D., Karl Marx: Selected Writings, Oxford University Press, 1978, p. 225

7. Weber M., The Social Psychology of the World Religions, in Gerth & Wright Mills, op. cit., pp. 45-74.

8. Parsons T., & Shils E.A., Towards a General Theory of Action, Harvard University Press, 1966. See also Parsons' The Social System, Glencoe, Ill., 1957.

9. The 'delinkers' in dependency theory have been particularly prolific in demonstrating that 'underdevelopment' was caused by capitalist penetration, in Latin America and Africa. The most renowned spokesmen of the delinking formula are Immanuel Wallerstein, Giovanni Arrighi, Andre Gunder Frank and Samir Amin. See in particular Wallerstein's The Capitalist World Economy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979; Arrighi's The Geometry of Imperialism, Schocken, London, 1978; Amin's Le Développement Inegal: essai sur les formes sociales du Capitalisme Périphérique, Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1973. Frank will be quoted at length below in this chapter. Consult the bibliography for his references.

10. Rostow had devised a five-stage process of modernisation to be followed by all 'traditional' societies. His motivations were primarily ideological and political, his concern being to counteract the communist influence in 'developing' areas. See his Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, Cambridge University Press, 1971.

11. Parsons quoted in Hoogvelt A.M.M., The Sociology of Developing Societies, The MacMillan Press, London 1981, p. 12.

12. Whitaker C.S.(Jr.), The Politics of Tradition: Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria 1946-1966, Princeton University Press, 1970, pp. 8-9.

13. See for example Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East, New York, 1958.

14. See Parsons T., Structure and Process in Modern Societies, Glencoe, Ill., 1960, in which he devoted a section to the analysis of "The Problems of Underdeveloped Areas", pp. 116-131.

15. Brian Holmes' approach constituted an interesting rupture in the methodological tradition of Comparative Education in the West (Europe and North America). Since its early days (19th century) as a systematic study of educational issues, Comparative Education concentrated on 'Cultural Borrowing' between different national educational systems. It was marked by a strong 'emulative' tradition (see Holmes, 1981: 19-35). By opposition, Holmes drew attention to the importance of "initial conditions" in situations of cultural borrowing, and thus devised his 'problem-approach'. Inspired from Dewey's philosophy of 'reflective thinking' and Popper's 'hypothetico-deductive' method, Holmes' method is par excellence a pragmatic one. A complete account of it can be found in his Problems in Education: A Comparative Approach, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965; and highlights of it in his Comparative Education: Some Considerations of Method, George Allen and Unwin, London 1981, as well as Some Considerations of Method in Comparative

Education, a series of student seminar papers prepared under a SSRC Personal Research Grant in 1974-1975, University of London Institute of Education.

16. In order to draw an 'ideal-typical normative model', Holmes stresses that "In selecting from a wealth of sources the research worker should have in mind concepts of reliability and validity, his particular 'problem' and the context (or contexts) in which he intends to analyse it and the policy solutions offered to the 'problems'"(Holmes, 1981: 122). This is vastly different from the ready-tailored models of traditonal and modern societies. Holmes adds that the researcher should take into account the : "1. spatial context, 2. historical dimension, 3. contemporary scene, 4.social change, 5.policy aims, 6.implementing policy, 7.economic/political considerations." ibid.

17. Holmes distinguishes between 'pure' and 'actual' types that is between general philosophical sources and their modification (as in constitutions and legislation). See his Problems in Education, op.cit., pp. 57-58.

18. The controversy of the class analysis will be examined in Chapter 3.

19. Tillion, G., Le Harem et les Cousins, Le Seuil, Paris, 1966.

CHAPTER TWO: THE RATIONALE OF 'SPECIFIC SOCIALISM'

The notion of 'specific socialism' adopted in the present study to describe Algeria's and Tanzania's official political ideology has not been encountered in the literature on either country. Many a study on Algeria and Tanzania has been concerned with the 'construction of socialism' in each context,[1] but not with the nature of the official discourse. As a result, subsequent contradictions of socialist policies in Algeria and Tanzania have been interpreted as a 'betrayal of the socialist cause', especially by radical scholars.[2]

In this Chapter, the 'betrayal thesis' will be examined and rejected, in favour of an internal reading of the official rhetoric of socialism in Algeria and Tanzania. This latter will help disclose a clear rejection of 'scientific socialism', and an emphasis on a specific brand of socialism, mostly inspired from local socio-cultural traditions. Hence the notion of 'specific socialism'. Extracts from Algeria's Charte Nationale (1976), and Nyerere's Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism (1968,1978) will be used as illustrations for the argument.

2.1. Socialism: National, Islamic, African, Universal but not Marxian

A careful reading of the discourse of 'specific socialism', as illustrated by official rhetoric in Algeria and Tanzania, shows above all a persistent emphasis on the 'authenticity' and endogeneity of socialist practices. Nyerere affirmed in *Ujamaa*, (the first blueprint he produced for independent Tanganyika in 1962), that:

> We, in Africa, have no more need of being converted to socialism than we have of being taught democracy. Both are rooted in our own past - in the traditional society which produced us. Modern African socialism can draw from its traditional heritage the recognition of society as an extension of the basic family unit.
>
> (Nyerere, 1968: 6)

The ideologists of the Algerian Charte Nationale, for their part point out that:

> Socialism in Algeria does not proceed from any materialist metaphysique, neither is it attached to any dogmatic conception alien to our national genius. Its engineering is identified with the emancipation of Islamic values which constitute a fundamental element of the personality of the Algerian people.
>
> (Charte Nationale, 1976: 23)[3]

and:

> Socialism in Algeria is neither an arbitrary option nor an imported system thrown onto the inert body of the Nation; it is rather a dynamic process whose roots go back to the struggle of national liberation, a process intimately linked with the renascent nation and its future.
>
> (ibid: 24)

One cannot fail to note that the socialist options of Algeria and Tanzania are clearly a national endeavour which purports to legitimise socialism by virtue of local norms and values. Socialism is intimately intertwined with national and cultural identity. For the Algerians, it even becomes a necessary corollary of national liberation and national reconstruction in the 'Third World':

> Socialism appears to be a process adjacent to the process of national liberation. It is characterized by a feature of internal necessity which, favours its development in the minds and confers upon it an authentic mark. It is from this adherence to the national ego that socialism has extracted the secret of its vitality in the Third World.
>
> (ibid: 25)

Thus, there seems to be an organic link between the choice of socialism as a societal programme and the struggle for national liberation:

> In the conditions of newly-independent countries, socialism is not external to the nation; it is identified with its organic development. The future of the socialist revolution in the Third World, will be increasingly tributary of a creative national thought which will be transformed, in a dialectical manner, into a socialist thought. Thus, for any Revolution to be socialist, it should primarily be national, and for any national Revolution to be consequent, it should necessarily lead up to socialism.
>
> (ibid: 27)

The corollary of the 'organic' national component of socialism in Algeria and Tanzania interestingly implies the rejection of any attempt at establishing an orthodox socialistic message such as that of 'scientific socialism' as embodied in Marxism-Leninism for instance. This is how Nyerere put it:

> We are groping our way forward toward socialism and we are in danger of being bemused by this new theology, and therefore trying to solve our problems according to what the priests of Marxism say is what Marx said or meant. If we do this we shall fail. Africa's conditions are very different from those of the Europe in which Marx and Lenin worked. To talk as if these thinkers provided all the answers to our problems, or as if Marx invented socialism, is to reject both the humanity of Africa and the universality of socialism.
>
> (in Mazrui, 1978: 178)

Less polemically, the Charte Nationale deems it necessary to hint to orthodox 'scientific socialists' that:

> Socialism is not a religion, it is a theoretical and strategic weapon which takes into account the reality of each people and therefore implies the rejection of all dogmatism.
>
> (ibid: 23)

However, belying the demarcation from a 'dogmatic' socialism is the rejection of the class conflict analysis inbuilt in 'scientific socialism', according to which socialism is to be considered as:

> ...the necessary product of the struggle between two classes produced by history, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Its task did not consist in building a social system as perfect as possible but rather to study the historical development of the economy which engendered these classes and their antagonism; as well as find in the economic situation thus created the means to resolve the conflict.
>
> (Engels, 1971: 88)[4]

At this point it is pertinent to contrast Engels' view of socialism as the 'objective' result of the exacerbation of class conflict (in conditions of capitalist exploitation), with that of the Charte Nationale and Nyerere.

In his usual polemical mood, Nyerere explains that it is precisely the conflictual nature of what he calls 'European socialism' which he rejects:

> ...As prayer is to Christianity or to Islam, so civil war (which they call 'class war') is to the European version of socialism - a means inseparable from the end. Each becomes the basis of a whole way of life. The European socialist cannot think of his socialism without its father - capitalism!
> Brought up in tribal socialism, I must say I find this contradiction quite intolerable. It gives capitalism a philosophical status which capitalism neither claims nor deserves. For it virtually says, 'Without capitalism, and the conflict which capitalism creates within society, there can be no socialism'! This glorification of capitalism by the doctrinaire European socialists, I repeat, I find intolerable.
>
> (Ujamaa, 1968: 11)

In a less polemical tone, the Charte Nationale explains that:

> ...socialism in the newly-independent countries could not abide by the same conditions prevalent in industrialized countries where, a sizeable working-class faces no oppression other than that of its own capitalist class.
>
> (ibid: 26)

It continues to argue that 'capitalist exploitation' in the 'Third World' has been mediated by colonialism and consequently:

> has not brought about the formation of a working class, but rather produced the accelerated pauperisation of the peasant masses, the ruining of their traditional economy, without providing the alternative lay-out of industrialisation.
>
> (ibid)

Consequently, the Charte Nationale suggests that the class conflict analysis is not tenable in 'Third World' countries. Neither is the proletariat to be reckoned with as the guarantor of the advent of socialism. But instead, one should count on social forces such as "the mass of poor peasants, workers of the cities and national revolutionary cadres" (ibid: 27), to bring about socialism. This denial of the existence of a proletariat is by the same token a subtle rejection of the Marxian conflict analysis. In this, the Algerian official ideologues betray the predominance of the unitarian nationalist norms which inform them, and which they have inherited from a long tradition of anti-colonial struggle.[5] In conditions of national struggle, as indeed in conditions of national reconstruction and state structuration, national elites strive to be seen as a natural alliance of 'progressive' social forces.

For his part, Nyerere rejects the term 'class' altogether as alien to African etymology, so strong is his aversion to the conflictual underpinnings of the concept:

> African socialism, on the other hand, did not have the 'benefit'of the Agrarian Revolution or the Industrial Revolution. It did not start from the existence of conflicting 'classes'in society. Indeed I doubt if the equivalent for the word 'class'exists in any indigenous African language;...and the idea of 'class'or 'caste' was non-existent in African society.
>
> (Ujamaa, 1968: 11)

Instead:

> ...Both the 'rich' and the 'poor' individual were completely secure in African society. ...Nobody starved either of food or human dignity, because he lacked personal wealth; he could depend on the wealth possessed by the community of which he was a member. That was socialism. That is socialism.
>
> (ibid: 3-4)

And as if to exorcise the body of 'African' socialism from any alien import, the *Mwalimu* [6] created a special term for the designation of socialism in Tanzania:

> *Ujamaa* then or 'Familyhood' describes our socialism. It is opposed to capitalism which seeks to build a happy society on the basis of the exploitation of man by man; and it is equally opposed to doctrinaire socialism which seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of inevitable conflict between man and man.
>
> (Ibid: 12)

As for the Charte Nationale, the natural cradle of 'the socialist revolution' in Algeria is to be found in Islam. For:

> Islam,...entertains no links with any particular vested interest, or specific clergy, or any temporal power. Neither feudalism nor capitalism can claim to proceed from it. Islam has presented the world with a superior conception of human dignity... . Its intrinsic egalitarianism can find expression in any era.
>
> (Charte Nationale: 21)

Thus, a careful reading of either the Tanzanian, or Algerian official rhetoric on the formulation of socialism, suggests that there is a forceful claim for a 'specific socialism' characterized by:

1. its organic link with the anti-colonial nationalist struggle;
2. its unitarian injunctions and the denial of class divisions;
3. its 'authentification' with a pre-colonial social order (presumably egalitarian) which requires a simple revival of its intrinsic values and attitudes.

This maverick mixture of revolutionism and reformism is indeed rather bewildering, as it confers an aura of transcendence to the pre-colonial social order, and by the same token renders it a-historical. The staunch rejection of scientific socialism on the one hand, and the appeal for the reform of an allegedly pre-colonial socialistic organisation of society, on the other, does not only betray an emotional assertion of a recovered identity. It is also the expression of world views different from the evolutionary positivist conception of absolute progress which came in the footsteps of Western domination. Instead of advocating an unconditional triumph of progress, due to an accumulative pattern of social organisation, these world views render progress tributary of a transcendent past. What the Algerian and Tanzanian rhetorics seem to advocate is the retention of a unitary cosmos, found in Islam in the case of the Algerian formula, and in communitarian familyhood in the case of Tanzania. Both share a non-materialist view of the universe, and insist that it should inform the models of individual, society and knowledge of their proposed societal programmes. Essentially, both view the individual as tributary of the community, with specific roles for men and women; society as based on social solidarity; and knowledge as pragmatic, progressive but

not infinite.

In effect, they reject European socialism as part of the Western legacy which had generated capitalism. Indeed, Weber had shrewdly observed that both capitalism and socialism alienated the individual:

> ...Weber rejected what he regarded as the utopian belief of certain socialist philosophies that public ownership of the means of production would eliminate alienation and exploitation. The scale of economic operations under socialist conditions would intensify the process of bureaucratization which had been set in operation by capitalist economies.
>
> (Turner, 1974: 152)

One recalls at this point Nyerere's condemnation of what he called 'European socialism' as being the heir of capitalism, and his rejection of it. In fact, at the core of the discourse of 'specific socialism', is an implicit refusal to abandon community allegiances for impersonal ones. For, in that case:

> ...there are no longer any natural or inevitable boundaries for an individual's life. Maturity no longer means that an individual has mastered the lore and wisdom of his tribe or society; it means rather that an individual has been overtaken by the ever growing stock of knowledge.
>
> (ibid: 153)[7]

This is precisely the kind of 'individualism' which seems to be rejected by Algeria's and Tanzania's 'specific socialism'. For this would entail disharmony in what is seen as the 'congenial brotherly' body of social solidarity. But most significant of all, it would break 'familial harmony', by conceding to women absolute freedom to act as individuals, and not merely as agents of reproduction.[8]

Finally, the notion of specificity in Algeria's and Tanzania's formulae of socialism is a convenient reminder of the monolithism of their political and cultural opinion, a powerful deterrent to political dissent or cultural schism. This contrasts with the tendency in 'modern society' towards pluralism, the underlying reason being that:

> The progressive development of science and the increasing specialization of all fields of knowledge give rise to countless world-views and interpretations of reality, but precisely because these interpretations are infinite, they cannot lay claim to any absolute value.
>
> (ibid)

It is precisely this 'need' for absolute value that the Algerian and Tanzanian discourses hint at when they express recognition of the pre-colonial norms. The aura of transcendence given to the pre-colonial cultural values as valid for all periods, represents in a way the 'absolute value' Turner refers to. Indeed, one may argue that the emphasis on local values, as parameters of cultural identity, has been put forward as a shield against the multiplication of 'world-views and interpretations of reality'. For the national-unitarian political regimes of Algeria and Tanzania, this would mean the acceptance of political and cultural plurality.

Thus, the reading of Algeria's and Tanzania's rhetoric of 'specific socialism' discloses a clear demarcation from orthodox 'scientific socialism'. But it has been seriously misread by radical critics of both countries.

2.2. Radical Disenchantment: a Misreading of 'Specific Socialism'

The processes of post-colonial nation-building in Algeria and Tanzania have, more often than not, caused some consternation amongst students of both countries. This has been translated into a confusing delineation of the nature of the decision-makers in each context. The bewilderment has indeed been fed by the normative statements of wholistic societal programmes aiming at the construction of socialism in Algeria and Tanzania. The eclectism of these statements has often been overlooked, especially by left-wing scholars who hastened at first to give support to the experiments, but then soon denounced them as revisionist, when they did not respond to the canons of 'scientific socialism' (Chaliand, 1964; Humbaraci, 1966; Clegg, 1971; Raffinot and Jaquemot, 1977 for Algeria; Shivji, 1978; von Freyhold, 1977 for Tanzania).

In endeavouring to understand why 'genuine' socialist transformation (ie. scientific socialism) was not favoured by decision-makers in Algeria and Tanzania, such students resorted to a class analysis as most were interested in the political economy of each country. Interestingly enough the similarity of the verdict is rather striking. The core of the argument can be summarised as follows: Algeria and Tanzania are not practising socialist policies, but capitalistic ones in view of their connivance with international capital and the exclusion of workers and peasants from the decision-making processes. The two regimes are at best populist and demagogical, and are led by a bureaucratic class, which is more of a 'bourgeoisie' rather than a 'revolutionary avantguard'. The "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" of Tanzania

(Shivji) and the "state bourgeoisie" of Algeria (Raffinot & Jacquemot) have allegedly been practising state capitalism rather than socialist construction. Each is considered as a class which has formed in the shadow of state structuration, as an heir of a dispersed and weak petty bourgeoisie on the morrow of independence (Shivji, 1978: 63; Raffinot &Jacquemot, 1977: 121). Each typically includes political officials from the state, party and army as well as the state-run economic structures such as national companies or parastatals, and the higher echelons of the civil service (ie. ministries). Each is supposedly an 'exploitative' class as it seeks to extract the surplus product of workers and peasants for its own reproduction. Its use of the state as the sole proprietor of economic and public institutions is considered but a legal and formal device

> to occult the real nature of the system of appropriation and affectation of the means of production and social surplus product, that is a capitalist system.
> (Raffinot & Jacquemot, 1977: 120)

Such class analysis presents a number of pitfalls. The most outstanding of which is the confusion it has thrown on the very Marxian concept of 'bourgeoisie' which does not incorporate the state, except in the sense of its use by the bourgeoisie as a superstructure and not as an infrastructure. On the other hand, it is important to remember that the bourgeoisie in the Marxian sense, was born of the antagonism with a feudal class which presumably preceded it, and was based in its formation on the privatisation of the means of production. In fact no better than Marx himself explained the process of this formation. Thus:

> Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses this distinctive feature: it has simplified the class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat. From the serfs of the Middle Ages sprang the chartered burghers of the earliest towns. From these burgesses the first elements of the bourgeoisie were developed.
>
> (in McLellan, 1978: 222)

Not only has no such process been taking place in Algeria and Tanzania, but neither 'proletariat' nor 'feudalism' as landmarks in the history of the bourgeoisie, appeared in the history and social structure of these two societies. No trace of a dialectical relationship is to be found there between either feudal nobility and bourgeoisie or between bourgeoisie and proletariat. Indeed, in each context, pre-capitalist structures were 'tribal' and not feudal, and the state of manufacture has hardly brought about the formation of a proletariat as described by Marx.

Significantly enough neither proletariat nor feudality are mentioned by the advocates of the 'state' or 'bureaucratic' bourgeoisie, but rather, they refer to 'workers' and 'peasants' which depict social categories rather than theoretical concepts. Indeed, they cannot render the social dynamics embedded in the Marxian concepts of 'proletariat' and 'feudalism'. On the other hand, Marx makes it clear that the state is indeed used by the bourgeoisie as "a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie" (Ibid: 223), but it is far from ruling it, as is the case of the so-called state or bureaucratic bourgeoisie. Last but not least, what is described as bourgeoisie in Algeria and Tanzania does not <u>own</u> the means of production (*a sine qua*

non condition in Marxian theory) but 'disposes' of them (Coulson, 1982: 322). But above all, what casts doubt on the theory of the state and bureaucratic bourgeoisie, is the disregard for the origin of its members:

> The mode of access to this class is a secondary question; what is decisive is the existence of a frame of bourgeois practices and vested interests which are organised around the consolidation of capitalist social relations.
>
> (Raffinot & Jacquemot, ibid: 121)

Such disregard for the process of elite recruitment is precisely what is lacking in this particular class analysis, which has distorted both Marx's careful historical analysis, and the specific conditions of local social formations. The expedient urge to squeeze these latter into existing paradigms seems to have taken over the theses of 'state' and 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie'.

The processes of nation and state building in Algeria and Tanzania have been taking place in the specific conditions of post-colonial socio-economic contexts. These have been inherited from disintegrating pre-capitalist structures and embryonic modern structures of a colonial kind. This has meant by and large that neither 'traditional' society was dead and buried, nor 'modern' society was established. The transitional nature of the above processes is important to retain in order to avoid the inductivism and positivism witnessed in the 'state' and 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' type of analysis.

On the other hand, the normative statements of socialist construction in Algeria and Tanzania have obviously eluded critics of both experiences. As seen earlier, these statements unmistakably reject

socialism as understood by their radical critics. Furthermore, the discourse of 'specific socialism' in Algeria and Tanzania has never been a strict and rigorous blue-print; rather it has followed a pragmatic itinerary.

2.3. 'Specific Socialism': An Expandable Discourse

As seen above, the notion of 'specific socialism' in Algeria and Tanzania has not only appeared as a natural corollary of nationalism (ie. of the anti-colonial struggle); but also, and maybe more significantly, as a rejection of 'scientific socialism', and the assertion of pre-colonial values. In both cases, the insistence upon an authentic origin of socialism is almost an obsessive preoccupation. It is interesting to follow the evolution of the socialist discourse in Algeria and Tanzania both prior and after independence. In both cases, the socialist option has been swinging between radical and reformist-liberal moods, instead of following a consistent linear development.

2.3.1. Algeria's Socialist Triangle: Nation, State, Islam

The contemporary history of political ideology in Algeria discloses that there was hardly mention of socialism in the early texts which accompanied the national uprising since 1954.[9] There was, however, a repeated stress on the social and democratic nature of the anti-colonial struggle. Reference to revolution could be found in all documents and declarations, but this was portrayed as 'popular revolution'. One of the earliest references to socialism was made, rather significantly, in one of the most comprehensive and critical documents on the national struggle and the role of the FLN (Front de

Liberation Nationale): Le Programme de Tripoli adopted in June 1962.[10] The document was indeed uncompromising in its denunciation of the "feudalistic, paternalist, and petit-bourgeois"[11] attitude of the FLN which it accused of not making provisions for a *projet de société* (or societal programme) for Algeria beyond the nationalist period. The severe criticism of the lack of a clear ideological choice by the FLN leadership reflected the internecine power struggle between the old nationalists to whom national independence was paramount, and who were attracted to an undefined liberal reconstruction of the country, and a younger generation of radical members of the party who had in fact been summoned to write the programme (Harbi, 1964; Quandt, 1969).

Following independence in 1962, references to socialism became more frequent, and a radicalisation of official rhetoric emerged in favour of a discourse of 'socialist reconstruction'. The explicit reference to socialism was laid out in the two most important documents of the early independent Republic: the 1963 Constitution, and the 1964 Charte d'Alger. Although the two documents did not fail to mention Islam as the state religion, the sharp analysis of Algerian society contained in the Charter and the provisions of the Constitution, betrayed strong left-wing Marxian inclinations. Indeed, it was the period when the internecine struggle was raging between radical left-wing elements of the political elite who were not all necessarily Marxists, but advocated radical reforms of the political and socio-economic structures, and more conservative elements who were in favour of a more liberal line (Lacheraf, 1976: 291-304). The aggravation of the conflict between the two civilian groups, scattered between party and government, hastened the intervention of the army in the 1965 coup led

by Col. Boumediene, who became subsequently Algeria's President until his death in December 1978. The intervention was not in order to promote a particular group, but it proved to be harsher on the left-wingers whose nationalism was doubted. The move was partly the result of a mounting technocracy anxious to enforce state and economic efficiency.

On the other hand, the emphasis on the specificity of Algerian socialism, especially under Boumediene's administration, was also a genuine expression of the still overwhelming hold of nationalism on the polity as well as civil society at large. The legitimation of the unifying character of the national struggle, so closely linked with the spirit of resistance of the Islamic faith, was certainly not to be forsaken in favour of a socialism based on class struggle and secular values. Concrete experience with the French communist movement during the war of liberation[12] had been sufficient proof that 'scientific socialism' was not prepared to support national struggles. Rather it gave priority to the metropolitan class struggle, the outcome of which would presumably bring about the communistic millenium.

Following the death of Boumediene, and the discreet dismantling of his all powerful technocratic team who masterminded Algeria's industrialisation (to the detriment of agricultural development), the new team in power was not so keen on continuing on the path of a centralising socialism. Its almost immediate task was to discredit the inefficiency of heavy industry projects and encourage intermediate and smaller industries (Benissad, 1982). However most significant of all, there was a new emphasis on the encouragement and contribution of the

private sector, especially in the economic sphere. The legitimation of these shifts can be found in the amended Charte Nationale of 1986.[13] One cannot fail to detect the lower key position given to socialism in this new blueprint. Instead, there is a clear emphasis on the 'necessity' to promote the private sector of the economy on the one hand, and a stronger reassertion of Islam on the other.

With regard to the new emphasis on the private sector in the economy, one can sense the pressures of entrepreneurial groups, who ironically started burgeoning under the Boumediene administration, and who were now powerful enough to lobby the central administration. However, the most striking amendments of the Charter, are its ideological priorities. Indeed, a sharp emphasis on the paramount position of Islam is now patently made. It is understood that Islam is part of the wider developmental process, and should inspire the 'socialist construction' of society. This is a significant difference from the 1976 Charter, which refered to Islam in relation to the "socialist revolution",[14] whilst the revised document links it to the "exigencies of the century",[15] and requires that "Islamic thought should be directed towards the solution of problems of the present epoch".[16] This sharper emphasis on Islam as an active component in the development process, is the deed of the advocates of more 'authentic' policies which would take into account the Arab-Islamic heritage of Algerian society. Yet, fundamentalism is certainly not their motto, but rather the establishment of Islamic values as the regulators of modernity.

Thus, the discourse of specific socialism in Algeria seems to have followed a rather irregular development, from the early vague populist

and social declarations of the national struggle in the mid-fifties, to the radical analyses of independence in the early sixties which presented socialism as paramount. A mixture of radicalism and populism appeared under the technocratic era of Boumediene, and seemed to have struck a balance between nationalism and authenticity, from the mid-sixties to the late seventies, only to be followed by a liberalising tone which tried to moderate a rising puritanism of a cultural and religious nature.

At no point in time has socialism been questioned as a fundamental societal programme, but the emphasis on its national specificity has legitimised progressive and conservative claims alike, as will be seen in Chapters 3 and 4. However, the only steady development has been that of the Islamic component which became more and more articulate over the years, to the point of representing the main trait of specificity. Indeed, it seems at present to be the most cogent and coherent argument in defining specificity, which for a long time contained nationalist and populist undertones of a more secular nature. The margin of interpretation allowed specificity in the dominant discourse has, interestingly enough, represented a forum for the expression of a wide spectrum of opinions at odds with the official rhetoric, especially those emanating from more conservative quarters.

2.3.2. Tanzania: The Uncertainties of *Ujamaa*.

As in Algeria, the development of the discourse of 'specific socialism' in Tanzania followed an irregular path, switching from vague nationalist populist declarations, to more radical wording, and finally to more liberalising tendencies.

When first created in 1954 to lead the process for independence, TANU (Tanganyika African National Union) relied mainly on a programme of social reforms in its provisions for political independence, achieved in 1961. The Constitution of TANU was mainly concerned with redistributive policies of the national product (Bienen: 1967) as well as with the 'Africanisation' of the political sector. The wording of socialism in Tanganyika at this time was not very different from that of 'African Socialism', based on African pre-colonial values, as formulated elsewhere by Senghor in Senegal. This brand of socialism was 'excommunicated' by Khrushev who threatened that "if they [Senghor and Nyerere] fail to understand that there is only one form of socialism, we will reject them".[17]

However, even within the realm of African Socialism, no clear formulation of Tanzanian socialism was made before 1967, when Nyerere issued the Arusha Declaration.[18] The declaration seemed to come as a response to previous failures in Tanzania's social and economic policies. These policies were made in an *ad hoc* manner and were based mainly on the incentive of economic growth which allowed for different tendencies to appear. Strings were being pulled between advocates of re-distributive ideas and state control of the economy, and those of economic growth based on private enterprise. The two economic plans[19] which preceded the Arusha Declaration remained ambiguous as to what economic vocation Tanzania should be given, industrial or agricultural. On the political front, the 1964 mutiny[20] and the 1966 student demonstrations[21] represented significant protests which precipitated Nyerere's opting for a clear formulation of Tanzanian socialism. Thence the Arusha Declaration and the developmental formula of

Ujamaa Vijijini rural socialism), which provided for a more systematic societal programme as envisaged by Nyerere.

The Declaration was to represent a watershed in Tanzania's post-independence history, since it expressed for the first time a clear definition of the Tanzanian brand of African Socialism. This was to be based exclusively on rural development, within a modernised framework of traditional African communalism with the creation of cooperatives and villages. In the long term it aimed to achieve economic 'self-reliance' and put an end to Tanzania's dependence on foreign aid and foreign imports. The Arusha Declaration, and *Ujamaa Vijijini* were nevertheless belied by an intense power struggle between ideologists and bureaucrats of the party, and the technocrats of the government who had to implement the new societal programme.[22] As will be seen in the following Chapter, the actual implementation became a matter of bureaucratic zeal versus the latent resistance of the would-be beneficiaries of *Ujamaa* (ie. the peasants). The latter refused to become totally dependent on the new bureaucratised process by retreating into subsistence production. As a response to this kind of resistance, the authorities expedited the 'villagisation' of the peasants and had to have recourse to more coercive means such as the displacement of families. Accordingly, millions of people were displaced between 1973 and 1977.[23] The move marked also a new era in Tanzanian socialism, which had to be revised so as to pave the way to more liberal economic policies, as drought and lack of capital stretched the country's resources to their limit.

The seventies and early eighties were to prove very trying for the specificity of Tanzanian socialism, especially for its utopian reliance on pre-colonial values of egalitarianism, and communitarianism. As in Algeria, the margin of specificity was either directly opposed by radicals as revisionism, or discreetly used by more conservative trends to legitimise their resistance to the sprawling effects of modern state control which could only deprive them of their autonomy and encapsulate them within its mechanisms of surplus extraction. Yet again, specificity was seized upon by the more liberal trends so as to reinforce the private enterprise sector, both national and foreign.[24] As in Algeria then, the discourse of *Ujamaa* found itself at odds with its specificity as this latter was used by those very tendencies which the dominant elite tried to whittle down in order to establish the new order and discipline of modernity. However, the development of the official socialist discourse did not follow a gradual linear development, but rather oscillated between an early independence national-populism, between 1961-1967, to more radical social-populism and elements of socialism in the period 1967-1977. With Nyerere's assessment of the Arusha Declaration: Ten Years After (1977) came the first hints at economic liberalisation. But, as in Algeria, there was no denigration of specific socialism, only an appeal for its reform in order to meet the demands of incessant world crises.

It is interesting to note the similarities in the line of development of Algeria's and Tanzania's rhetorics of 'specific socialism', marked by their unpredictability, and mixture of *ad hoc* and wholistic measures. The above brief expose of the development of Algeria's and Tanzania's official rhetorics of specific socialism is meant to shed

some light on the social forces, which by their interaction have marked the adjustments of the ideological discourse.

The emphasis on specifity can be seen as a legitimation device used by the political elites so as to avoid alienating a variety of groups, and provoking their outright opposition. Hence Nyerere's view of *Ujamaa* as consensus, and consultation. The 'talk until you agree' formula is certainly meant to eschew opposition outside the existing structures, and frameworks of expression. In Algeria, on the other hand, the aura of sacrality still surrounding the 'revolutionary legitimacy' of the nationalist struggle makes it difficult to stray away from the unitarianism of the official discourse. Hence, the stability of both political regimes for the last twenty years, and the persistence of their unifying, albeit eclectic ideological discourses. Or should one say because of their eclectic discourses? Indeed, the contention herein is that this relative stability is belied by internecine tensions and conflicts which the margin of specificity allows for. Given that discontent cannot be channelled outside the official structures in view of the one-party system, it has, more often than not, been voiced and legitimised in the name of specificity, which, by and large, has been brandished by conservative tendencies in view of its easy identification with authenticity. In examining the evolution of the official rhetoric of specific socialism in Algeria and Tanzania for the last twenty years, one is tempted to probe further the interplay between the various social forces involved in the societal project of modernity to which the elites of both countries are committed. A review of these interactions will be made in the following Chapter.

NOTES: CHAPTER 2

1. We can distinguish two main types of academic interpretations of the Algerian and Tanzanian socialist experiences. The first focuses on political institutions and is dominated by 'liberal' political scientists such as Quandt, W.B., Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria 1954-1968, the M.I.T Press, 1969; Bienen, H., Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development, Princeton University Press, 1967. The second are those of radical scholars such as Cliffe, L. and Saul, J. (eds.), Socialism in Tanzania: An Interdisciplinary Reader, Politics, Vol.1, East African Publishing House, Nairobi, 1972, and Vol.2, Nairobi, 1973; Shivji, I.J., Class Struggles in Tanzania, Heinemann, London 1978; von Freyhold, M. Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania: Analysis of an Experiment, Heinemann Educational Books, 1979; Chaliand, G., l'Algérie est-t-elle socialiste?, Paris, Maspero, 1964; Humbaraci, A., Algeria: A Revolution that Failed, London, Pall Mall, 1966; Clegg, I., Workers Self-management in Algeria, Allen Lane, London, 1971; Raffinot, M. & Jaquemot, P. Le capitalisme d'état algérien, François Maspero, Paris, 1977.

2. The 'plurality' of socialist formulae has been strongly condemned by dependency theorists. Cf. Amin S., Arrighi G., Frank A.G., Wallerstein I., Dynamics of Global Crisis, The Macmillan Press Ltd., UK, 1982.

Frank sees that:

> Independent national development in the Third World has proved to be a snare and a delusion; and self-reliance ...is a myth. ...These political compromises of the avowedly revolutionary socialist ...are another measure of the ideological crisis of the left in the face of the present world crisis. Therefore, as the world crisis

> generates further political stress in the Third World, new populist movements, increasingly based on nationalism and religion are likely to emerge.

See his article "Crisis of Ideology and Ideology of Crisis" in op. cit., p. 143. As for Amin, he blames in the same venue "socialist and national liberation movements" for being:

> incapable of criticising the petty-bourgeois state mode of production, of understanding the implications of de-linking and of the worker-peasant alliance in the transition... . As we can see, the peoples of the periphery are responding in their own way to this impasse: by popular uprisings and the renewal of traditional ideologies.

See his article "Crisis, Nationalism, and Socialism" in op. cit., p. 228. In pointing out the re-emergence of 'traditional ideologies', these conclusions do not however admit that they have their own autonomous dynamics, as it is suggested in the present research.

3. This extract and subsequent quotes from the Charte Nationale are this author's translations.

4. See note 1 in the Introduction.

5. The anti-colonial struggle, in its political form, started in the 1930s. It was marked by a passionate debate on the nature of the Algerian nation, between the national secularist trend led by Messali Hadj who identified the Algerian nation with modern colonial times, and Sheikh Ibn Badis, leader of the reformist religious movement, who identified it with the wider Arab-Islamic sphere, be it historically or politically. At stake was the rejection of France's assimilationist policies by virtue of which Algeria was to become part and parcel of France as a 'departement'. For a poignant account of the nationalist

struggle, consult Mostefa Lacheraf, Algerie: nation et societe, Maspero, Paris, 1965.

6. *Mwalimu* is a term of endearment used to designate Nyerere. It also means teacher in Kiswahili and refers to Nyerere's early career as a teacher in the early 1940s.

7. The notion that knowledge is infinite has been strongly criticised by Muslim scholars. The broad characteristics of Western epistemology as described by Turner, have been rejected as 'insane' by al-Attas:

> Can one be judged sane and coherent who contemplates some matter, and at the same time recognises something else entirely different from what is being contemplated and who says something again quite different altogether, who hears different sounds and sees yet again different things? ...such a condition is maintained by the encouragement and elevation and legitimization of doubt and conjecture as epistemological tools of scientific enquiry. The Holy Qur'an repeatedly repudiates such methods, branding them contraries of knowledge.

See his article "Preliminary Thoughts on the Nature of Knowledge and the Definition and Aims of Education", in al-Attas (ed.), Aims and Objectives of Islamic Education, Hodder and Stoughton, Jeddah, 1979, p.21. His fears as a scholar usefully rationalise for us those held by politicians with regard to the multiplicity of opinion, at least in the Muslim world.

8. See the discussion of Algeria's and Tanzania's family laws in Chapter 4.

9. Textes Fondamentaux du Front de Libération Nationale (1954-1962), Ministère de l'Information et de la Culture, Dossiers Documentaires, no. 24, Janvier 1976.

10. The programme was adopted in Tripoli (Libya) by the *Conseil Nationale de la Révolution Algérienne* June 1962, and contained guidelines for the "construction of the popular and democratic revolution". Independence was declared a month later on 5 July.

11. Textes Fondamentaux, op.cit., pp. 38-39.

12. The French Communist movement hesitated to support the liberation struggle in the colony, and was condemned in a renowned document entitled *Le Communisme Absent* . The criticism appeared in the Plate-Forme de la Soummam, the second most important document after the Proclamation du 1er Novembre 1954, the call for the war of liberation. The Soummam Platform was issued on 20 August 1956, to put forward the position of the FLN in the struggle for national liberation, op. cit., p. 15.

13. The National Charter of 1976 has been replaced by a so-called "enriched" version (*enrichissement de la Charte Nationale*) in January 1986, following a national debate and referendum. Cf., La Charte Nationale, Journal Officiel de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Année 25, no.7, 16 Fevrier 1986.

14. Front de Libération Nationale, Charte Nationale 1976, Editions Populaires de l'Armée, 1976, p. 21.

15. Charte Nationale, op.cit. p. 109.

16. Ibid, p. 111.

17. The declaration was made at Bucharest in May 1963, cited in Rene Dumont & Marcel Mazoyer, Socialisms and Development, Andre Deutsch, 1973, p. 143.

18. The Arusha Declaration, in Uhuru Na Ujamaa, Freedom and Socialism, by Julius K.Nyerere, Oxford University Press, 1970, pp. 231-251.

19. The Tanzanian authorities had launched a 3-year plan for 1961-1964, and a 5-year plan for the period 1964-1969.

20. In January 1964, Nyerere called in British troops to crush a military coup attempt.

21. In October 1966, students demonstrated in Dar es Salaam against the introduction of the National Labour Service destined to enroll them in developmental 'manual' programmes. It could be argued that the attitude of students was one of the apparent reasons which triggered off the radicalism of *Ujamaa* which was to appear a year later in the Arusha Declaration.

22. See J. Hartmann's unpublished Ph.d thesis "Development Policy-making in Tanzania 1962-1982: a Critique of Sociological Interpretations", University of Hull, April 1983. Hartmann argues that

three political organs are involved in policy making, the Party, the Government and the Presidency (with special reference to Nyerere's charismatic role). More often than not deep rifts have marked the process as the militantism of Party members clashes with the liberalism of Government technocrats, with the President playing the 'referee'.

23. See Chapter 3.

24. Hartmann, op. cit. chapters 2 to 8.

CHAPTER THREE: SPECIFIC SOCIALISM AT ODDS WITH SPECIFICITY

As seen in the previous Chapter, the rationale of 'specific socialism' was above all characterised by the identification of socialistic ideals with indigenous values of egalitarianism. These, according to official rhetoric, were embodied in Islam in Algeria, and 'tribal communitarianism' in Tanzania. However, the discourse of 'specific socialism' is also a societal programme of 'nation building' and 'modernisation' of both state and civil society in Algeria and Tanzania. It marks the entry of these two countries in the world economic, political and cultural arena as decolonized nation-states: hence, its eclectism or 'synthesism' of pre-colonial values and post-colonial 'universal' ideals of modernism and progressivism as embodied in 'science and technology'.

However the wide ranging spectrum of values covered by 'specific socialism' may present some difficulty at the level of policy implementation, as it is expected to legitimise two world-views, be it in Algeria or Tanzania. It will be argued in the present Chapter that the rationale of 'specific socialism' constitutes not only a 'normative inconsistency' in attempting to reconcile values of different if not opposite time scales, but it is also a recipe for the enforcement of conservative and traditionalist claims (in matters of social control for instance). The normative ambiguity of 'specific socialism' will be best rendered by the process of institutional change whereby the efficiency of the latter is dependent on corresponding attitudes and mental states. How can 'specific socialism' secure them

when it legitimizes at the same time the attitudes and mental states of other epochs?

In order to facilitate the answer, models of the social protagonists at play in Algeria and Tanzania are drawn. These are by and large meant to represent the two main conceptualisations contained in 'specific socialism': the local and the universal.

3.1. Citizens versus Cousins and Brothers-in-Law: the perennial saga of change/no-change.

The societal programmes of Algeria and Tanzania based on a specific brand of socialism have been the product of a nationalist elite laying down a normative conception of the good society, man and knowledge. A shared basic normative statement has been the emphasis on the engineering of a 'modern, progressive society, man, and knowledge' with the retention of elements of the 'traditional good society'. That is one embodied in the pre-capitalist and pre-colonial social organisation and cultural values.

A process of 'modernisation'[1] has thus been formulated, adopted and implemented, with the condition that it should not operate a rupture with 'tradition' but rather 'revive' it. The idyllic image given the latter in the official rhetoric can be very misleading, as it is not corroborated by sociological findings. Instead, it is the result of emotional apologia for a mythical order, albeit a natural post-colonial response to the colonial experience. It is also misleading on another account. The celebration of a 'mythical' traditional order conceals the survival of 'real' traditional norms which continue to inform the

world-view of ordinary people as well as members of the political elite. And these norms do not always answer the idyllic canons of the mythical traditional society of the official rhetoric. This is what the 'modernising' polities of Algeria and Tanzania have seriously disregarded. It will be argued that they have unwittingly paved the way to the reinforcement of conservative social trends, thus putting socialism at odds with 'specificity'. Indeed, the apparent acquiescence of civil society faced with a forceful polity (determined to win the battle of 'development'), is largely due to the monolithism of the Algerian and Tanzanian political systems. But 'people' have many a way to express discontent or opposition as will be shown in this Chapter.

An orthodox pattern of analysis of 'modernity versus tradition' would have disclosed a modernising trend at the one end of the line of change undergone by Algerian and Tanzanian societies, and a resisting, conservative, traditional one at the other end. However, in view of the ambiguities of the official normative discourse of 'specific socialism', one is tempted to consider normative inconsistencies within the rhetoric, and not only a 'lag' between theory and practice. With regard to the position of women in the rhetoric of specific socialism, it is pertinent to use ideal typical models of 'tradition' and 'modernity' which would not present them as totally dichotomous (as in modernisation theory). This would help establish an interaction between the two.

The pattern is drawn from the study of Germaine Tillion[2] on the persistence of women's marginalisation and domestication in Mediterranean society despite the dominant rule of:

> modern governments which have not hesitated to issue legislation in order to try and associate the female half of the population. In vain. Resistance of the milieu has constantly been stronger than the law.
>
> (Tillion, 1966: 21-22)

Tillion's study is an anthropological investigation into the correspondence between a certain type of society based on "tribal endogamy" and the "lowliness of the feminine condition" (ibid: 13). She argues that women have been debased throughout human history, but their subjection has been most consistent in the historical societies whose survival was tributary of the retention of the familial and tribal patrimony, be it agricultural or pastoral. These societies happen to have been established along the stretches of the Mediterranean, and throughout the pastoral areas of Asia Minor, reaching as far as Japan in the Far East. According to Tillion, such a society, which she calls the "Republic of Cousins", has mainly survived through the retention of its women thanks to the institution of the "endogamous marriage" within the patrilineal line, so as to prevent women from inheriting, and thus avoid the atomisation of the tribal patrimony. This society, she claims is in sharp contrast with the so-called "savage society" so often described by anthropologists as based on the 'exchange of women', ie. on 'exogamy'[3]. The practice of the exchange of women has made the 'savage'society a "Republic of Brothers-in-law" (ibid: 8-10), whereby familial and tribal intra-marriage is strictly forbidden. However, as in the endogamous 'Republic of Cousins', women had no better or higher status in the exogamous 'Republic of Brothers-in-Law', be it patrilineal or matrilineal[4].

The 'Republic of Cousins' is also in opposition with a third republic of immediate interest to the present enquiry. That is the "Republic of Citizens", namely the modern and modernising republic, which nowadays "extends from Peking to New York" (ibid; 8). The 'Republic of Citizens' has flourished with the establishment of "structured states" (ibid) and:

> ... if we consider that the whole world is divided into States, and that big cities have proliferated and extended, we may admit that the "republic of citizens" is probably an unavoidable step in human evolution.
>
> (Tillion, 1966: 23)

The model of the 'structured state' is what has characterised the socio-economic and political developments of Algeria and Tanzania as 'new nations-states' since Independence in the sixties. The societal programme put forward by their respective elites is that of a universal 'Republic of Citizens'[5] whereby:

> men and women are free individuals, equal to their fellow men and women, reasonable and only accountable to the state as sole regulator of social life;
>
> society is based on exchange and mobility of its members, who are treated equally regardless of sex, since the market economy 'frees' individuals as labour force;
>
> knowledge should be scientific and progressive and open to all, it should encourage technological subjects so as to help society develop, and man be rational.

Needless to say that in the Algerian and Tanzanian 'Republics of Citizens', one is bound to find a mixture of the good man, society and knowledge ranging from the eighteenth century European Enlightenment, to the Marxist-Leninist model. All these basically represent derivations of the 'Universal Modern Model', whereby individuality, secularity, and rationality are paramount features. However, members of

the 'Republic of Citizens' in Algeria and Tanzania have shown hesitation in as far as a total adherence to the 'episteme' of the West was concerned. The discourse of 'specific socialism' showed that they prefered to recourse to their own traditional episteme. This hesitation has been dictated somehow by the 'Republic of Cousins' (Algeria) and the 'Republic of Brothers-in-Law" (Tanzania) whose conceptions of man, society and knowledge may be summarized as follows:

> men and women are subordinated to a corporate community, with clear cut distinctions of sex roles; status of individuals is based on sex, age and experience rather than talent and expertise;
>
> society is egalitarian in the sense of its members sharing the total labour product. It is not equal in the sense that there is a strict hierarchy between the sexes and ages. Society is reproductive more than it is productive in the sense that it is based on subsistence economy, and does not produce a surplus;
>
> knowledge is the reproduction of past experience, and the result of a particular, pragmatic approach and not of systematic scientific investigation. It is not rational but spiritual, is magically or religiously induced.[6]

The above synopsis of the conceptions of 'man(woman), society and knowledge' in the three 'Republics' are certainly informed by different sources, but they are presented here in a general form so as to grasp their rationales. They will be further illustrated in the more detailed analysis of social interaction in Algeria and Tanzania, later in this Chapter. Suffice it now to present them as alternative paradigms of 'modernity' and 'tradition'. They interest the present enquiry because they suggest a historical development of different agents of social change. The purpose behind their adoption is to highlight significant and relevant imports other than those of the colonial and post-colonial era, and not to give a chronological account of the various historical experiences in Algeria or Tanzania. Above all, they suggest that

'modernity' and 'tradition' are part of an incessant process of change/no-change.

3.2. Algeria's 'Republic of Cousins'

The 'traditional' society of Algeria can be easily assimilated to Tillion's 'Republic of Cousins' since Algeria belongs to the historical-geographical area covered by Tillion's investigation. The latter focused on the Mediterranean basin, with a special emphasis on societies of North Africa and the Middle East. The practicality of the model lies in its reference to the position of women. Thus, instead of drawing an extensive descriptive picture of the area's social structure and 'superstructure', one is informed about them through one particular aspect (ie. women's position).

The crux of Tillion's model deals with the marginalisation of women within a cause and effect paradigm between "tribal endogamy and the subjection of women". It is not concerned only with structural features, but with the evolution of structures as well:

> Indeed, it is not in the institutions but in the manner in which they evolve that I have perceived a contradiction or, ...a conflict. And the 'hiding' of women seems to me to result directly from this conflict. ...The "conflict" in question seems to be the product of a chronic 'frustration', of a habitual 'aggression' to which the organism, - herein: society - responds by a 'defense posture'.
>
> (Tillion, 1966: 23)

Tillion refers for instance to the multifarious and repeated aggressions that Mediterranean society has been subject to from time immemorial. Hence the development of a conservative defence mechanism which, "sucks back these societies into a dead past, instead of thrusting them into the future and the unknown " (Tillion: 24). It was

for fear of losing its autonomy and its reproduction that the 'Republic of Cousins' had developed structural mechanisms which would protect it from more universally-oriented types of social organisation. And it is in this sense, that the 'Republic of Cousins' had been tightening its grip on women's mobility. For instance, Tillion argues that the features of the domestication of women in Muslim North Africa have been simplistically attributed to the Islamic doctrine. If anything, it was in the process of resisting the 'universalistic' claims of the Islamic religion that the customs of the North African 'Republic of Cousins' became more rigid, especially in the treatment of women.[7] Hence the veiling of women, their disinheritance, and imposed marriages. However these should be seen instead as customary practices of the 'Republic of Cousins" which we can still witness today. Rather than stemming from Islamic dictates, they coincide with a number of structural developments, which Tillion classifies as follows:

1. The veil coincides with the city: "Muslim women wear the veil only when they dwell in the cities; rural women go round unveiled" and "the veil regresses in the cities but progresses in villages" (ibid: 25).

2. Endogamy means nobility: "Nobility, for the Maghrebians, is in relation with marriage between cousins of the paternal line; ...one is nobler when descending from a pure endogamous family" (ibid: 25). This explains the practice of forced marriage which affects mainly young women, while again, Islam insists on the explicit agreement of the woman or the rejection of the offer.[8]

3. Women inherit where tribes have been destroyed: "...women's inheritance destroys the tribe. The whole tribal structure relies on the impossibility, for an outsider to claim lineage of the ancestor, and to acquire a part in the familial patrimony" (ibid: 26-27). Indeed, if women were to inherit or be married to outsiders, their part in either case would go to the husband's side. In this case, Tillion explains that "To avert the danger, the Maghrebians have combined two systems of protection: disinherit all the girls (that is violate the Koranic law) and marry them systematically to kin members of the paternal line" (ibid: 27).

4. The destruction of tribes coincides with devotion: as seen above, following the Islamic prescription of women's inheritance would mean devotion, but also the end of the tribe. The 'Republic of Cousins' faced the following dilemma: either save the tribe by violating devotion to Islam, or abide by the Qura'nic law and consequently cause the distintegration of the tribe. However, the first alternative was chosen as testified by the survival of tribal organisation throughout the medieval and Ottoman periods. Even European colonial aggressiveness failed to undermine[9] customary practices but rather had to accommodate them.

5. Girls are veiled only where they inherit: "it is as if women, by acquiring inheritance rights, - that is by acquiring economic power - lose disposition over their own person" (ibid: 28). A paradoxical result indeed, when it is commonly thought that economic autonomy entails power, or at least self-determination. But not so in the North African 'Republic of Cousins' which creates the veil when conceding inheritance to women.

Tillion sees a common thread to these five 'coincidences' in the following manner:

a. Religious fervour imposes female inheritance;

b. Female inheritance destroys the tribe;

c. The destroyed tribe admits strangers;

d. The fathers then veil their daughters, so as to keep them for the family's sons... .

(Tillion, 1966: 29)

Thus Tillion's demonstration implies that Islamic teachings in North Africa are by and large principles conducive to a 'Republic of Citizens', and not as generally thought to a 'Republic of Cousins', which incidentally has circumvented Islamic precepts on women's treatment for fourteen centuries. In fact, the implementation of Islamic injunctions was bound to break apart the tribal system while it erected cities and dynasties, and created new allegiances to a central government headed by a *Khalifah*,[10] a temporal ruler more than a spiritual one. It also broke through the reproductive subsistence barriers of the tribal system by establishing trade routes, and an

extensive tax system. For this it needed a layer of middlemen and government officials to carry out the task of tax collection, and thus established a hierarchical order. This new political, social and economic organisation of an expanding empire threatened the closed world of the endogamous, self-sufficient, egalitarian tribal system of North Africa. The seventh century Arab conquerors were bringing no other than a typical 'Republic of Citizens' to impose onto the 'Republic of Cousins' of North Africa. Subsequently, the ideal normative and institutional patterns of the 'Universal Islamic Republic' were likely to clash with the actual normative and institutional patterns of the North African 'Republic of Cousins'. More interestingly, they were to develop into travestied expressions of the ideal patterns following interaction with local customs, so much so that today most students of Islam talk about 'orthodox' and 'popular' Islam.[11] The first is considered a higher form, whilst the second accommodates a variety of customs and beliefs legitimised in the name of Islam, but remain alien to the body of its teachings and scholarly traditions. In Algeria, this is well illustrated by the 1930s 'religious' reformist movement of the *Ulamaa* of which more later.

3.2.1. Ibn Khaldun on the Maghrebian 'Republic of Cousins'

The best testimony on the meagre structural changes brought in by the Islamic expansion is to be found in the writings of the fourteenth century Muslim historian Ibn Khaldun, renowned for his systematic study of 'Maghrebian' medieval society.[12] Ibn Khaldun was concerned with the repetitive pattern of rising and falling dynasties of medieval Islam, and particularly of North Africa, which, in the making seemed to evolve according to a cyclical process. Lack of space in the present research

prevents us from expanding on Ibn Khaldun's theory of society. Suffice it to note those of his observations which help corroborate Tillion's hypothesis on the survival of the 'Republic of Cousins' in the very midst of the Muslim empire.

First of all, Ibn Khaldun draws attention to the dominance of the tribal structure, and the role of tribes in the seizure of political power. According to his pattern, it was the rural tribe, *badw* which invaded the city, *hadhar* (a term which can be translated into 'civilisation'). The complex structure of the *hadhar* is alleged by Ibn Khaldun to lead to the weakening of blood ties and the *esprit de corps* or *assabiyya* needed for the retention of power. On the contrary the austere, and puritan way of life of the rural tribes enhances their *assabiyya* thus helps them covet and seize political power. However, the new triumphant tribe, which was most of the time a federation of tribes, established in the city and became 'civilised' in its turn, in the sense that it espoused an urban way of life whose refinement, Ibn Khaldun argued, was bound to undermine its *esprit de corps* . After "three generations and five phases" (Ibn Khaldun, 1965: 112-115) of urbanite prosperity, the now loosened dynasty established in the city was in its turn overthrown by a new warrior-tribe, and the cycle went on.

It is essential to understand that the concept of *assabiyya* evolves around kin and lineage, (ie. around a biological conception of cohesion guaranteed by close blood ties). Hence the preference for the endogamous marriage, and the conception of "honour and nobility [as resulting] only in the absence of mingling" (Ibn Khaldun, ibid: 71).

Ibn Khaldun's description of political change in fourteenth century Maghrib goes beyond the descriptive stage to propose a theory of social change. His cyclical model of rotative rather than cumulative change helps shed some light on the resisting mechanisms of the 'Republic of Cousins' in North Africa, and the inability of the Islamic empire to undermine such mechanisms. If anything, the empire's 'universalistic' claims seemed to have been absorbed by the North African 'Republic of Cousins' and transformed into 'particularistic' ones. Suffice it to remember that for the lay observer, women's subjection in the Islamic areas is automatically attributed to the very philosophy of Islam and its cosmogony. Whereas Tillion's research very helpfully unveiled the structural reasons for such a subjection (ie. the pastoral-nomadic and segmentary nature of social organisation in the Mediteranean basin, the Middle-East and Asia-minor, and the ensuing practice of endogamy as detrimental to women). The Islamic empire could expand the faith, but could never tame the tribes. For Islam itself emanated from one of the centres of the segmentary, pastoral-nomadic society prevalent in the Arabian peninsula. Whilst the Islamic doctrine provided a 'universalistic' and 'individualistic' rhetoric, it did not upset the autonomy of the tribal order which is at the core of pastoral-nomadic and segmentary society (ie. the 'Republic of Cousins').

As Gellner put it, Ibn Khaldun's major contribution was to teach us (in the case of medieval Maghrebian society) that "the preconditions of civilisation and of cohesion are mutually antithetical" (Gellner, 1981: 88). Accordingly, in order to remain cohesive, the North African 'Republic of Cousins', which was by and large a segmentary, pastoral-nomadic society, rejected all that was susceptible to incur

'civilisation' in the Khaldunian sense. In fact, it strove to retain its autonomy *vis á vis* the city and the state. It never allowed the city to extort from it a surplus, but rather acted as a consumer of artisan goods which it could not produce. It is yet again Ibn Khaldun who informs us about the unorthodoxy of the pastoral segmentary society:

> Note that they [the Bedouin] need the townsmen for the necessities of life, while the townsmen need the Bedouin only for conveniences and luxuries. The Bedouin thus need the cities... . As long as they remain in the *badiya* [the countryside] and do not found a monarchy, they will need the townsmen.
>
> (Ibn Khaldun, 1965: 100)

As Gellner said, "this is an astonishing statement to European ears"[13] and indeed to all ears used to the widespread pattern of the cities' dependence on rural surplus. Another paradox is that in view of this exclusively consumer position, Bedouin society did not have to modify profoundly its social organisation, despite its dependency. This is mainly due to its political rebelliousness to any central authority, such as a state or a city-state, which would encapsulate it into a system of taxation, and political hierarchy. Two fundamental antitheses of its deeply ingrained egalitarianism.

This was the 'Republic' which defied the Roman one, outdared Islam by turning a deaf ear to its 'feminist' claims on women's right to inherit, took refuge in the solidarity provided by its customary and religious practices in the struggle against colonial rule, and is today trying to resist the edicts of a 'democratic and popular republic',[14] especially where women's rights and family regulation are at stake. Can one conclude therefore that it is a conservative republic

par excellence ? Or has its conservatism been developed in the wake of its struggle (defence mechanisms) for its autonomous existence as Tillion tried to suggest?

So far, the model of the 'Republic of Cousins' has been built largely on the characteristics of pre-capitalist North African society, as part of a socio-cultural and geographical whole where endogamy was a dominant practice. Contrast has been drawn between this model as typifying the 'traditional' pastoral-nomadic and segmentary society of North Africa,[15] and the model of the Islamic 'Republic of Citizens' established as a conquering power and later developing into the dominant pattern of North Africa, which it metamorphosed into the 'Maghreb'.[16] Emphasizing the Islamic import as 'universalistic' and 'individualistic' should not be interpreted as an apology of Islam. Rather, it is to help comprehend the accumulation of the change/no-change processes which have led to the present marginalisation of women in Algerian society, as part of the Islamic social and cultural ensemble. In its own way, Islam was a 'modernizing' agent in Berber North Africa in the sense of opening a 'larger world' to its scattered ethnies. Yet, the Islamic empire was not entirely successful in undermining the autonomy of the Berber communities which continued to disinherit their women, and keep them in their midst through endogamous marriages. This did not only mean a considerable lack of movement for women, but a continuation of the closed social scale of the 'Cousin' type. Acceptance of Islam as a religious creed prevented clashes with its ideal 'Republic of Citizens'. Instead, it helped develop confusing situations whereby Cousin-type customs are legitimised in the name of Islam, as will be shown in Chapter 4.

3.3. Tanzania's 'Republic of Brothers-in-Law'

The model of the 'Republic of Cousins' developed for Algeria could not be extended to Tanzania because of its close identification with endogamy. Instead, the model of what Tillion termed the 'Republic of Brothers-in-law' will be applied to encompass the 'resisting' social actors in contemporary Tanzanian society (ie. the elements of no-change). Earlier we have seen that Tillion coined the term to designate the so-called 'savage' societies in the human kaleidoscope. Her reproduction of the colonial expression 'savage' was made with a tinge of irony in it, as it drew attention to the violent European onslaught on such societies as exemplified by the North American tribes, the Australian aborigines and the numerous hunter-gatherer populations of Africa; all perceived as 'savage' by colonial anthropology. This so-called 'savage' society was characterized, *inter alia* , by its strict practice of exogamy. This was the general social pattern which prevailed in 'native' Tanzanian societies till their interaction with what Iliffe called the 'larger world'[17] of medieval Islamic mercantilism and nineteenth century European colonisation, two forms of the 'Republic of Citizens'.

However, the pattern has survived as Tanzania's 'peasant' society. It is characterised mainly by small-scale subsistence agricultural production, within the family or the tribe.[18] The ensuing social structure is egalitarian in the sense that the produce is by and large equally shared between the members of the family and the tribe.[19] This subsistence economy not only means that there is no production of surplus but also that the family and the tribe are relatively

autonomous. This is the type of society which practices what Goran Hyden has called "the economy of affection". He explains that:

> In the economy of affection, economic action is not motivated by individual profit alone, but is embedded in a range of social considerations that allow for redistribution of opportunities and benefits in a manner which is impossible where modern capitalism or socialism prevails and formalized state action dominates the process of distribution.
>
> (Hyden, 1980: 19)

The notion of the 'economy of affection' is very useful in that it is contrasted with the type of impersonal production relations of the 'Republic of Citizens'(be it capitalist or socialist). In the case of Tanzania , the capitalist form was embodied in the German and British colonial administrations, which succeeded each other in the first half of this century; and the socialist form in the post-independence societal programme of modernisation.

The 'economy of affection' based on household production is characterised by:

- a rudimentary division of labour;
- little exchange between small units of production;
- the provision for domestic needs alone;
- cooperation manifested at time of emergency;
- planning related to socially reproductive needs.

This type of socio-economic organisation informs a specific social logic and world-view whereby the conceptions of man, society and knowledge are antithetical to those of the 'Republic of Citizens' seen above. In the Tanzanian peasant 'Republic of Brothers-in-law':

Man is not an individual distinct from the group, but is subordinate to the corporate household. His status is not commensurate to his possessions, but to his age. Men and women are not equal and perform well defined chores. Although women are essential in production,[20] they are mainly perceived as reproducers, hence inferior.

Society is egalitarian in the sense that the total labour product is shared between the members of the community. But it is not equal or democratic as there is no scope for individual action or opinion. It presents very little[21] hierarchy outside that defined by gender and generation. Reproduction of the same organisational pattern prevails, as well as kinship and communal ties rather than impersonal ones.

> Knowledge is based on past experience; it is immediate and not universal; it is practical and pragmatic but within a reproductory process and not a systematic scientific one. It is also[22] magical and mythical pertaining to extra-human 'forces'.

These conceptions of man (woman), society and knowledge of the peasant 'Republic of Brothers-in-law' were likely to clash with those of the modernising 'Republic of Citizens'. Their interaction has been well depicted by Hyden in his study of the implementation of the societal programme in Tanzania. He rightly points out that the programme proceeds from the attempt at subordinating small peasants to the State and the new social 'classes' which emerged in the wake of nation-building. In this process, the previous colonial administrations had paved the way in trying to extort a surplus out of the small-holding peasants, and had perturbed the local pre-capitalist socio-economic organisation by creating export-oriented cash-crop agriculture. However, the colonial and formal nature of this kind of capitalist exploitation prevented the total disruption of the pre-capitalist social organisation of the prevailing 'Republic of Brothers-in-law'. This latter could still maintain a fair margin of autonomy thanks to the continuing practice of subsistence agriculture. Hyden argues that the same pattern of resistance and protection

provided under colonialism, is used by the peasant household in times of national independence and 'socialist construction', mainly as embodied in *Ujamaa* :

> The real problem of Ujamaa is that the material base of the peasant mode was far too narrow for a rapid socialist transformation. In addition, the structural constraint of the peasant mode, encountered efforts to bring the peasants to meet the demands of capitalism, operated also against a socialist transformation. The above account does not imply that the peasants in Tanzania are uninterested or incapable of change. The problem is that they are unwilling, and usually unable, to achieve it at a pace, and to an extent that other social classes demand of them. Socialist transformation is as taxing on the peasants as capitalist development.
> (Hyden, 1980: 124-125)

Thus Hyden draws our attention to the point of 'resistance to change' by the Tanzanian 'Republic of Brothers-in-Law' not as an intrinsic feature, but as a defence mechanism. The *Ujamaa* societal programme in Tanzania proceeds after all from the logic typical of a 'Republic of Citizens' in that it threatens to subordinate the peasant communities, by 'liberating' their individual members as citizens of the State, free to sell their labour, and by invalidating peasant knowledge by making it dependent on modern expertise and know-how.

In constructing ideal typical models for the 'traditional' societies prevalent in Algeria and Tanzania, and by contrasting them with a model of the 'modern' 'Republic of Citizens', the aim was less to emphasize 'intrinsic' features than to draw attention to the dynamics behind 'the resistance to change' of so-called 'traditional' societies. The pertinent findings of Tillion on the mechanisms of the 'Republic of Cousins' in the Mediterranean basin does not only bear directly on the question of the subjection of women, but breaks away from the simplistic assumption which assimilates traditionalism with Islam. That

this latter is seen by Tillion as a form of 'modernising' 'Republic of Citizens' is quite novel. On the other hand, the tenacious survival of the 'Republic of Cousins' in the Maghrib, due to its 'absence of mingling', is further supported by the Khaldunian theory of social change in agro-pastoral and nomadic societies. In contemporary terminology, he informs us that they are 'cohesive' when and because they are neither state-prone nor city-prone.

> They are so organised that they can resist the state without, at the same time, crystallising a state in their own midst. This is the central feature of their social organisation. It is egalitarian.
>
> (Gellner, 1979: 189)

It is significant that the same 'feature' has been pointed out by Hyden as the source for the stateophobia of the 'Republic of Brothers-in-law' in Tanzania. His metaphor of the 'uncaptured peasantry' and their 'being powerful because they are small' (and we should add scattered), is very much reminiscent of the Khaldunian austere, cohesive and autonomous *badw*. Another significant similarity between the North African *badawi* and the East-African peasant is that they approach the city-state and the city-market as consumers and not as producers. Accordingly, they evade 'capture' by the dominant classes in the city-state by not producing the surplus so badly needed by these in order to construct their 'Republic of Citizens'.

Our two 'traditional' republics, that of the 'Cousins' in Algeria, and the 'Brothers-in-law' in Tanzania prove still that the history of the peasantry is far from being a 'closed chapter'[23] in Africa. Ironically, the independent socialist states of Algeria and Tanzania are confronted with the task of capturing these 'resisting' Republics economically and

socially, while creating new legitimations based on science, progress and the work-ethic. Just how successful they have been in this process for the last two decades, can be depicted in the implementation of societal programmes aimed at 'modernising' the two countries. Accordingly, the next section will examine some selected policies of 'development' in Algeria and Tanzania and their reception by the 'Cousins' and the 'Brothers-in-law'.

3.4. The National 'Republic of Citizens' in Algeria and Tanzania: Three Decades of Nation-building.

Following Independence in the early 1960s, the nationalist elites of Algeria and Tanzania embarked on formidable societal programmes, along the framework of 'nation-building', (the international catchword which followed in the footsteps of decolonisation). Although a great deal may differ between the two contexts; notably the nature of the colonial occupation and the process of national liberation;[24] the post-colonial political elites shared similarities in the voluntarist and populist nature of their 'nation-building'. Both political regimes boasted an ideological rhetoric which purported to be both anti-capitalist and anti-Marxist. The ensuing ideology was to be a special brand of socialism, owing more to an alleged pre-colonial egalitarianism, than to the Western ideal of socialism.

Accordingly, an eclectic, pragmatic, and modernist conception of individual, society, and knowledge has marked both societal programmes. Although the blueprints containing these have shifted since Independence, as national and international conjunctures changed, the mainstream argument has remained a nationalist one. Thus, although

there has been a steady tendency towards 'economic liberalisation' since the late seventies and early eighties in both countries, the legitimation of such a move from earlier radicalism, remains national unity. In actual policy formulation and implementation this continues to mean a paramount concern for the reinforcement of the state apparatus, and a desperate search for ways and means to reinforce economic efficiency.

What is interesting to note about the Algerian and Tanzanian political regimes is their continuity and stability since the mid-sixties.[25] This should not mean that their elites have shown a high degree of cohesiveness. If anything, the frequent changes in the political 'teams' and the discreet discarding of officials, reflect an undercurrent of internecine struggles. However, both governments have consistently posed as anti-imperialist and non-aligned regimes in the international scene, and as serious and reliable forces of social and economic 'development'.

Typical modernist 'Republics of Citizens' have steadily been established in Algeria and Tanzania, led by 'elites' which proved skilful in striking a balance between the pressures of international capital, and the 'resistance' mechanisms of the internal 'traditional social formations' of the Algerian 'Cousins' and the Tanzanian 'Brothers-in-Law'. This has been achieved through the "nationalitarian process" (Abdel-Malek, 1965: 16-17) which followed in the wake of national independence. The term 'nationalitarian' proves to be more accurate than nationalist in that it depicts external as well as internal action. Externally, this has been mainly translated in

terms of economic and diplomatic policies, such as the nationalisation of foreign holdings and adherence to the non-aligned movement in an attempt to counter imperialist hegemony of either West or East. Internally, the supremacy of national unity has led to the growth of the public sector, and the consolidation of the State *vis á vis* civil society. In this process it is worth noting the relative weakness of political coercion exercised by the modernising 'Republic of Citizens' in Algeria and Tanzania. This is largely due to their populist celebration of the 'masses' and the formidable investments in social and welfare institutions which have brought about an appreciable improvement in the standards of living at a national level. Hence the aura of 'national consensus' obtained in both cases by the lack of support of any one group or any one social class, exclusive of the others. In each context, due to the opaque social structure whereby social classes have not crystallised and elite recruitment has remained relatively open, political and social dissent has been minimised. It is remarkable that in the last twenty years, the history of the Algerian and Tanzanian regimes has not been marred by major antagonisms, but rather presented an appearance of unity and continuity rarely matched in other parts of the African continent.

However, it is time to consider more closely some of the modernising policies brought about by the 'Republic of Citizens' in each country. This should clarify the nature and composition of such a Republic, and highlight policies which have caused it to interact with the traditional formations of the Algerian 'Cousins' and the Tanzanian 'Brothers-in-law'. It will be interesting to find out whether we are in the presence of discrete models, or whether they are likely to

overlap. Accordingly, it is worth asking if the 'Citizens' have been systematically modernists, or whether they are not sometimes caught in the web of their eclectic and inconsistent normative statements which favour the retention of certain features of the very society they are out to modernise?

In order to examine the impact of the modernising process in Algeria and Tanzania throughout the sixties, seventies and early eighties, Holmes's notion of 'change/no-change' will be used to depict the normative, institutional and environmental background of the adopted policies. Particular attention will be given to their reception by the residual 'Republics of Citizens and Brothers-in-Law'. Given the wholistic dimension of the Algerian and Tanzanian societal programmes since the emergence of each independent republic, it would be beyond the scope of the present investigation to provide a comprehensive treatment of all policies involved. However, a selection of major policies can be conveniently adopted.

The Algerian and Tanzanian ruling elites seem to have shared similar preoccupations as to the priorities of their respective 'nation-building'. Their position *vis á vis* international capital as former colonies, and as recipients of technology transfer and 'cultural borrowing', has influenced internal developments. However categorising them as mere extensions of developments on the world scene would not do justice to some independent and single-minded decisions which have affected policy formulation and implementation in these two countries. The evolution of political and ideological adjustments since independence, and the ensuing policies, will help

disclose the mechanisms of leadership recruitment through the intervention of various social contenders.

On the whole, internal political and socio-economic developments in Algeria and Tanzania have been characterised by:

1. a preoccupation for institutional building with a strong emphasis on state and administration (Algeria) and party (Tanzania), as well as the recovery of economic sovereignty through the nationalisation of foreign assets, banks and insurance companies, in the mid and late sixties.

2. launching of formidable economic programmes such as industrialisation, and agrarian reforms (this took place in the early and mid seventies, and constituted a radicalisation in policy-making compared to the piecemeal process of the sixties) and at the same time, the accompanying political jargon articulated more radical conceptualisations of socialism, and the slogan of 'participation' predominated.

3. a sudden shift in policy formulation from radical to more 'liberalised' formulae involving a new appraisal of the private sector, emphasis on the social rather than the economic (Algeria)[26] and 'surrender' to international capital (Tanzania)[27] hitherto so staunchly resisted have marked the late seventies and early and mid-eighties.

Objections might be raised against the claim herewith, that there have been similarities in the decision-making process of Tanzania and Algeria, given the different nature of their national liberation processes. Indeed, Algeria fought a long and bitter war against French colonialism (1954-1962),[28] while Tanzania achieved independence almost 'hand-in-hand' with the British colonial administration.[29] It has been argued for instance, that wars of liberation have brought about radical political parties as supreme organisms of direction and control, while piecemeal decolonisation has induced stronger legislative instances:

> Only in countries that have gained their independence through armed struggle, as in the territories of Portuguese-speaking Africa, have political parties

> developed a capacity for decision making equal to TANU's. TANU is thus the exception rather than the rule.
> (Okumu, 1979: 61-62)

However, as will be seen below, this does not apply to the Algerian FLN party (Front de Liberation Nationale), the initiator of the war of liberation which raged between 1954 and 1962. The weak post-independence role of the FLN remains to this day a maverick development of the revolutionary part it played as a rallying force in the war of national liberation.[30] In contrast, TANU (Tanganyika African National Union), later to become Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Revolutionary Party) of Tanzania, evolved into a relatively strong political instance, where radical militants predominated.[31] Whereas, Algeria's FLN was deserted by its radical elements as early as 1963-64, and was later to become the shadowy figure of Algerian politics.

3.5. The Euphoric Sixties

> It is important to observe that colonies were managed in a manner similar to that of an administrative state in which decision-making powers are centralised in the state bureaucracy while organised politics, if allowed to exist, is kept to the barest minimum.
> (Okumu, 1979: 43)

Although it was precisely this state of affairs that African national movements fought against, most independent African countries have been ruled by administrative state bureaucracies, rather than representative governments. This has usually been ascribed to an alleged 'political immaturity' of African regimes, thus overlooking the inception and institutionalisation of such process under colonial conditions. On the whole, the colonisers' consent to enfranchise the colonised came most of the time as a last resort to retain the colony, or secure its

'dependence' after decolonisation.[32] Hence the formalism of political participation.

At Independence, Algeria and Tanzania inherited precisely such conditions of political decision-making. Apart from a brief spell of parliamentary rule in the early sixties, the enforcement of the state (Algeria) and party (Tanzania) took over from the mid-sixties.

3.5.1. Algeria

In Algeria, a military coup on 19 June 1965 overthrew the civilian government and dissolved the National Assembly following heated internecine power struggles, which involved advocates of legislative power against those who favored the predominance of the executive apparatus. The period 1962-1965 was marked by attempts of democratic management of the economy with the burgeoning of *l'autogestion agricole* (agricultural self-management), whereby farmers took over vast colonial properties to run them as co-operatives. It was also a period of active radical and militant thinking which produced the most progressive documents of Algeria's recent history. The 1963 Constitution and the 1964 Charte d'Alger (Algiers Charter) are testimonies of this radical era. Above all it was a period of heated debates at the National Assembly where various opinions were represented, notwithstanding the unitarianism of national reconstruction (Quandt, 1969). It was to prove fatal for the civilian political institutions. The 1965 military coup led by Colonel Boumediene put an end to what was seen as 'formal democratism' and political confusion, as well as a threat for the unity of the nation. No better than Boumediene himself, (later to become President until

his death in December 1978), has expressed the motivations behind what he called "the revolutionary adjustment" of 19 June. A content analysis of his speeches on the event disclose three main obsessions:

1. revolt against individual leadership as a reaction to the cult of personality style of the demised President Ben Bella;

2. the engineering of the state as the best guarantor of national unity;

3. organisation of the economy in a disciplinary and efficient manner.

The following passage[33] refers to these aspects, which countless declarations by Boumediene repeatedly emphasized over the years. On the first anniversary of the coup, Boumediene declared:

> The 19th of June is a return to the sources, to the past of the Revolution, to collective leadership, to the distribution of responsibilities at all levels of the Party and the State. The 19th of June means also the construction of the Algerian State, the reinforcement of the FLN. ... Finally, it entails the reorganisation of the national economy, ...the achievement of revolutionary unity on the basis of the FLN principles and not on imported ideas... .
>
> (in Mameri, 1975: 35)

Later, when commemorating the coup in 1973, he reiterated most of these points:

> On 19 June 1965 we promised to provide the country with stability and calm, while organising the economy which is of capital importance. ...We promised to create institutions capable of outliving both men and events. ...We had proclaimed our will to construct a State worthy of respect both inside and outside. We had pledged to liberate the country's economy.
>
> (in Mameri, 1975: 38-39)

Boumediene's declarations and speeches abounded in the direction of the strengthening of the state seen as "an indispensible and vital question" (ibid: 121-2), and indeed a series of measures were taken to extend state control over the whole country. A new territorial,

administrative and political organisation was launched with the 1967 Communal Reform and the 1969 Departmental Reform whereby administration became a tool for 'participation'. It has been argued that such reliance on the strengthening of local and national administration is a 'pragmatic' device, which bears an astonishing resemblance to old colonial practices (Aboutaki, 1974: 324). Although the authorities had proclaimed that they envisaged decentralisation, it was never made clear whether this meant administrative or political decentralisation. What was made clear was that 'delegation' of central power and not 'devolution' or 'derogation' was the aim (Riggs, 1964: 344); especially at the level of the *wilaya* (district) where the *wali* (or prefect) is appointed as a state representative and not elected. Whereas the head of the *daira* (commune), the lower echelon in the administrative hierarcy, is proposed by the FLN party, and elected in national local elections. The charter of the *Wilaya* makes it clear that:

> This decentralisation is not meant to give any autonomy for the *wilaya*, because our State is a unitarian State. It is only a technique towards a greater active participation of the *wilaya* and the popular masses to revolutionary power.
>
> (in Leca, 1973: 225)

One cannot fail to note the recurrence of 'technique' as a key symbol in Algerian politics in which political integration is more a matter of administrative and technical efficiency. The 'technicalisation' of politics, and the politicisation of technique are not alternatives in the Algerian case. They go hand in hand in the realm of administrative and political control. In other words, the state in Algeria has decentralised in order to permit greater political integration (political control); but has retained tight control over local institutions which play the role of representatives of the central authorities rather than locally elected bodies.

The consolidation of the state apparatuses between 1965 and the early seventies, did not involve local administrative reforms alone. However, they remain the most telling example of the technocratic conception of decentralisation and participation which characterised Algerian politics in the sixties. The pre-eminence of the state over the party was quite clear in view of the formulation of economic programmes which needed swift adoption and implementation.

Thus, hand in hand with state consolidation came economic structuration. The recovery of national resources was a priority together with the creation of state companies. The state proceeded to nationalise totally the banking sector as early as 1966-67, and created its own banks. A rigorous control of the banking system helped reach a necessary financial balance for the launching of socio-economic programmes. The most conspicuous economic policy of the period was the launching of heavy industries, with the adoption of the policy of 'industrialising industries'. The chief objective was to provide Algeria with a basic heavy industry which would provoke a chain of reaction in light industry generation and job creation. The idea was to create conditions for import-substitution with the help of industries of equipment; seen as the only way towards the "fulfillment of economic autonomy, the attainment of growth and the necessarily ensuing social transformation" (Benissad, 1982: 142). The industrial effort was impressive, absorbing 51.6% of the total investments of the first Three Year-Plan (1967-69) (Benissad, 1982: 46-47).

Going hand in hand with the strengthening of the state and the expansion of industrialisation, there was heavy investment in formal

education as part of the overall technocratic package for the creation of a 'modern' citizen, society and knowledge in Algeria. Emphasis was put on all cycles of the formal educational system, but hardly at all on the informal sector of adult education and adult literacy, as will be examined in Chapter 5.

In summary, the sixties in Algeria were marked by the consolidation of executive power over the legislative and the ideological, with a significant absence of party action. There was a formidable expansion of all state apparatuses, but mainly of the administrative functions, for a tighter control (integration) of the national territory, as well as an expansion of economic planning and the launching of ambitious import-substitution industries. Strong organisational and economic bases were launched by a leadership which had shown a fervent commitment to state power, and economic competence and performance. Although revolutionary legitimacy was not questioned, a new ideological and political discourse based on an economistic and developmentalist philosophy became paramount. Save for the former political groups and some regional military personalities, the new political team met very little opposition. It was by and large accepted that the army should reinforce a threatened national unity, and launch the bases for national development.

The new military team was very quick in co-opting all strata of the civil service, a pragmatic move which was to prove extremely efficient in securing the new economistic and developmentalist choices:

> Along with the elimination of the past political elite and the establishment of an internal cohesion within the army's structure of authority, the new Algerian regime strengthened its hold on the economy and the administration by recruiting civil servants and technicians in such a way that the congruence between military and managerial elites was maximised.
>
> (Hermassi, 1975: 167)

In conclusion, social change in Algeria in the sixties was characterised by:

> normative change noted for its eclectism linking revolutionary rhetoric with a developmentalist and modernist one;
>
> institutional change translated into formidable economic and social infrastructural projects with a special emphasis on administrative and economic efficiency;
>
> environmental change with the systematic exploitation of the national resources, especially mining and oil.

Behind these changes there was a reasonably cohesive political elite, "contending only with weak vested interests, ... and pursuing a policy independent of various social classes" (Hermassi, 1975: 155). However, in as far as this political elite gave prominence to the executive in its outlook and policies, it was supported by a "variety of petit bourgeois clienteles" (Raffinot & Jacquemot, 1977: 77) who aspired to extend and preserve privileges and interests built up in the course of the policy choices mentioned above. However, the comprehensiveness of the societal package earned it an unequivocal support from all quarters of the population, as social mobility increased, and no clear cut class divisions riddled Algerian society as yet. The regime could then be said to have achieved a fair amount of success in securing its philosophy of unitarianism and economic efficacy.

3.5.2. Tanzania

The sixties in Tanzania were also characterised by the introduction of significant institutional changes, albeit under the aegis of one single outstanding personality, that of Julius K. Nyerere, rather than a 'collective' leadership. Indeed, the personality of Nyerere started to mark Tanzania's life as early as 1954 when TANU was created to take over political power in 1961. The charisma of Nyerere could be said to have determined most of Tanzania's development strategy for two decades and a half until he retired in 1985.

Again as in the case of Algeria, the sixties, and especially the mid and late sixties were marked by institution-building. However unlike the Algerian leadership, the Tanzanian elite, under the instigation of Nyerere, sought to strengthen the role of the party. Consequently ideological matters were at the forefront in the process of nation-building. Nyerere for instance, resigned as prime minister in January 1962 to write and think about a societal programme for Tanzania (Coulson, 1982: 136). He came out from his retirement to propose a presidential regime and a one party system for Tanzania. But he was also armed with one of the most original reflections on African socialism, thus strengthening his reputation as the enlightened leader and moral teacher: the *Mwalimu*. The document was called Ujamaa: The Basis of African Socialism (1962). In it Nyerere advocated a socialism based on the pre-colonial and pre-capitalist social organisation to which he ascribed a natural egalitarianism due to the self-reliance of the households as units of production. He translated *Ujamaa* as 'familyhood' and exorted his compatriots to revive it as "a mentality, a state of mind" (Nyerere, 1962).

Although a period of confusion followed Independence in the early years: a coup attempt, and an army mutiny in 1964, (which both failed), Nyerere was back in control. He successfully managed to divert national opinion towards institutional and economic building. In 1965 (also a watershed in Tanzania's recent history) a new constitution was adopted consecrating TANU as the only legitimate party, thus giving it a constitutional status allowing it "to function in governmental capacities" (Bienen, 1967: 198). At the same time, the former independence Parliament was transformed into a National Assembly in October 1965 (Nyerere, 1970: 86).

As in Algeria, the Tanzanian leadership proceeded to expand the economy once administrative reorganisation had taken place. Planning was chosen as the most rational device for a comprehensive economic strategy. The 1961-64 Three Year-Plan and the 1965-69 Five Year-Plan launched the bases of infrastructural facilities, with a heavy emphasis on agriculture and education. Although, unlike Algeria, Tanzania could not afford launching programmes of heavy industries in view of the limited mineral resources. However, the same nationalist spirit was animating the Tanzanian leadership. In 1967 a comprehensive wave of nationalisations took over foreign banks, insurance companies, food industries and export-import bodies thus securing state control but also expanding the 'Africanisation' of the civil service so badly needed for the credibility of the party in power. Indeed TANU had always advocated the Africanisation of the civil service, in all sectors as a priority. However, the greatest emphasis rested with agriculture as the sector occupied 90 per cent of Tanzania's population.

So great was the country's dependence on agriculture, especially on the cash crop sector, that Nyerere issued yet again another revolutionary blue-print in 1967 unequivocally binding Tanzania's fate to its agricultural policy: The Arusha Declaration.

> Initially, this meant nationalizing the commanding heights of the economy, promoting communal production in rural "Ujamaa" villages, and adopting a policy of "education for self-reliance" which integrated agricultural work into the primary school curriculum. It also included a "leadership code" which prohibited senior state officials from holding more than one job, from having shares in or directing private companies, from owning rental property and from employing wage labour.
>
> (Mueller, 1980: 13)

However, the Declaration became renowned for the *Mwalimu's* vision of a uniform agrarian society in Tanzania, orderly gathered in villages and performing communal work, which was to directly benefit the villagers. Thus he advocated the 'villagisation' of Tanzania, insisting that this should be achieved through "persuasion" and "participation" of those concerned, ie. the peasant masses. However these latter were to be at the receiving end of the policy, and consequently were not the only ones 'to change'. Indeed, as a visionary and as a modernist Nyerere tended to overlook the dramatic changes which were likely to take place among the 'implementors' of the vision, ie. the countless administrators and bureaucrats, either of the party or state apparatus, who were all too eager to carry out the operation in view of the gains they were likely to extract from it in their capacity of 'power intermediaries'. In advocating free will in the creation of communal *Ujamaa* villages, Nyerere remained rather ambiguous, trying to accomodate the peasants as recipients, and party and government officials as bestowers. Indeed, Nyerere was extremely misleading in

delineating the peasants' free will and the officials' intervention.

First he declared:

> Ujamaa villages are intended to be socialist organisations created by the people, and governed by those who live and work in them. They cannot be created from outside, nor governed from outside. No one can be forced into an ujamaa village, and no official - at any level - can go and tell the members of an ujamaa village what they should do together, and what they should continue to do as individual farmers. No official of the Government or the Party can go to an ujamaa village and tell the members what they must grow. ...An ujamaa village is a voluntary association of people who decide of their own free will to live together and work together for their common good.
>
> (Nyerere, 1973: 67)

However, Nyerere seemed to go back on the emphasis on 'free will'

claiming that it needs 'leadership':

> The fact that people cannot be forced into ujamaa villages, nor told how to run them, does not mean that Government and TANU have just to sit back and hope that people will be inspired to create them on their own. To get ujamaa villages established, and to help them to succeed, education and leadership are required.
>
> (ibid: 68)

The role of this leadership was later to prove extremely problematic in the implementation of *ujamaa* villages as the operation of villagisation was increasingly bureaucratized (Von Freyhold, 1979; Hyden, 1980). Indeed, a whole host of administrative posts were created in order to introduce the idea and the practice of Nyerere's vision. The village had to have a chairman, a vice-chairman and a secretary as well as different committees. Mechanisms of coordination were introduced such as monthly meetings in order to discuss eventual problems, as well as training for local party officials so that they explain the policy to the villagers. In the course of implementation the socialist component of the programme, initially *Ujamaa Vijijini* (socialism in the villages) was transformed into *Vijiji vya Ujamaa* (*ujamaa* villages)

which emphasized the actual operation of the resettlement of the peasant population, hence the bureaucratisation.

> If Nyerere wanted ujamaa villages the bureaucracy would produce them. It is less clear whether administrators were as committed to socialism as they seemed to be to resettlement.
>
> (Hill, in Coulson, 1982: 107)

Following Hill's point, it is pertinent to suggest that the operation was in the end more effective in establishing a national administration and bureaucracy, rather than in 'modernising the traditional peasants'. This pattern occured both in Algeria and Tanzania in the sixties whereby the sheer breadth of nation-building in its early years confused participation with bureaucratisation. Where the Algerians directly used the bureaucracy to expand participation which finally took the shape of state expansion, the Tanzanians used participation but expanded bureaucracy. It is thus that towards the end of the sixties the state and party machineries were strengthened in Algeria and Tanzania, while people's participation was altogether absorbed into the process of institutional change. So much so that the vertical proceedings of bureaucratisation and the horizontal ones of participation became one.

3.6. The Aggressive Seventies

Following the initial structuration processes of the sixties, the Algerian and Tanzanian political elites were to be in greater offensive mood in the seventies. Interestingly enough, both leaderships continued their show of strength towards international capital in a bid to end their dependence on it. However while the same intention and motivation animated the new policies, the difference remained that Algeria's oil wealth permitted such offensive, but Tanzania's poverty led it to clamp down on its own peasants for surplus extraction.

3.6.1 Tanzania

In Tanzania, the early seventies were marked by a slow down in 'voluntary' villagisation as both peasant resistance and bureaucratic mismanagement contributed to bring the process to a stalemate. Communal production of the existing villages did not contribute more than 1 or 2 per cent of total national production by the end of 1970 (Coulson, 1982: 246). At the same time, the operation proved costly to the authorities who had to bargain social services and facilities in exchange for peasant consent to move to villages and engage in communal work (ie. in cash crop production rather than subsistence production). Petty thefts by officials, and corruption made villagers wonder for whom they were working (Coulson, 1982: 245).

All this was not to the liking of the *Mwalimu* who, losing patience, declared in 1973 that "to live in villages is an order". The same year, the TANU Biennal Conference resolved that by the end of 1976, the whole of Tanzania's population should live in villages. These declarations were to start the most dramatic upheaval in Tanzania's history, whereby no less than 13 million people were moved to villages in a period of three years; "a village being defined as a site acceptable to the party with adequate agricultural land and at least 250 families" (Coulson, 1982: 249-250).

It was the first time that the Tanzanian regime had to resort to massive coercion[34] in a desperate move 'to discipline peasant society'. At this point, the Nyerere vision became a matter of 'class interests'. Many observers have been able to demonstrate through field work that compulsory villagisation was the last assault of the "bureaucratic

bourgeoisie" (Shivji, 1978) to capture the peasantry (Hyden, 1980) in order to secure its own reproduction. Coulson gives an idea of who constituted this 'class' whose unity and loyalty Nyerere wanted to maintain (Coulson, 1982: 255):

> ...the idea of villagisation (without Ujamaa) was popular with most urban-based professional politicians and at least acceptable to the civil servants who had been 'decentralized' to the region: it gave them a defined job to do, a sense of their own importance, and a chance to exert their influence on the peasants... .
> (Coulson, 1982: 254)

3.6.2 Algeria

In Algeria, a similar analysis of class formation and class consciousness was made of the leadership which was seen to have crystallised also in the early seventies (Raffinot & Jaquemot, 1977). This time it was coined as a *bourgeoisie d'Etat* (state bourgeoisie), and interestingly enough, its crystallisation was also linked to an agrarian reform, *La Révolution Agraire*. The ordinance of the Agrarian Revolution was signed by Boumediene on 8 November 1971, and was thus legitimised:

> We are aware that the agrarian revolution has failed in many countries for different reasons. Some of them wanted to achieve an agrarian reform without fulfilling other reforms. Hence their failure. As for us, we may claim that the conditions of success have been gathered, and that there is no danger on the economic front. Our economy is developing well. All industries are now under state control; as well as banks, insurance companies, external trade and a major part of internal wholesale trade. These are the conditions which allow us to further the struggle for development in all serenity.
> (in Mameri, 1975: 302)

The aim of the policy was institutional and structural. It involved the grouping of peasant families in villages designed by the authorities, in order to produce communally within a system of cooperatives. Essential facilities were to be provided such as

schools, dispensaries, electricity, running water and gas, which meant that the operation was heavily subsidized by the state. But whereas in Tanzania the problem was to encircle the peasantry and thus answer an economic exigency as well as a political one (ensure the reproduction of the ruling 'class'), in Algeria the motivation was more of a political order. Indeed an agrarian reform had long been promised, but never fulfilled. In a country which had suffered an acute problem of land confiscation under settlement colonialism, one might have expected an agrarian reform to be the top priority of a socialist regime. This was however postponed in favour of industrialisation, and the technocratic elite could well afford following such a course thanks to the important oil revenues, as implicitly admitted by Boumediene.

The crux of the policy of the Agrarian Revolution was that the private sector, as opposed to the self-managed farms, was to be affected. This entailed land distribution to the small poor peasants, but also nationalisation of big landholdings. And this is where the operation seemed more political than economic and entailed a 'class' conflict. However, unlike Tanzania where villagisation opposed bureaucracy and peasantry, in Algeria the Agrarian Revolution was to involve the 'state bourgeoisie' against the large landowners and notables (Raffinot & Jaquemot, 1977: 357-374). The interesting detail to retain is that a number of these landowners were part of the government and party apparatuses, suggesting that an internecine power struggle had taken place; whereby the managerial and technocratic faction of the elite was strong enough to clamp down on a faction of politicians. The presence of the latter within the polity had been legitimised by their nationalist past, but could no more be tenable in face of a growing and

aggressive bureaucracy. Indeed this latter managed to establish the new legitimacy of efficient nation-building through redistributive policies, and could afford to antagonise the agrarian 'bourgeoisie' in favour of the landless peasantry. Together with the policy of Agrarian Revolution, came another major politico-economic decision which was to illustrate the strength of the ruling elite; the nationalisation of all oil industries. Begun in the late sixties, the process had affected only various European and American companies, but not French ones, with which there were special agreements. But this favouritism came to an end on 24 February 1971 when Boumediene declared "in the name of the Council of the Revolution and the Government" that the state would retain 51 per cent of the French shares, nationalise natural gas fields, and all gas and oil inland transport (in Mameri, 1975: 257-258).

In summary, it may be affirmed that the seventies witnessed in Algeria and Tanzania the delineation of clearer contours of the ruling elite. This was distinguished by more offensive policies both towards international capital as well as internal social groups.

In terms of institutional change, this was translated in Tanzania through the dramatic operation of villagisation between 1973 and 1977 whereby millions of peasant families were moved into villages 'in order to partake the benefits of modern institutions' (schools, health facilities), as perceived by the formulators of the policy, including the then President Nyerere. In the course of the operation, it became more and more clear that the decision was dictated by political as well as economic exigencies. This involved an offensive by a now

established bureaucracy in an attempt to control Tanzania's vast and scattered peasantry which accounted for more than 85 per cent of the population. Having secured control of the state apparatus, the leadership was now out to control society at large.

The same pattern took place in Algeria where the defiance of international capital was even bolder. "No foreign company was left to work for its own benefit by 1974, and Algeria was involved in the new international division of labour on its own terms" (Raffinot and Jacquemot, 1977: 101-106). However the agrarian reform was not an assault on the peasantry's autonomy or a search for surplus extraction, but rather a way for the managerial and technocratic faction of the ruling elite to eliminate the liberalising political elements. If anything the peasantry in Algeria was conspicuously dependent on the state, having been already heavily undermined by the colonial system.

3.7. The Pragmatic Eighties.

The early eighties came as a total contrast to the radicalism of the seventies, as both the Algerian and Tanzanian ruling elites seemed to have again shifted their priorities. Institutional change was brought to a relative standstill, following the turmoil of the sixties and seventies. It seemed that both leaderships had secured their institutional bases. State and party machineries had been erected. The Algerian technocrats and military were reconciled to the idea of a stronger party and a legislative representation. Indeed in 1976, a Constitution and a National Charter were adopted, and a year later, the National Assembly was reestablished. In Tanzania, villagisation was being achieved, and power seemed to be 'equally' shared between party,

government and presidency, brought together as 'modernisers' of a 'resisting traditional' peasantry.

Nevertheless, this security having been bought more often on the "political market place" rather than on the "economic market place" (Hyden, 1980: 30), proved rather fragile as economies became increasingly unyielding. Mismanagement of huge industrial plants in Algeria, and of parastatals in Tanzania; insufficient food production and increasing dependence on food imports; high birth rates (4.6 per cent in both cases) and growing underemployment and unemployment; all contributed to the failure to reach targets. Hence the recourse to more liberalising measures.

3.7.1. Algeria

In Algeria, the death of Boumediene in December 1978, had precipitated an internecine power struggle between the harder-line of the army and party, and the more right wing elements in the government and the bureaucracy. However a totally unexpected successor was proposed and eventually elected according to the provisions of the new Constitution. The choice of the new president (Chadli Bendjedid, a colonel in the army), reflected the political elite's ideological inclinations. Bendjedid was known for his liberal sympathies and following his election, most of the political and technocratic teams working under Boumediene were ousted; accused of having failed to design a 'sound' economic policy for the country, in favour of a 'prestigious' one. Although no outward coercion was carried out, the new 'teams' were anxious to establish a new legitimacy. This time it was based on a discourse of 'social' investments rather than 'economic' ones. At the

same time, new alliances were sought amongst the burgeoning private sector which was discreetly hailed as an alternative in small businesses. Heavy bureaucratisation was denounced and all declarations were made in favour of the 'citizen's well-being and comfort'. In short the discourse of the 'socialist individual, society and knowledge' was being replaced by the 'consuming individual, society and knowledge'. This was obviously in response to the consumer goods shortages which had become endemic under the previous administration.

3.7.2. Tanzania.

In Tanzania, an even more difficult economic situation led to a return to the cooperative system in agriculture instead of communal production in *Ujamaa* villages. The cooperative system had been extremely popular with rich farmers before the Arusha Declaration and villagisation, and was more integrated into the market economy; hence its success as a productive sector. Here again the social alliances of the leadership shifted back to rich farmers, traders, and a burgeoning bourgeoisie which had been frowned upon earlier in the seventies. Indeed, as no surplus could be extracted immediately from the newly 'captured' peasantry, and as famine on the one hand, and lack of capital accumulation on the other, threatened the foundations of the ruling group, this latter had to liberalise its radical political stances.

Significantly, Nyerere declared to the National Conference of Chama Cha Mapinduzi in 1982 that they had no choice but to deal with the International Monatery Fund (Nyerere, 1982: 59). This was indeed a very hard and bitter decision and one which the Tanzanian leadership had to take very reluctantly. Indeed, the decision was but a surrender to

international capital on its terms and not any more those of Tanzania. Could it be that these circumstances precipitated Nyerere's decision to step down as president of the republic in 1985, thus clearing the way for a more 'liberalising' leadership, and new legitimations away from self-reliance and *Ujamaa* ? The answer is yet to emerge as Nyerere has not stepped down as chairman of Chama Cha Mapinduzi.

The depiction of the institutional changes for which the Algerian and Tanzanian post-colonial leaderships have been most noted in the last twenty years, has shown two strong tendencies:

> to establish administrative competence as a priority;
>
> to adopt policies which address primarily the political market in order to secure different alliances, without favouring any one social group, (hence the propensity to expand social welfare programmes and nationalist economic projects).

As Hermassi rightly pointed out:

> Socioeconomic reorganisation and sociopolitical reforms require primarily the concentration of power and the mobilization of resources for national goals, that is, the capacity to create new power. These processes usually run into opposition from the interests and ideologies that benefit from the existing distribution of power, status and rewards. Governmental effectiveness in this sense is the ability of the government to modify the privileges of vested interest groups in the light of public policy.
>
> (Hermassi, 1975: 159)

However, as shown in the cases of Algeria and Tanzania this process is far from homogeneous, and categories such as 'government' and 'national goals' are far from being transcendental, but rather entail incessant movements and shifts in the alliances of the modernising 'Citizens' in power. Nevertheless, the administrative and bureaucratic nature of the dominant group is unmistakable as it is largely determined by the relative weakness of the Algerian and Tanzanian private

bourgeoisies, and "the awsome political project of consciously and deliberately transforming the entire social structure" (Hermassi, 1975: 158).

The normative and institutional changes introduced by the Algerian and Tanzanian leaderships have been typical of those of modernising 'Citizens'. As modernists their stated aims and societal projects sought to replace (in modernisation jargon) the 'particularistic, ascriptive, affective and diffuse' traditional society with a 'universalistic, achievement-oriented, neutral and role-specific' modern society. However, by and large, they found themselves more concerned with the implementation of order and efficiency, be it through party consolidation as in Tanzania, or state enforcement as in Algeria. In Holmesian terms, the normative and institutional changes were not always a coherent and homogeneous package. In both cases, the 'Citizens' in power sought to maintain order and national unity by formulating, and adopting politically motivated policies, whose economic viability was frequently doubtful. The changes they introduced were certainly revolutionary in terms of improving national standards of living. However, they have also been more concerned with containing and controlling the growing wave of 'political participation' on the part of various groups, than establishing a grass-roots democracy. The policy shifts analysed earlier provided a way of adjusting to external pressure. But at least as important was the range of internal responses of civil society at large to official policies. This will be dealt with in the next section of this Chapter.

3.8. No-change in the Form of 'Resistance'.

In practice, the vision of specific socialism (Islamic in Algeria, African and *Ujamaa* in Tanzania) was to be at odds with the very values and practices it purported to revive. Indeed, the visionary nature of the discourse of specific socialism tended to dwell on mythical rather than real 'traditional' pre-colonial values. These were far from being idyllic as assumed by official rhetoric.

The Algerian discourse elevated, and by the same token, reduced all traditional society to an egalitarian Islamic 'city'. The Tanzanian rhetoric embodied in Nyerere's *Ujamaa* philosophy, distilled the myriad of tribal entities and groups of Tanzania into one fraternal and egalitarian brotherhood, presumably determined by the subsistence economy. Imbued with such mythical images of the past, the modernising 'Citizens' in Algeria and Tanzania took very little account of what these images entailed in terms of resistance to their respective societal programmes on the part of the real actors of the idealised traditional society; the 'Cousins' in Algeria and the 'Brothers-in-law' in Tanzania.

In fact, the policy shifts described earlier were partly determined by their reception among the 'Brothers-in-law' and the 'Cousins'. Indeed, the 'Citizens' found themselves in the difficult position of having to impose, and not only propose a socialist model of society, which ironically proceeds from the same rationale which has brought about capitalism.

> The dilemma facing African socialists is that since capitalism failed to revolutionize the means of production, their transition to socialism is not supported by dynamic forces generated under capitalism, for example, an articulate class consciousness, adherence to the principles of modern organisation, technical know-how, and a general sense of control of the forces of nature. The bourgeois mentality has simply failed to have an impact in most parts of Africa. This means that the principle function of socialism will be to achieve exactly those things that capitalism has failed to attain. The conditions under which socialism has to be built in Africa, therefore, are bound to be very different from what has been experienced elsewhere.
>
> (Hyden, 1980: 200)

Goran Hyden wrote this as a concluding remark to his book Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry, (1980) in which he was led to consider the cultural factors behind the relative failure of *Ujamaa* . Although these specifically concern Tanzanian society, some elements of analysis could also be extended to Algerian society in explicating the difficulties encountered by 'modernisation' there. Basically, Hyden argued that the world view of peasant society was pre-scientific in the sense that it was religious and mythical. Above all, it did not conceive that individuals can affect a change in their environment towards a higher stage. Rather, their efforts are closely tied to the mechanical solidarity which links them to the rest of the community and should be aimed at preserving a balance with the environment, and not master it.

In Holmes' terms, the 'Republic of Brothers-in-law' does not suffer discrepancies between the normative, institutional and environmental realms, and thus is unlikely to suffer 'problems'. Accordingly, in the case of failing official policies, Hyden has rightly pointed that "in the eyes of the peasants the official is part of the problem" (ibid: 216); since he is the one who has brought disruption to the balanced

world of the 'Republic of Brothers-in-Law'. As will be seen below, the pre-scientific world view of peasants in Tanzania is to account, partly, for their resistance to *Ujamaa* , which after all embodies values and practices of a scientific era.

3.8.1. The Resilience of Tanzania's 'Brothers-in-law'.

When Goran Hyden embarked on his field-work to try and unveil the difficulties of villagisation, he intended it to be a study in political economy. It turned out to become a study on 'cultural relativism'. Hyden was bewildered by the 'determinism' of cultural factors as it were, in the implementation of *Ujamaa* . He, in fact, discovered what has been termed herein the 'Republic of Brothers-in-law', and which he coined as "the economy of affection".

Given that the 'Republic of Brothers-in-law' was described earlier, it suffices now to draw attention to the aspect of cultural resistance displayed by the actors of this 'Republic' to the enforcement of modernisation through *Ujamaa* . It has already been noted that the operation of villagisation became coercive from 1973 to 1976, as the 'Citizens' of the official organs of power grew exasperated by the reluctance of peasants to move into government-designed villages. The move was prompted in order to break the structural support of the 'Republic of Brothers-in-law', embodied in peasant household production. As Hyden pointed out: "pre-capitalist (or pre-socialist) social formations survive because the economic structures that give them life are still at work" (ibid: 4). Hence the recourse to coercion by the 'Citizens'.

However, the use of force might have helped bring the peasants to the village sites, but ensuring their participation in production was another matter altogether:

> The villagers made token efforts for a year or two, usually clearing less than 1 acre of communal land per adult member, and doing so in such a way as not to interfere with the agricultural activity on their private farms.
>
> (Coulson, 1982: 245)

Ingle (1972) has pointed out also that as far as political participation was concerned, individual peasants reacted either through "accomodation, aquiescence or withdrawal" depending on circumstance:

> Most likely the peasant's first and minimal reaction to the intrusions of the external political system into his established patterns of life was accomodation [which] meant little more than appearing for political meetings... .As the district political system became capable of securing greater compliance to policy goals due to increased coercion, a second possible reaction was acquiescence. For the peasant acquiescence was a temporary coping measure. ...If the external system were able to place unrelenting pressure on the localities to ensure compliance with their demand, a third reaction might occur. The individual peasants might merely withdraw physically from the penetration of the external polititcal systems into their immediate political system.
>
> (Ingle, 1972: 253-4)

Thus, the normative system which still informed peasant society in Tanzania, and which was ironically praised as being the basis of *Ujamaa* by Nyerere, constituted the most important element of resistance. When Nyerere claimed the Africanness of *Ujamaa*,he referred to a totally idealised version of communitarian and egalitarian organisation of life based on brotherhood and self-help. True the peasant mode was a self-reliant type of social organistion, but it was also dependent on a host of cultural beliefs and customs.

For instance, it has been found that often, peasants refused to move from their initial homesteads because they did not want to leave the place where their ancestors had been buried (Westerlund, 1980: 144). By moving to new villages , the peasants were indirectly drawn to abandon the cult of the ancestors, in favour of the cult of the state. This they were not prepared to do unless forced to. On the other hand, the discourse of Nyerere itself was caught in a contradiction, since its version of traditional society did not account for the importance of the cult of ancestors in promoting and preserving affinity with the extended families, "the affinity that ujamaa was supposed to extend" (Westerlund, 1980: 144).

Another important point of conflict between the 'Republic of Brothers-in-law' and the 'Republic of Citizens' and their *Ujamaa* programme, has been the belief in witchcraft.

> The problem was all the more serious because many people joined ujamaa villages very reluctantly or even refused to do so "for fear that if they came closer together a lot of bewitching would arise".
>
> (Westerlund, ibid: 155)

Thus proximity of other people is seen as conducive to witchcraft, and permanent settlement would make it difficult for people "to follow their usual practice of simply moving their village to another area when withchcraft or any other calamity threatened" (Ingle, ibid: 88). Sometimes, local officials were thought to connive with 'witches' when they prevented and outlawed local witchhunts. The state was seen to establish an alliance with evil, and the credibility of *ujamaa* was partly jeopardised. It is interesting for instance that the rapid changes sought by *ujamaa* "created situations which were conducive to the practice of witchcraft" (Westerlund, ibid: 156-7), as the tensions

of change grew, while the normative framework most likely to deal with them was not internalised yet. It is also significant that the Tanzanian national press was used to denounce the "widespread belief in superstition", which was detected even amongst "highly educated and responsible people indulging in using witchcraft to get promotions and to 'maintain' themselves in their jobs" (in Westerlund, ibid: 155). This indictment appeared in the Daily News, 7 May 1974. The paper went on:

> Let it be said openly that it will be a mockery of the whole virtuous ideas of education, enlightenment and civilisation if even after Tanzania will have achieved 100 per cent literacy, such rotten superstitious ideas will still be prevailing.
>
> (in Westerlund, ibid: 155)

Westerlund further reports another editorial of the Daily News dated 30 March 1977, which found it "distressing" to see that some people still believed in "primitive and unscientific ways of dealing with their environment" (Westerlund, ibid: 159-160).

In Holmes's terms, the comments of the Daily News editorials disclose a twofold problem:

> a normative clash between the norms of the 'Republic of Citizens' and the 'Republic of Brothers-in-law';
>
> a normative discrepancy among the 'Citizens' themselves as they still held to some norms of the 'Republic of Brothers-in-law'.

In these circumstances, while the higher valuations held by each 'Republic' clearly clashed with each other, some 'Citizens' still maintained valuations pertaining to the 'Republic of Brothers-in-law', as lower valuations, which in theory should have given way to the new higher valuations of the 'Republic of Citizens'. Accordingly, the Tanzanian dilemma in terms of failure of *Ujamaa* , (ie. the difficulties of nation-building and modernisation), is due not only to a clear-cut

clash between two fundamentally different normative and institutional patterns. Part of the problem is also contained in the relative normative no-change prevailing amongst some 'Citizens', although they have initiated institutional change of modernisation and integrated nation-building, with all the attached paraphernalia of modern apparatuses.

Another difficulty emerged in the course of *Ujamaa* implementation, and that was the weak productivity of the modern economic sector. At the 1982 National Conference of Chama Cha Mapinduzi, Nyerere passionately pleaded that "everyone must work" (Nyerere, 1982: 64), thus attesting to the absence of the 'work ethic' of a modern 'Republic of Citizens'. Indeed, in Nyerere's own words, the *ujamaa* conception of work remains very ambiguous:

> When I say that in traditional African society everybody was a worker, I do not use the word 'worker' simply as opposed to 'employer' but also as opposed to 'loiterer' or 'idler'. One of the most socialistic achievements of our society was the sense of security it gave to its members,... But it is too often forgotten nowadays that the basis of this great socialistic achievement was this: that it was taken for granted that every member of society... contributed his fare share of effort towards the production of its wealth. The other use of the word 'worker', in its specialized sense of 'employee' as opposed to employer reflects a capitalist attitude of mind ...which is totally foreign to our way of thinking. ...and it is incompatible with the socialist society we want to build here.
> Our first step, therefore, must be to re-educate ourselves; to regain our former attitude of mind.
> (Nyerere, 1966: 165-166)

By rejecting the capitalistic version of 'worker', Nyerere did not realize that he was bound to reject its closest corollary, the very 'work ethic' which, according to Weber and Marx, had guaranteed the rise of capitalism, and was subsequently adopted in orthodox socialist countries. While Weber insisted that:

> Labour must...be performed as if it were an absolute end in itself, a calling. But such an attitude is by no means a product of nature, ...but can only be the product of a long and arduous process of education.
>
> (Weber, 1958: 62)

Marx explained that:

> The advance of capitalist production develops a working class, which by education, tradition, habit, looks upon the conditions of that mode of production as self evident laws of nature.
>
> (Marx, 1967: 737)

Labour as a 'calling' and as a 'self evident law of nature' is far from being the case in Tanzanian society today, where the eclectism of *Ujamaa*, and the reproductory (rather than productory) habits of the 'Republic of Brothers-in-law' have made it very difficult for a 'Republic of Citizens' to establish solid foundations. The Tanzanian experience of socialist transformation for the last twenty years, casts doubt on Nyerere's vision of socialism based on the peasant mode of social organisation, given the resilience of valuations typical of a 'Republic of Brothers-in-law' (which managed to survive even amongst 'official socialists').

3.8.2. Algeria's 'Cousins' Wave the Islamic Flag.

As in Tanzania, the elements of no-change in Algeria, have by and large emanated from the persistence of the normative system of 'traditional' society embodied in the 'Republic of Cousins', as well as from the normative inconsistencies of the modernising 'Republic of Citizens'. However, the scene in Algeria is further complicated by the presence of Islam as normative legitimiser of the 'Republic of Citizens' as well as the 'Republic of Cousins'.

Whereas in Tanzania, the relative balance between Islam, Christianity and African religions has favoured the adoption of a secular state; in Algeria the predominance of Islam within civil society at large has led to the state being proclaimed Muslim. Indeed, the assertion of 'Islamic principles' has been appearing unmistakably in all official documents from the Proclamation du 1 Novembre 1954 to the 1986 revised Charte Nationale. However, long before the war of liberation, the cultural movement of the *Ulamaa*, which thrived in the 1930's, erected Islam as its paramount motto against the assimilationist policies of the colonial administration. The leader of the movement, Sheikh Abdelhamid Ibn Badis, successfully launched a rallying cry against French presence in Algeria. Its motto was: "The people of Algeria is Muslim, and to Arabity it belongs". It was destined never to desert all subsequent rhetoric, be it during the war of liberation, or independence. Since 1962, the two Constitutions (1963 and 1976) of the country proclaimed Islam as the religion of state (respectively article 4, and article 2), and so did the three Charters (1964 Algiers Charter, 1976 and 1986 National Charters).

To many observers, the proclamation of Islam as religion of the state seemed paradoxical in view of the modernist economic strategy, which in institutional terms has revolutionised the social structure of Algerian society, almost beyond recognition.

> In this disconnected society, one is struck by the socialist rhetoric disseminated to the outside and by the Puritanism embraced at home. Even within the society, the combination of technical build-up and complete avoidance of secular practices seems paradoxical... .
>
> (Hermassi, 1975: 213)

Some have argued that the proclamation of Islam as the religion of the state, is but a process of "ideologisation of Islam" by the dominant political class to legitimise itself and its developmentalist ideology:

> Such references present, for the political class, the double advantage of carrying modern options "along the sense of History" whilst backing a search for authenticity, which official apologia will not fail to underline as the most cogent proof of its attachment to cultural models of Islamism.
>
> (Merad in Gellner & Vatin, 1979: 154)

Although there is an element of truth in this argument, it cannot, nevertheless, claim to be systematic. Indeed, such statements all too often overlook the dynamic behind the adoption of specific ideological discourses. Rather, they seem to be content with tautological confirmations such as: 'official ideology is dominant, and is professed by the ruling polity in order to secure their interests, and insure their reproduction'. Accordingly, an aura of homogeneity is cast upon the political leadership, thus disregarding its need for recruitment amongst a variety of groups, and the likely heterogeneity it might suffer on this account. Above all, the argument of the presumed instrumentality of ideology disregards the very important element of lower valuations held by members of the polity, despite their tranformist or revolutionary aspirations.

Indeed the profession of Islam is far from being an instrumental matter in Algerian politics. This has been shown in the consistency of the discourse on 'Islamic identity', since the 1930's. All political movements known to have marked the nation were led by people who emanated from petty-bourgeois scripturalist milieux, and could not be accused of having merely paid lip-service to Islam. It would be difficult to deny the impact of such a tradition on post-independence

leaderships. Despite the presence of an overwhelming modernist technocratic trend amongst the polity, none of its members can be confirmed to hold non-Islamic views. The fact that they are hardly fervent practitioners of the rites, is not a sufficient indicator of their indifference to Islam.

On the other hand, the official profession of Islam indeed indicates that the Algerian 'Republic of Citizens' is tributary of the influences of the 'Republic of Cousins'. Although triumphant in its 'development' strategy on the whole, it has been increasingly under the spell of the 'Cousins' and their allies amongst the 'Citizens', especially with regard to the enforcement of the Islamic discourse in the early 1980's. One should only judge by the latest amendments brought to the 1976 Charte Nationale; now replaced by the 1986 version which concentrates in particular on the role of Islam as the first ideological reference (JORADP, no.7, 1986: 109-111) compared to its subordination to the "socialist revolution" as in the 1976 version (Charte Nationale, 1976: 21).

If anything, the 1986 amendments have revealed an offensive by the 'Republic of Cousins', or at least their representatives within the 'Republic of Citizens'. Indeed, the team officially appointed to "enrich" the National Charter could be said to belong to the cousins-prone faction of the wider 'Republic of Citizens' in power. Significantly enough, most of them were the product of the *Ulamaa* school, and educated in the Arab-Islamic tradition of the Maghribi *medressa*, and the prestigious Islamic institutions of higher education (such as Zaitouna in Tunis and El Azhar in Cairo). All of them were

party or government members. But most striking of all, they all belonged to the arabophone intelligentsia, a significant contrast with the team who elaborated the 1976 Charter, who were mostly French-educated nationalists. Another detail of some importance was the vernacular used to write each version of the Charter. The 1976 version was written in French and translated into Arabic for official purposes, whilst the 1986 version was written directly in Arabic. This is of some importance because it is symptomatic of the composition of the 'Republic of Citizens', of its political alliances and of the reactions of the 'Republic of Cousins' to it.

In essence, the re-writing of the Charte Nationale not only adds to the normative inconsistencies of the 'Republic of Citizens' in power, but it is also symptomatic of the growing reaction of the 'Republic of Cousins' at large. This latter has been gradually using the institutional channels of the 'Republic of Citizens' to voice its disapproval of the increasing secularisation of social and cultural life. In 1984, for instance , the 'Cousins' managed to institutionalise the *Shari'a* as the sole regulator of matters of personal status and family life in Algeria, thus defying the Constitutional provisions on "Fundamental Liberties, and Human and Citizen Rights" (Constitution, 1976: 24) and especially Articles 39, 41 and 42. But more on the legal battle of the cousins in Chapter 4, when the debates on the 1984 Family Law in Algeria are examined. It suffices here to examine the motivations of the 'Cousins' and their growing resistance to an outright modernisation of Algerian society. In this, the additional chapter of the 1986 Charter entitled "Islam and the exigencies of the century" is very eloquent:

> ...for the Algerian Revolution, it is not enough to dispose of the beneficial effects of economic development, but rather and in particular, it should ensure that there is balance and harmony between material needs and the demands of the spirit and soul, in a perspective which permits the construction of a society aware of its personality, proud of its past and its patrimony. ...the process of development has engendered modes of behaviour influenced by an environment away from true religion, in opposition to sane traditions, and uses a deceitful language which pretends to express modernity... .
>
> (JORADP, ibid: 110)

The explicit demand for spiritual considerations of a religious kind is quite new in the Algerian discourse of specific socialism. The 1976 Charter indeed denied that socialism in Algeria "proceeded from any materialist metaphysics"(p.23), but no moralistic considerations were bestowed on the declaration. In fact, a number of developments in the normative and institutional changes brought about by the 'Republic of Citizens' have precipitated the reaction of the 'Cousins' and their allies amongst the 'Citizens', epitomized today in the 1986 Charte Nationale.

Since the death of Boumediene in 1978, a questioning of the underlining philosophy of economic development, almost exclusively based on industrialisation, has taken place. The new philosophy was to favour consumer interests rather than sheer productivity, and by the same token, encourage the proliferation of the small and intermediate private sector. Behind the change a new polity was manoeuvering; in contrast with the aggressiveness of the 'Republic of Citizens' under Boumediene, the new team of 'Citizens' was more sensitive to the reaction of the 'Cousins'.

The omnipotence of the state apparatuses in all spheres of life has not always been welcomed. It was in fact impinging more and more on the 'mechanical solidarity' of the 'Republic of Cousins'. Although this latter had been profoundly undermined by the previous colonial structures (Benhachenhou, 1978), it managed to salvage its normative references. Whereas it could legitimise its resistance to a destructive foreign power, it was less willing to reject the progressivist advances of the modernisers under Independence. Nevertheless, the malaise grew as loyalty to a central state increasingly replaced the more traditional loyalties to the local clan, tribe or ancestor. For the 'Republic of Cousins', which had maintained cohesion without central power through ancestral loyalties, offering allegiance to an impersonal centre of power had its limits. Whilst regulation of its economic life was now unavoidable, it nevertheless made this conditional upon its political participation with the 'Citizens'.

Indeed, the survival of some practices of the 'Republic of Cousins' in Algeria, can be witnessed in the political recruitment process. Patronage and kin relations are still a predominant criteria for political office and the problem of 'regionalism' has always weighed heavily on the leadership's composition. To maintain a certain aura of homogeneity, the Algerian 'Republic of Citizens' has had to yield to demands for equal representation of each region. The redistributive policy of 'regional equilibrium' is a testimony of kin-patronage practices. Although meant to be strictly economic (in terms of expanding development programmes to the whole national territory so as to ensure national integration), it turned out in practice to be transformed into 'tribal and clannish' representation. The policy of

'regional equilibrium' was mainly enforced under the Boumediene administration, and went hand in hand with the consolidation of the central executive apparatuses. But it still remains difficult to distinguish between ideological rifts and regional ones. Indeed political debates between left and right in Algeria have hardly been predominant given the unitarian legitimacy of nationalism. Instead, very early after Independence, they gave way to regional competition. That is where the 'Republic of Cousins' had managed to survive and eventually influence the 'Republic of Citizens', within a pattern astonishingly reminiscent of the Khaldunian type of political recruitment.

> When modern conditions lead to the fusion of modern jargon with the spirit of Ibn Khaldun, we get a distinctive species of "totalitarian democracy" in which populist verbiage covers kin-patronage politics. Under modern conditions, it is often noted that government is by patronage network... .The links of patronage are not created arbitrarily and freely, in a so to speak, open market of corruption. Their formation is weighted in favour of pre-existing group links. Such systems which are now common, should perhaps be considered a mixed or intermediate political form, a neo-Ibn-Khaldunian type of government.
>
> (Gellner, 1981: 30)

In other words, a residual 'Republic of Cousins' (ie. the Khaldunian *badw*) has survived in the bosom of the 'Republic of Citizens' by forcing onto it patronage links, thus retarding Weberian type meritocratic practices.

Despite an aggressive modernisation policy, the Algerian 'Republic of Cousins' proved hard to eradicate as it continued to be residually manifest within the 'Republic of Citizens' itself. Indeed, unlike the Tanzanian 'Republic of Brothers-in-law' which can still take refuge in its structural basis of the 'economy of affection', the Algerian

'Republic of Cousins' has totally lost its economic structural basis.[35] However it managed to recuperate political influence over the 'Citizens', as national integration forced these latter to recourse to kin-patronage practices rather than meritocratic ones in political recruitment. But, the main shield of the 'Republic of Cousins' in Algeria remains the brandishing of Islam as a legitmiser for their demands, and practices.

Although introduced as a 'Republic of Citizens' itself (as analysed earlier), Islam has long been adopted by the Algerian 'Republic of Cousins' as its principal higher valuation, albeit with a significant disregard for the more universalist and individualist injunctions of the Islamic doctrine as demonstrated by Tillion. If the 'Republic of Cousins' today appeals to Islam to back up its resistance to the modernising 'Republic of Citizens', it is mainly because it fears the materialism and individualism of a modern socialist republic. Indeed the growing number of youths taking part in the Friday prayers all over the country, is not entirely fortuitous. The industrialised economy of Algeria and its polytechnical educational system should have been conducive to creating a secular political culture as modernisation theory would put it. Instead, it should be emphasized that the growing spiritualist demands have been made to put a halt to any attempt at secularisation, as attested by the inclusion of a whole new chapter on Islam and spirituality in the 1986 Charte Nationale. However the most pugnacious response of the 'Republic of Cousins' in Algeria remains the legal battle over family law. This will be examined in the next Chapter.

NOTES: CHAPTER 3

1. 'Modernisation' should not be read as 'modernisation theory' as discussed in Chapter 1. Here the use is deliberately non-rigorous, and can simply be read as 'development'. Subsequent uses such as 'modernizing' (elites of Algeria and Tanzania) will be made along the same lines. The expression conveys non-critically the process of change as conceptualised by policy-makers in both countries.

2. Cf. Tillion, G., op. cit. Although historical, her study of the subjection of women in Mediterranean societies, is a remarkable example of a problem-centered reading of historical facts. She particularly enlightens our approach to 'traditional' societies by suggesting that their presumed static nature is more of a 'defence mechanism' than an intrinsic feature. Her study also skilfully draws attention to the survival of 'residual' practices long after the weakening or even the destruction of their material culture. Subsequent quotes from Tillion's work are this author's translations.

3. Cf. Claude Levi-Strauss, Les structures élémentaires de la parenté, Paris, Presses Universitaires, 1949. Tillion criticizes for instance Levi-Strauss' inductive conclusion on the practice of the exchange of women as essential for the survival of all subsistence economies. The practice of endogamy in most Mediterranean social formations, also based on subsistence economies, is a significant refutation.

4. Cf. Lucy Mair, African Marriage and Social Change, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1969; Radcliffe-Brown A.R. & Forde D. (eds.) African Systems of

Kinship and Marriage, London, 1953. Both accounts are very careful not to equate matriliny with a superior status for women. If anything, matrilineal descent can be very binding for women since they are kept within their familial compound as an element of production and reproduction.

5. A 'Universal Republic of Citizens' is in fact a euphemism for the ideals of individual, society, and knowledge embodied in Western philosophical and political traditions, especially since the enlightenment. The Marxist-Leninist tradition is generally considered as a rupture with the 'liberal' traditions of Descartes, Rousseau, Locke, J.S. Mill, Condorcet, Jefferson. However, the Judeo-Christian and Hellenic heritage (particularly Plato and Aristotle) may be taken as the core for both. Holmes, recommends for instance that the Bible as well as Plato and Aristotle are taken as philosophical references for the USSR (Holmes, 1981: 124) along with Marx and Lenin. It is interesting that the scientific contribution of the Arabs passes unnoticed. Perhaps it was also considered 'universal' by Renaissance Europeans and therefore unrecognised as Arab. It is ironic that today, the rhetorics of Algeria and Tanzania ignore the European component of their discourse because it was mediated by colonialism. Cf. Ali Mazrui, Political Values and the Educated Class in Africa, Heinemann, 1978, about the mixture of Islamic radicalism and Rousseaunian 'idyllism' in the African socialist discourse.

6. The conception of knowledge of the 'Republic of Cousins' has been kept very broad as it is not meant to encompass one particular historical period, but rather a 'social framework of knowledge'. Cf. G.

Gurvitch, The Social Frameworks of Knowledge, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1971. Following Gurvitch's typology of 'Global Societies and their Cognitive Systems' (Part Four: 117-220), our 'Republic of Cousins' largely corresponds to his 'Patriarchal Societies' in which:

> ...the structure was based on the exclusive pre-eminence of the large-scale domestico-familial group based on consanguinous kinship, related usually through masculine descent, whether or not it was polygamous. This group incorporated all others,...it predominated over age and sex groups.
> All economic, political and religious activities were brought together in the home of the domestico-conjugal family... .
>
> (Gurvitch, ibid: 144)

The predominance of the familial group is exactly what Tillion has brought up in relation to women's subjection in the Mediterranean 'Republic of Cousins', especially in view of its cansanguinity. Gurvith also draws attention to the behavioural pattern pertaining to such a social structure. It is "preferably customary and traditional rather than procedural or ritualistic" (ibid: 145). This has some bearing on the state of knowledge. Gurvitch notes that 'common-sense' knowledge is prominant in this type of society and is "firmly attached to tradition"; whereas 'knowledge of the external world' is "placed in the time of slowed down, long duration as well as cyclical-seasonal time" (ibid: 146). 'Mythico-theological knowledge' is "weakly expressed" (ibid):

> The fact that the concern for perpetuating the mythico-theological tradition was left to the 'bards'; narrators and singers of epic tales, whose position and social role were the least respected ones, is sufficiently eloquent: it proves that the patriarchs and their followers had little time to be concerned with theological knowledge.
>
> (ibid: 147)

The 'little concern for theological knowledge' was encountered by Islam when conquering the North African 'Republic of Cousins' which continued

to practice its 'customs' as noted by Tillion and as analysed by Gurvitch. Finally, Gurvitch points out that scientific knowledge in the patriarchal society is 'non-existent', although it had rudimentary technical knowledge.

7. Pierre Bourdieu in his Sociologie de l'Algérie, Presses Universitaires de France, 1961, draws attention to the depth of intermingling between the local Berber customary element and the Islamic component of Algeria's culture:

> An example of this is Kabyle law, in which it is impossible to distinguish the borrowings that have been re-interpreted in terms of the receiving context from the vernacular institutions and from the dissimilating reconstructions protecting against invasion by Koranic law. Inversely, everywhere the Berber rock may be seen just beneath the surface of Moslem legislation. A mass of local institutions have been absorbed by Moslem law in the name of the principle of "necessity" and of "necessity making law". It has been noted by G. Marcy that the most typical Moslem institutions are marked by the spirit of Berber law, for example, the agricultural and stock-breeding associations, and the accessory stipulations of marriage contracts.

This passage is quoted from The Algerians, a translation of Bourdieu's 'Sociologie' by A.C.M. Ross, Beacon Press, Boston, 1962. The emphasis on the intermingling of local Berber and Eastern Islamic laws throws some light on the power of local customs to transform the Islamic ideal normative pattern into a local actual pattern. See Chapter 4 for a discussion of family legislation, taken as an illustration of the present argument.

8. The subject of 'marriage compulsion' is still today one of the most passionate debates in Sunni Islamic legislation, as there is no explicit treatment of it in the Qur'an However, the latter's injunctions on women's 'good treatment' in a variety of verses (30: 21; 2: 187; 4:

19; 2: 229; 2: 31) has led to a consensus among leading jurists of Islam that compulsion should not be tolerated, and if exercised women may appeal against the imposed marriage contract. Cf. Hammudah Abd al 'Ati, The Family Structure in Islam, American Trust Publications, 1977, pp. 78-84; Afzular Rahman, Role of Muslim Woman in Society, Seerah Foundation, London, 1986, pp. 311-312.

9. See Chapter 4.

10. The term *Khalifah* was first used to designate the prophet Muhammad's companions who succeeded him to lead the nascent Muslim empire. Those were the four *Khulafa' al-Rashidin* who led the empire from Medinah and Mecca. The word means a 'viceroy' entrusted with the mission of preserving God's earthly realm. Cf. Watt, W.M., Islamic Political Thought, Edinburgh University Press, 1980; and al Attas, op.cit., pp. 24-5.

11. Cf. Arkoun, M., "Le Concept de raison Islamique" in Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, CNRS, Paris, 1979; Gellner, E., & Vatin, J.C., (eds.) Islam et Politique au Maghreb, Table Ronde du Centre de Recherches et d'Etudes sur les Sociétés Méditerranéennes, Aix en Provence, Juin 1979; and in particular Vatin's article "Puissance d'Etat et Résistances Islamiques en Algérie, XIX-XX siècles: Approche Mécanique"; as well as A. Merad, "l'Idéologisation de l'Islam dans le Monde Musulman Contemporain"; both in Gellner & Vatin, op. cit. The underlining argument defended by these authors is the distinction they draw between the orthodox scripturalist tradition in Islam, as official and intellectual; and a more grassroot model of Islam

combining faith and local customs. The two are alleged to be more likely at odds with each other, rather than confirm the aura of uniformity ascribed to the so-called Muslim World.

12. Abd al Rahman Ibn Muhammad Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) was born in Tunis, but travelled extensively in the Muslim empire of the period. Holding political and legislative office from time to time in numerous central and regional courts of the empire, he developed a close understanding of political change in 'medieval Islam'. Hence his formidable work on the history and social and political mechanisms of both Western and Eastern parts of the empire: Kitab el 'Ibar, known in translation as the Muqaddimah, after its first volume where Ibn Khaldun laid down his theory of social change based on the concept of *'Assabiyya*. However, ibn Khaldun's work included seven volumes which he devised as a comprehensive Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle (Monteil's translation for Unesco, 1967-68). Cf. A. Megherbi, La Pensée Sociologique d'Ibn Khaldun, SNED, Alger, 1971. Ibn Khaldun concentrated his study on the North African provinces of the Muslim empire, which was coined as Maghreb. See note 16 below.

13. Cf. E. Gellner, 'State and Revolution in Islam' in Millenium, Journal of International Studies, Vol. 8, no. 3, Winter 1979-1980, p. 191.

14. At independence (5 July 1962) Algeria became République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire. Note that socialism does not appear in this official title.

15. In Algeria, the pastoral-nomadic and tribal elements were predominant, especially among the Arab-speaking groups. However, Berber populations were divided between the sedentary arboriculturalist Kabyles in the northern mountains, the transhuming Shawia of the eastern mountains, and the city-based merchants of the M'zab region in central Algeria (see Bourdieu, op.cit., chapters 1,2,3). The seclusion of women is stricter amongst the first and the last and seems to coincide with sedentarity. The pastoral-nomadic and tribal characteristic was retained as general for the 'Republic of Cousins' as it is taken for a type, which, by and large, renders the total structure of both Arab and Berber groups which intermingled to a very great extent.

16. The term *Maghreb* was adopted for North Africa following the Arab-Islamic conquest of the 7th century. It literally means the sun-setting time, but also West, and Occident. It completed the empire's map, with the *Mashrek* in the Middle- East and Far-East. Cf. Laroui, A., 1'histoire du maghreb, François Maspero, Paris, 1970.

17. John Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika, Cambridge University Press, 1979, p.35. The Islamic merchant influence goes back to the ninth century with Arabs and Shirazi Persians migrating to Zanzibar, as well as establishing settlements in the islands of Pemba and Kilwa Kisiwani off the mainland coast. Between the thirteenth and eighteenth centuries the Arabs and Afro-Shirazi controlled the gold, ivory and slave trades from the city states of Zanzibar and Kilwa Kisiwani. By 1840, Zanzibar became the world leading producer of cloves(based on slave-dependent plantations), Cf. Rodger Yeager, Tanzania, An African

Experiment, Westview Press, 1982, pp. 7-8. The Muslim islanders did not venture mainland, which was left to the Germans and later the British to colonise. Germany occupied Tanganyika by virtue of the Anglo-German treaty of 1886. Following WW1, the country was handed over to the British as a 'mandate' of the League of Nations in 1919. The European legacy was later to establish share-crop agriculture, and extend proselytisation of local peoples through missionary work and education. Cf. I.N Kimambo and A.J. Temu (eds), A History of Tanzania, Heinemann Educational Books for the Historical Association of Tanzania, Nairobi, 1969.

18. Again this is a general characteristic of our model of the 'Republic of Brothers-in-law' in Tanzania. We should be aware that it is in fact a melting pot comprising a great variety of populations. Indeed, Iliffe has argued that dividing Tanganyika into 'tribes' was a European administrative and political device in order to implement 'indirect rule' (Iliffe, ibid: 318-41):

> The notion of tribe lay at the heart of indirect rule in Tanganyika. Refining the racial thinking common in German times, administrators believed that every African belonged to a tribe, just as evry European belonged to a nation. The idea doubtless owed much to the Old Testament, to Tacitus and Caesar, to academic distinctions between tribal societies based on status and modern societies based on contract, and to post-war anthropologists who prefered 'tribal' to the more pejorative word 'savage'. Tribes were seen as cultural units possessing a common language, a single social system, and an established customary law. Their political and social systems rested on kinship. Tribal membership was hereditary. Different tribes were related genealogically, so that Africa's history was a vast family tree of tribes. ...this stereotype bore little relation to Tanganyika's kaleidoscopic history,... . Europeans believed Africans belonged to tribes; Africans built tribes to belong to.
>
> (ibid: 323-4)

Iliffe is careful to explain that groups and identities were ecologically and geographically determined, and that the history of Tanganyika is that of a flow of colonists. Two main groups are immediately recognisable: the Bantu cultivators with small scale fluid social organisation; and the Nilotic pastoralists, less numerous and more mobile. However, "most of Tanganyika's peoples were patrilineal" (ibid: 16). See note 19 below for further details on Tanzania's 'traditional' social patterns.

19. The egalitarianism of Tanzania's traditional societies (so much boasted by Nyerere for instance) is a general feature. Today's national society is based on "an extreme ethnic diversity", which a century ago meant that "a large number of tribes and separate political units ...[ranged from] complex democratic states, [to] small chiefdoms, or were organized into large centralized kingdoms". Cf. J.E.G. Sutton, "The Peopling of Tanzania", in Kimambo & Temu (eds.) (ibid: 1-13). Four distinct regions in mainland Tanzania may constitute our 'Republic of Brothers-in-law': the West Lake region where the Kingdom of Kitara rigidly divided people into castes, and held a stratification and clientship system; Western and Central regions where agricultural communities practiced matrilineal succession to perpetuate the nobility of the ruling group; the North-Eastern region with its pastoral polulations of Pare, and Masai with warrior-like traditions; and finally the Southern region with its small chiefdoms. See, Isaria N. Kimambo, "The Interior Before 1800", in Kimambo and Temu, (ibid: 14-33). However, most of these communities were by and large agricultural societies organised into small chiefdoms, with individual autonomous clans, which recognised chiefdom authority only in matters

of common interest, as its function was more ritualistic than administrative (Kimambo, ibid: 15).

20. Iliffe has summarized the division of labour between the sexes and the ensuing status of women in a general pattern for 'traditional' Tanzania:

> The division of labour between the sexes varied. In human societies generally, hoe-agriculture has tended to coincide with low levels of economic differenciation, the extensive use of female labour in agriculture, polygyny, the payment of bridewealth as recompense to the family losing a woman's labour and fertility, and the importance of extended families where survival remained tenuous and men owned little property which they wished to keep within a nuclear family. This was broadly Tanganyika's social pattern. In most areas, women did much of the repetitive agricultural work, while men herded, hunted, cleared the forest, and managed the homestead... . Polygyny existed in most areas... . Bridewealth was also common but not universal. Where cattle existed, they were the normal gifts in bridewealth. ...Those who lacked cattle might obtain brides by labour.
>
> (ibid: 16-17)

It is clear from the above that women were by and large an 'exchange commodity', and where they were kept in their families, this was through "marriage by service to the bride's parents, who then owned the children" (ibid: 17). Present- day family legislation had to take these non-individualist traditions into account (see Chapter 4).

21. A number of subtle exploitative practices exist and can be catalysed through the position of women:

> Control of women enabled older men to control and exploit their juniors. Although exploitation was masked by every man's expectation of becoming and elder, generational tension may have been the most important form of social conflict in all but the politically most sophisticated of Tanganyikan societies. ... Exploitation of women and young men was the corollary of men's inability to exploit each other by economic means.
>
> (Iliffe, ibid: 16-17)

However, we should be careful to note that slavery was practised on the coast and in Zanzibar, thereby entailing the existence of a sophisticated social and political system. "Coastal towns had each its Sultan, *diwani* or *jumbe* often claiming Shirazi origin and advised by leading merchants" (ibid: 37). The predominant Muslim influence of coastal Swahili culture also meant the 'domestication' of women, who "Although regarded as inferior in status, intellect and moral strength, could wield considerable political influence, and were spared the agricultural drudgery which was their lot in most inland societies"(ibid: 38). Thus, no matter how simple or complex the system of exploitation, the position of women seems to be that of inferiors.

22. By and large, the conception of knowledge of the Tanzanian 'Republic of Brothers-in-law" corresponds to that of Gurvitch's 'archaic societies'. According to him, "theogonic and cosmogonic mythology ...pervades all the types of knowledge that appear in these societies, especially as the types of knowledge are not clearly distinguished: indeed not only are scientific and philosophical knowledge missing, but common-sense knowledge, perceptual knowledge of the external world, knowledge of the Other and the We, and political knowledge, tend to fuse together" (Gurvitch, ibid: 123). On the absence of philosophical knowledge, and the danger of equating philosophical thinking with oral 'folk' traditions in Africa, see Kwasi Wiredu, Philosophy and an African Culture, Cambridge University Press, 1980, particularly the introduction and chapter three.

23. Cf. Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Penguin Books, 1981, in which he reviews the transformation of rural

social organisation in England, France, the USA, China, Japan and India, and the processes which led this transformation to bring about the contemporary forms of 'dictatorial and democratic' political regimes. Moore's argument is mainly concerned with the transformation of the 'peasantry' as an exploited class, which in most cases was done away with, to pave the way to more urbanite and industrial formations. Hence his conclusion that the 'peasantry is a closed chapter in human history'. However, both Africa and Latin America are examples of struggling peasantries which are more likely to have evolved together with capitalist mechanisms, rather than belong to inherent social structures. For Africa, see Iliffe, op. cit., Chapter 9; and for Latin America, A. Gunder Frank, Latin America, Underdevelopment or Revolution, Monthly Review Press, 1969.

24. Algeria became a colony of France following its invasion by French troops in 1830. The colonial policy rested mainly on European settlement (and lasted until 1962). Thence, the agressive policies of land confiscation, and cultural assimilation, so that Algeria was considered a *département* of France. Tanzania, experienced two colonial administrations, the German from 1886 to 1919, when the British took over until Independence in 1961. The Germans were noted for their expansion of Swahili culture and language in view of their privileged relations with the Zanzibari sultans; the British for their 'indirect rule' policy to further control of the scattered population of mainland Tanganyika. In both cases, even the proselytising activities of the various missions were carried out in local vernaculars. As a result, the nationalist struggles of Algeria and Tanzania vastly differed. Algeria's had to be far more radical and was

epitomised in a bloody war of liberation, whereas Tanzania's was much more piecemeal.

25. Indeed, the mid-sixties represent a landmark in both countries. Boumediene led a bloodless coup in 1965 to establish a strong and stable regime. In 1964, Tanzania was created following the amalgamation of mainland Tanganyika and the island of Zanzibar.

26. This came in sharp contrast with the previous discourse of economic austerity of the Boumediene administration, and was largely echoed in the national press. It was also welcomed by city-dwellers who grew impatient with endemic shortages of agricultural goods, and the quasi absence of luxury goods.

27. Following ten years of talks between International Monetary Fund (IMF) officials and the Tanzania government, the latter had to yield finally to the conditions of the Fund. These included currency devaluation and the withdrawal of subsidies on staple goods. Agreement was reached in 1986, shortly after an international conference on Tanzania, organised by the Centre for African Studies of the London School of Oriental and African Studies. The conference, interestingly entitled Tanzania After Nyerere, conveyed in fact a very tense atmosphere, significantly linked with the IMF talks. The panoply of interventions disclosed both bitterly disillusioned radical scholars, and euphoric supporters of the new 'liberal' economic policies. Although Nyerere's policies, and philosophy of self-reliance were attacked, the *Mwalimu* himself still drew a lot of respect, especially as he had stepped down from his presidential office in 1985.

28. See Alistair Horn's account of the war and the social and political forces involved in it, A Savage War of Peace, Algeria 1954-1962, Penguin Books, 1977. French and Francophone literature on the subject abounds; the most poignant account remains that of the Algerian Mostefa Lacheraf (currently a diplomat), L'Algérie, nation et société, François Maspero, Paris, 1976.

29. Cf. Iliffe J., 1979; Bienen H., 1967; Coulson A., 1982.

30. Cf. Bedjaoui M., 1961; Quandt W., 1969; Lazreg M., 1976.

31. Cf. Bienen H., 1967.

32. De Gaulle's visit to Algeria in 1958, when the war was raging, is an example of such moves. De Gaulle came with a package of social and economic reforms aimed at improving the standards of living of so-called 'Muslim Algerians'. However he met with the wrath of European settlers, and the rebuke of fighting Algerians, who now wanted no less than full independence.

33. This came in a compilation of Boumediene's speeches by Khalfa Mameri, Citations du Président Boumédiène, SNED, Alger, 1975. This and other passages are this author's translations.

34. Earlier, when formulating his visionary philosophy of *Ujamaa* and Self-reliance, Nyerere was adamantly against coercion:

> By orders, or even by slavery, you can build pyramids and magnificent roads, you can achieve expanded acreages of cultivation, and increases in the quantity of goods produced in your factories. All these things... can be achieved through the use of force; but none of them result in the development of people. Force and deceitful promises can in fact achieve short term material goals. They canot bring strength to a nation or a community, and they cannot provide a basis for the freedom of the people.

This is from his paper Freedom and Development published on 16 October 1968, and reproduced in his Freedom and Development, A Selection from Writings and Speeches, 1968-1973; Dar Es Salaam, Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 61.

35. Cf. Benhachenhou A., Formation du sous-développement en Algérie, essai sur les limites du développement du capitalisme en Algérie 1830-1962, Entreprise Nationale, Alger, 1978.

PART TWO

THE FORTUITIES OF SOCIAL CHANGE AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE POSITION OF WOMEN IN ALGERIA AND TANZANIA

CHAPTER FOUR: FAMILY LAWS IN ALGERIA AND TANZANIA, THE BATTLE FOR A SEGREGATED CITY OF WOMEN

In the previous Chapters, attention was focused on the establishment of a 'Republic of Citizens' in Algeria and Tanzania. Both rhetoric and practice of the societal programmes put forward by the national leadership of each country were examined. By and large, each national leadership was presented as a typical example of the 'Republic of Citizens' in time of nation-building. In the cases of Algeria and Tanzania, legitimacy for this 'Republic' drew largely on a discourse of 'specific socialism' whose roots were claimed to be established more on a pre-colonial egalitarian social order, rather than on European and Marxian brands of socialism.

Nevertheless, both the Algerian and Tanzanian 'Citizens' in power had to account with a pre-existing socio-economic structure whose protagonists were mostly acting as clients to the new deal and its institutional and normative proposals.[1] While in Algeria the 'Citizens' were to face a 'Republic of Cousins' and its spiritualist demands, in Tanzania a tribal and scattered 'Republic of Brothers-in-law' simply exasperated the impatient 'Citizens' by taking refuge in ancestral customs. As analysed in Holmesian terms, the change sought by the Citizens happened to come up against a variety of elements of no-change, mainly exemplified in the retention by the 'Cousins' and the 'Brothers-in-Law' of their own normative and institutional models. The latter were not necessarily de-legitimised by the imposition of the new social and economic order since they were indeed recognised as its authentic basis. On the whole, the 'Cousins' and 'Brothers-in-law' did

not openly oppose institutional innovations in view of their legitimacy, which, by and large, dwelt on the 'universal' axioms of development, science and progress.[2] But they approached them as consumers rather than producers. Hence the resistance to the new social rites of a 'Republic of Citizens' which were yet to be internalised (Bouguerra, 1979: 113). However where the resistance of the 'Cousins' and the 'Brothers-in-law' seemed to be residual in matters of institutional change, it turned into adamant and firm opposition to the aspirations of equality of the sexes put forward by the socialist 'Republic of Citizens'. Above all, provisions for equal legal status for men and women in matters of family law and personal status, have been considered as anathema; even heresy. This Chapter willaccordingly examine the disputes over family laws in Algeria and Tanzania as parameters for the ambiguity of the 'Citizens' towards sex equality, and the deep-seated resentment of the 'Cousins" and 'Brothers-in-law' at the idea.

4.1. Family Law: The Lower Valuations of Algeria's and Tanzania's 'Republic of Citizens'

Both in Algeria and Tanzania, the 'Citizens' have long hesitated before bringing into the open the issue of personal status and family law. Indeed, confronting the issue meant entering the private realm, not only of the 'Cousins' and the 'Brothers-in-law' at large, but also their own. In Myrdal's terms they would be disturbing dormant 'lower valuations'.[3] Whereas the public realm policies did not constitute a menace for these valuations, the private realm of family life, and role and status of the sexes presented an intense controversy.

Where public policies addressed citizens at large, family law and personal status law addressed the 'individual male and female'. This meant that promises of equality of the official rhetoric of socialism could be made more palpable and more immediate:

> It is common that laws which are promulgated touching upon the private lives of individuals and largely dependent upon their willingness to act or refrain from acting in a certain way, depend entirely upon the extent to which other social forces in the community are generated and directed towards the observance of the new rules. In the absence of such socialization the community will continue to be governed by the rules existing prior to the institution of the new rules.
>
> (Rwezaura, 1976: 120)

In the cases of Algeria and Tanzania, Rwezaura's remark would have us assume that the family laws proposed by the ruling 'Citizens' are revolutionary in the sense that they are counter to the higher valuations of the 'Cousins' and the 'Brothers-in-law', as well as the lower valuations of the 'Citizens'. It is argued herein that the new family law in each context represents at its very inception a compromise by the 'Citizens' to the 'Cousins' and the 'Brothers-in-law', as well as an expression of the lower valuations of the 'Citizens'. It will be argued and demonstrated in the following, that the 'Cousins' in Algeria and the 'Brothers-in-law' in Tanzania triumphed in their opposition to the 'Citizens' attempts at enacting relatively progressive family laws. This opposition was not only a lack of socialisation of the "law-subjects" as suggested by Rwezaura (ibid: 101), but was openly voiced by the representatives of the 'Cousins' and the 'Brothers-in-Law' in the very institutions set up by the 'Republic of Citizens' to introduce change. Indeed, in both countries, parliamentary procedure was followed so that the new provisions were debated. Ironically, the issue of family law and personal status brought about the most lively debates ever experienced in either country.

Paradoxically, the conservatism of the 'Cousins' and the 'Brothers-in-law' brought about the most memorable experiences of 'democratic' discussions. Not only did they provoke the legitimation of the developmentist discourse to be questioned for the first time ever, but they also unleashed the expression of more radical and progressive views on the part of the secularist 'Citizens'. For the first time since independence, a variety of social protagonists came to the forefront to voice their opinion about official policy.

In the following, the triumph of the 'Cousins' and the 'Brothers-in-law' over the 'Citizens' in power, and the latter's inconsistencies will be examined in the light of the 1984 Code de la famille in Algeria, and the 1971 Law of Marriage Act in Tanzania. While a close study of the parliamentary debates was possible in Algeria, secondary sources had to be used for Tanzania in order to illustrate the role and reaction of the 'Brothers-in-law', as well as those of the secular 'Citizens' who represent the more progressive quarters of public opinion. Finally, in order to illuminate the attitude of the 'Cousins' and the 'Brothers-in-law', it will be relevant to examine the structure of the family in Africa (North and South of the Sahara), as well as the world view of the *Shari'a* and customary laws on woman's status, as sources for the valuations of our main social protagonists.

4.2. Personal Status and Family Law in Algeria (1962-1981).

Relatively recently, an Arab woman scholar, Fatima Mernissi was speculating:

> Why is it that the eclectism that reigns in so many spheres of Arab daily life is absent when it comes to the shaping of sexual identity?
>
> (in Barakat, 1985: 224)

Mernissi was attempting to comprehend the systematic adoption of Islamic law *Shari'a* in the private realm of the family and personal status in all Arab countries. She argued pertinently that, despite making provision for all other spheres of social organisation, the *Shari'a* had only been adopted in the area of family legislation.[4] Mernissi's question can easily be extended to Algeria, where the eclectism and the aggressiveness of the economic policies since Independence have been unique in the Arab world. Notwithstanding its political and ideological eclectism, the Algerian national elite finally adopted one of the most retrograde family laws with grave consequences for women's constitutional rights as equal citizens.[5] As will be demonstrated, the contemporary history of family legislation in Algeria reflects the hesitations of the official 'Republic of Citizens' and its normative inconsistencies, as much as it reveals the unsuspected strength of public conservative trends (represented by the 'Cousins' of the National Assembly) in imposing their world view on the matter of sex equality.

It would be interesting to note, *en passant*, the attitude of the colonial 'Republic of Citizens' *vis á vis* matters of personal status and family legislation. Notwithstanding the colonial offensive on the local social order, the French assimilationist onslaught had to stop at

the doorstep of the Algerian family. In his extensive study on personal status and family legislations in the Maghrib, Borrmans (1971) explained that the colonial administration was caught between its dominant assimilationist creed and the caution with which it had to treat matters of personal status to minimize clashes with what was then an undisturbed 'Republic of Cousins'. In Algeria, there were gradual, but timid assaults on the indigenous legal apparatus. They were embodied, for instance, in the *Senatus Consulte* (14 July 1865) on the naturalisation of Algerians, and the *Loi Jonnart* (4 February 1919) which furthered assimilation, and finally the *Loi du 18 Août 1929* which extended the naturalisation process to women.[6] It was not until 1959, when the war was raging, that a civil law was promulgated to regulate questions of marriage and divorce registration, as well as questions of inheritance; probably as a last attempt by the colonial administration to control the Algerian family.

The colonial authorities realized that the way to breaking this 'atom' asunder was through the 'release' of the women as it were. On 13 May 1958, the colonial administration launched a campaign of intimidation, whereby a number of women were forced to take off their veils in public squares. But this "battle of the veil was to provoke the native's bristling resistance" (Fanon, 1970: 32), and was indeed a desperate move by the colonial 'Republic of Citizens' to violate the order of the 'Cousins'. Paradoxically, the latter were joined by women in brandishing the veil as a liberating device, and a mark of cultural distinction against the colonial order.

> To the colonialist offensive against the veil, the colonised opposes the cult of the veil. What was an undifferentiated element in a homogeneous whole, acquires a taboo character, and the attitude of a given Algerian woman with respect to the veil will be constantly related to her overall attitude with respect to the foreign occupation.
>
> (Fanon, 1970: 33)

Fanon reminds us at this point of Tillion's analysis of the defensive mechanisms of the 'Republic of Cousins'; and the heavy burden they assigned to women for the protection of their order against the assault of the 'Citizens'. For the defeat of the colonisers in family legislation was to be followed by that of the national leadership.

In encouraging women to join the struggle for independence, national leaders of the war of liberation (1954) had to compromise with the 'Republic of Cousins', and thus kept the participation of women to a minimum. Indeed, the closed and unyielding structure of the Algerian family with its well-defined sex roles could not easily accommodate a public role for women, albeit for the sake of the anti-colonial struggle. According to Fanon,

> This relatively cloistered life, with its known categorised, regulated comings and goings, made any immediate revolution seem a dubious proposition. Would not such a decision have catastrophic consequences for the progress of the Revolution.
>
> (ibid: 35)

It is significant that a revolutionary such as Fanon expressed doubts as to the consequences of a rapid reform of sex roles in the Algerian family. Obviously, compliance with revolutionary norms of sex equality would have jeopardized the whole revolutionary programme itself. The same kind of argument was to be adopted by the modernising 'Citizens' after Independence. One could argue that the pace of family law reform was to be informed by the status of the individual person in

Algeria, as embodied in article 34 of the *Code de la Nationalité* (AAN, 1963: 806-814), which stressed the paramount position of Islam as the main normative model of the ideal typical citizen in independent Algeria. Article 34 stipulates the agnatic, patrilineal, and Islamic status of the Algerian individual by birth:

> Our reference to the Islamic status is something we insist upon because it absolutely conforms to our historical realities, both sociological and judicial. When in 1830 colonialism deprived us of of the attributes of our personality, we found shelter in the only refuge left: the Islamic status. This latter is a system of judicial regulations ruling the majority of the population of this country, in conditions similar to those before 1830. This is the reason why, in conforming to our theory of continuity of the Algerian nation, we have insisted that this system of rules should appear in this text.
>
> (in Borrmans, 1971: 504)

This was part of a speech by the Justice minister to the Assemblée Populaire Nationale (APN) in its debate on the *Code de la Nationalité* in June 1963[7]. Borrmans referred in his study to the emphatic reference to Islam (as a shield against assimilation) by the Assembly delegates (ibid: 503-505). The ensuing process of family law reforms between 1963 and 1981 was to reveal the same concern for the role of Islam as a bulwark against the secularisation of daily life.

4.2.1 The 1963 Law On a Minimum Age for Marriage.

The revolutionary euphoria of early Independence made it possible for the radical secularists of the polity to make a number of moves in favour of women's rights in matrimonial matters. For instance a law on a minimum age for marriage, Loi no. 63-224, was adopted by the National Assembly on 25 July 1963. This law was especially designed to protect young girls from early marriage (sometimes arranged when they were only

nine or ten years old).[8] It fixed the minimum age to sixteen years, and made compulsory the registration of marriages with a local authority. By the same token, it rendered the simple oral pronouncement of the *Fatiha* (the Exordium in the Qur'an)[9] in the validation of the marriage contract obsolete. Not that the Exordium was not retained, but written registration became the sole legal recognition of the marriage contract. Articles 4 and 5 of the law were particularly interesting in view of their radical wording. They consider the failure to comply with the law as amounting to rape and complicity of rape, and hence called for maximum sanctions. However subsequent amendments toned down the forms of punishments which were either brief imprisonment (one to three months) or payment of a fine. It remains doubtful whether the provisions of the law were applied at all, but the enactment of such a bill was significant in that it illustrates the manifestation of radical secular opinion in the early days of Independence.

Nevertheless, it was not long before some moves by the 'Cousins' became manifest in a series of administrative directives, validating marriage by the *Fatiha*, and forbidding the union of "Muslim women to men of other creeds".[10] Such measures appeared for instance in the Circulaire no. 31, 23 Avril 1963 (Borrmans, ibid: 511). It seemed that the circular was paving the way for an offensive by the 'Cousins' on the family code which was at that time in preparation.

4.2.2. Abortive Family Codes 1963-1972.

Between 1963 and 1964 commissions were set up by the Party and Government to elaborate a family code, amidst repeated recommendations that Islamic precepts should be the main guidance. The Justice Minister declared that "commissions studying the family code should bear in mind that Islam [was] the religion of state" (Rasjep, March 1964, 2: 75-81). It remains difficult to find out what happened during the debates of commissions for the code was never to be issued and was given up in the course of 1964.

Borrmans reported heated debates on the questions of marriage procedure and polygamy between three trends of opinion; the traditionalists, the modernists, and the revolutionaries (ibid: 512-516). These correspond respectively to the present categories of 'Cousins', moderate 'Citizens' in power, and radical secular 'Citizens'.[11] The first were staunchly in favour of polygamy, the right of the husband to repudiate his wife, and the retention of the guardian as the legal representative of the bride in the marriage procedure. They were not even in favour of the registration of marriage, since, they argued, the presence of two male witnesses is a sufficient guarantee.[12] Facing this kind of intransigence were the compromising 'Citizens' who swayed between secularism and religion; and the radical secular 'Citizens' who opted for a total equality between men and women to appear in the code. However consensus proved difficult if not impossible to reach and the proposals were never presented to the National Assembly for adoption.

The same scenario of intransigence and failure to compromise was to repeat itself two years later (1966), and was also to lead to an abortive attempt at issuing a family code. This time, a first draft was prepared but was kept unpublicised although it managed somehow to be circulated (M'Rabet: 1967). Despite the fact that Boumediene mentioned it vaguely in a speech commemorating International Woman's Day, on 8 March 1966, Justice Minister Mohammed Bedjaoui insisted that it was just a project.[13]

The most controversial points remained those related to marriage, divorce and inheritance, where Islamic tradition is clearly in favour of the male prerogative and superiority. The contention was how to replace the divinely bestowed male superiority (Qur'an, 4: 34)[14] by a humanly designed equality, which seeks to metamorphose the mere consultation of women into their direct participation. This time again, an unpublished draft of the family code was stifled at its conception, and was not to be debated in any case since the National Assembly had been dissolved by the new regime of 19 June 1965. This last event was in any case to discard both the conservative 'Cousins' and the radical secularist 'Citizens', to pave the way for the more pragmatic and technocratically minded 'Citizens' who were to dominate Algeria's decision-making process up to this day. From then onwards, ideological debates were considered divisive, and no opportunities were provided for consideration of contentious matters, such as family legislation. All efforts had to be geared on infrastructural change, and developmental processes.

Following the experience of 1966, the family code 'saga' fell into oblivion as family regulation was not deemed a priority in nation-building by the new technocratic team in power. The silence on a specific family legislation was nevertheless replaced by more general guidelines on the role of women, and women's ideal typical behaviour in Algerian society. Again Boumediene took the lead in spelling out such guidelines in various speeches for about a decade, that is between 1966 and 1976 when the Charte Nationale and the new Constitution were issued.

Boumediene for instance never failed to remind Algerian women of a double role. While conceding that their role as producers was guaranteed by the development strategy, he always insisted upon their 'moral responsibility' towards the preservation of an Islamic ideal behaviour:

> When we mention the rights of woman and the role she is to play in the political, economic and social fields, we should not forget the evolution of the Algerian woman. This evolution cannot in any case lead to the imitation of the Western woman. We say no to such evolution as our society is Islamic and socialist. Accordingly a problem arises, it is that of the respect of morality. We are all for evolution and progress so that woman plays a role in all domains... . But this evolution should not be the cause of the decay of our society.
> (ibid: 189-190)[15]

Boumediene was here addressing women at a rally commemorating International Women's Day on 8 March 1966. His guidelines were more of a moralistic warning, than political injunctions.

In another speech, 8 March 1967, he remarked:

> All doors are open to her [woman], and no hindrance is to limit her evolution. However, she should endeavour to preserve her dignity and her personality, by trying not to succumb to the charms of certain Western traditions and certain new fashions. What could be considered as progress by some, is no other than regression, and a

> form of degradation which the Algerian woman should not mistake for real evolution.
>
> (ibid: 191)

To the third Congress of the party's women's organisation, the Union Nationale des Femmes Algeriennes (UNFA) in April 1974, he had this to say:

> However, liberty, progress and emancipation of the Arab, Muslim and Algerian woman in particular cannot be achieved to the detriment of social morality and traditions... . Our desire is to see the Algerian woman enjoying her freedom and her rights like her husband, brother, and son, whilst remaining the Arab and Muslim woman armed with a morality which would preserve Algerian society.
>
> (ibid: 144-195)[16]

This leitmotive of morality seemed to be Boumediene's favourite whenever the issue of women's role in the construction of the new 'Republic of Citizens' sprang up. It was as if the new role of 'Citizen' granted to women was not a right, but a favour; for which they had to pay in return by retaining their 'virtue'. Boumediene's language would be incomprehensible for an ear external to Islamic culture. Indeed the obsession with morality (as related to women) is no other than the traditional restriction on women's movement, and the free disposition of their body. In order to understand Boumediene's references, a look at the model of the ideal typical woman in Islam, and into the customs of the 'Republic of Cousins' will be necessary. It will be dealt with in this Chapter.[17]

In the meantime, yet another abortive attempt at issuing a family code was experienced in the early 1970's. Indeed the aggressiveness of the development strategy was thought to have tamed the 'Cousins', and mellowed their intransigence as far as women's legal equality in family matters was concerned. But the 1972 project of the Family Code was to

unleash yet more clashes between 'Cousins' and secularist 'Citizens', tempered by the tactic manoeuvering of the technocratic 'Citizens'.

The confidence gained during a decade of nation-building led Boumediene to announce the preparation of a family code in a speech on 8 March 1973:

> Dear sisters, we are aware that there are certain problems to which definitive solutions have not been found, as our revolutionary march has been geared on urgent and vital projects. However, the Code of the Family which we hope to promulgate soon, once woman has voiced her opinion on the project, will certainly bring about solutions to the serious problems which deny the Algerian woman-citizen her right to take part effectively in the construction of our society.
>
> (ibid: 192)

Boumediene was referring to the project prepared by a National Consultative Commission affiliated to the Ministry of Justice since 1971. The commission had to elaborate a code which was "to rid the structure of the family of everything non Islamic" as it was put by the Justice Minister.[18] This acerbic remark heralded a rather conservative code which was to provoke the wrath of the UNFA. Its Secretary General had this to say following the discussion of the project:

> We hope that the amendments and the reflexions which we have formulated will draw the attention of the legislator and higher officials who hold the power of decision. We have for instance expressed our staunch opposition to polygamy, and even to its intermediary formulation in the project. Our rejection of both as humiliating to woman, takes into account the present sociological, religious and economic conditions. ...Indeed, it is unthinkable to tolerate in socialist society either polygamy or bigamy, it would be contrary to our basic principles. It is with hope that we wish to foresee the ultimate version of a code of the family which would give our society its due stability.
>
> (El-Djazairia, no. 19-20, 1972)

This bold denunciation of the project of the code, and the demand for an immediate implementation of a 'Republic of Citizens' as it ought to

be, (ie ensure sex equality), was to cost the secretariat of the UNFA a heavy price. Indeed , the team of secularist 'Citizens' at its head were quickly dismissed, and replaced by more moderate ones.[19] In any case, the project of the code was yet again withdrawn by the moderate 'Citizens' as they failed again to bring together the 'Cousins' and the radical 'Citizens'. In the words of Boumediene, this is what happened:

> Some have accused us of giving in too much to women, whilst for others the rights granted to them remain insufficient. It must be admitted then that the project of the new code has not resolved the family issue. We shall then leave the debate open until such time the will of the majority is met, and is in harmony with the political options of the country.
>
> (Mameri, ibid: 193)

Leaving the debate open meant that in the meantime, family legislation in Algeria was slowly drifting towards the growing adoption of the *Shari'a* precepts for the resolution of family matters. Two documents were to pave the way to the future code based entirely on the *Shari'a* ; the 5 July 1973 Ordinance and the 26 September 1975 Ordinance. These stipulated that, in the absence of legal provisions in family matters, the judge should resort to the principles of Islamic Law or to custom. These measures betrayed the natural inclinations of the 'Citizens' in power towards an Islamic order of the family, as much as a tactical manoeuver to discard secularist 'Citizens". However, the growing pressures of the 'Cousins', who were outraged at the ambivalent attitude of the moderate 'Citizens' in what was after all an Islamic state according to the 1976 Constitution (Article 2), were to lead eventually in 1984 to the adoption of a Family Code.

4.3. The 1980s Saga of the *Code de la Famille* .

While the saga of the previous codes was kept hidden from the lay eye at large, and debates restricted to the official circles of 'Cousins' and 'Citizens', the history of the 1984 code was riddled with sensational incidents. Indeed this time, the modernising 'Citizens' in power were determined to enact the code at all costs. However, it is contended herein, that the final adoption of the code was not so much due to their aggressiveness or boldness, as to the existence of a greater proportion of 'Cousins' or Cousin-sympathisers in their midst. Indeed, following the death of Boumediene and the political purge within the secularist 'Citizens', the new leadership was brought to yield more willingly to the pressures of the 'Cousins'. The latter were reinforced both by the Pan-Islamic fundamentalist movement epitomized in the Iranian Revolution of 1979, as well as a growing internal demand for authenticity.[20]

The process which led to the adoption of the law on the family code was to prove particularly arduous for the Algerian leadership, mostly constituted of moderate 'Citizens'. The process started in 1981 with the elaboration of a project on Personal Status, and was to end four years later with the adoption by the National Assembly of the Family Code (which is in operation today). As will be seen from the following discussion, the process unleashed passionate debates at the National Assembly during two legislatures in 1982 and 1984. The most remarkable contrast between the two parliamentary sessions was the dynamic presence of the secular 'Citizens' in the first, and their noticeable absence in the second; which was exclusively dominated by hard-line 'Cousins'. A close study of the interventions by Assembly delegates of

both categories will help illuminate the subsequent development towards the triumph of the 'Cousins'. But more of this later in this Chapter.

So far no description of the various aborted codes has been given. It should be pointed out that they were all versions of the 1984 code which will be provided in relation to the study of the 1984 debates. Suffice it to point out that the hesitations of the moderate 'Citizens', and the pressures of the 'Cousins', have always led to the elaboration of codes based by and large on Islamic Law (albeit with minor alterations, especially with regard to polygamy), so as to curb the opposition of the more progressive secular 'Citizens'. The debates remain very significant in that they represent broadly the different trends of Algerian public opinion on the matters of family life and women's status.

4.3.1. The 1982 Debates at the National Popular Assembly.

Following the 1972-73 experience, only vague allusions were to be made about a family code. However, the difficulties arising from a plural legal system, and the growing social tensions affecting families in view of the important institutional changes, prompted the necessity to enact a family law. The impetus for change arose from the increase in divorce in the form of repudiation of the wife, and abandonment of wives and children.

Although all trends of opinion converged towards the timeliness of a family regulation, the nature of it in terms of being either secular or religious brought about the most passionate disagreements. In January 1982, the Justice Minister presented the National Assembly with a bill

on the *Statut Personnel* (Personal Status). The bill was submitted in an aura of tension provoked by the circulation of a petition presented to the chairman of the Assembly by a group of women protesting against the retrograde provisions of the bill. The latter included clauses such as a limitation on women's freedom to work and a wife had to have her husband's permission if she wished to work. Such provisions sparked off the first feminist manifestation ever witnessed in Algeria since Independence.

The underground circulation of the bill in the winter of 1981, initiated a series of public protests by groups of women of different occupations (though mainly professionals and university students). On the 9 and 16 November 1981 respectively, groups of 100 women and 250 women presented petitions with 10,000 signatures to the Assembly as a protest against the bill, which they denounced as being "contrary to the spirit of the National Charter" and as "unconstitutional". Heading the delegations were former women war veterans who gave an aura of nationalist legitimacy to the protest movement.[21]

However, as the Government had no intention to withdraw the bill, protests gained momentum on 23 December 1981, when more than 100 women demonstrated this time in the busy centre of the capital Algiers. They carried banners which read: "No to Silence, Yes to Democracy" and "No to Socialism without Women's Participation". But the protests were not to deter the moderate Citizens of the Government from submitting the bill to the National Assembly. Indeed, the opposition of the secular 'Citizens' did not weigh heavily in the balance of power compared to that of the 'Cousins', who were eager to pass the bill, and with it

their world-view. The Assembly debates in January 1982 were to be the last opportunity for the secular 'Citizens' to voice their contempt for the reinstitution of a 'Republic of Cousins' in the midst of the promised 'Republic of Citizens'.

4.3.1.1. The Argument of the Secularists.

In his introductory talk on the bill of *Statut Personnel* , the Justice Minister summarized its message as embodying:

> ...the legislative reference within the framework of Islamic principles,which guarantee to woman her rights, her position as partner of man, and as mother in society.
>
> (JOAPN, 1982, no.126: 3)

In presenting the bill to the plenary session, the chairman of the Assembly's Admministrative and Legislative Commission insisted on four points: marriage, polygamy, divorce and guardianship of women, all as understood by the *Shari'a:*

> Marriage should occur early so that society is preserved from the depravation of young people; it is first and foremost geared on the procreation of a progeniture useful to society; it is based on equality between husband and wife, except in legal responsibility and familial authority, a natural prerogative of the husband.
>
> Polygamy remains the only valid solution to grave familial discord, and in any case even positive law admits *de facto* polygamy, whilst Islam gives it a *de jure* status.
>
> Divorce is the exclusive faculty of the husband, for he is the breadwinner; it would be inconceivable that the wife is also permitted the exercise of such a prerogative as she is unlikely to suffer from the same disadvantages.
>
> Guardianship reflects the concern of Islamic legislation for the protection of incapacitated people. There is a special provision with regard marriage as the *Hadeeth*

> [literally the Prophet's speeches] stipulate that the presence of four people is required for the validation of the marriage contract:
>
> the matrimonial guardian on behalf of the bride;
> the bridegroom;
> two male witnesses.
>
> (JOAPN, 126: 5-6)

The points mentioned were all reminders of a 'Cousin-like' world view.

It remains surprising that they were presented by a moderate 'Citizen' on behalf of the Government.

The response of the few secularists present in the Assembly came as a passionate reminder of the values typical of the 'Republic of Citizens' which was, as it were, under construction in Algeria. They mainly concentrated on the values of: "equal citizenry for men and women; the national revolution; and socialism as legitimised by the war of liberation, and the 1976 Constitution and National Charter" (ibid: 12-19).

About ten secularist delegates intervened to reiterate Algeria's commitment to socialism and progress. Significantly, not all interventions were reproduced in the Journal Officiel de l'Assemblée Populaire Nationale (JOAPN).[22] The secularist 'Citizens' emphasized in all their interventions the role of Islam as the religion of 'change, progress, emancipation, justice and tolerance'. Delegate Djeffal (a woman) pointed out in particular that:

> Islam encourages the effort of *Ijtihad*, and nothing should prevent the Algerian legislator from interpreting the *Shari'a* in a manner different from that of the seventh or eighth century legislator, in view of constantly changing social conditions. ...The effort of *Ijtihad* is a must for the continuation of the Revolution.
>
> (ibid: 17)

By *Ijtihad* , delegate Djeffal was referring to the effort of interpretation of the sacred law provided for by the body of various schools which mushroomed between the eighth and twelfth centuries when the Muslim empire was expanding. The principle of *Ijtihad* was erected in order to help apply the sacred texts to new circumstances.

The endorsement by the secularist 'Citizens' of Islamic precepts should not come as a surprise, but rather illuminate their need for legitimation; hence their 'progressive' interpretation of Islam. The secularists were particularly unhappy with the retention of polygamy in the bill on the *Statut Personnel*. Delegate Mesli (another woman) argued that polygamy threatened to be socially divisive as it encourages social stratification, given that only rich men can afford to entertain more than one wife. She warned that acceptance of polygamy meant the implicit recognition of a rich class in Algeria, and this was in contradiction with socialism (JOAPN, ibid: 18).

Another significant secularist argument concerned the idea of guardianship over women. It was seen as unconstitutional, as it ran counter to the principle of political and legal majority of all citizens (Constitution, Article 58). Indeed, guardianship as explicitly expressed above, is meant to protect a special category, the 'incapacitated', and thus addresses women as a 'handicapped sex'.[23] By the same token, their legal and political majority as citizens becomes nul and void, even though it has been endorsed without hesitation by the moderate 'Citizens' in the Constitution.

For instance, Delegate Saadi pointed out that arguments such as "guardianship of women prevents them from commiting immoral deeds", and "polygamy preserves society from depravation", were rather the expression of personal ethics, than objective legal provisions. He insisted that:

> ...it is unfair to incriminate moral deviation on woman when man shares a bigger responsibility given his leading role in society. It is rather presumptuous to expect that the *Statut Personnel* is to straighten all deviations, when these are linked to aspects of economic, social and cultural nature.
>
> (JOAPN, ibid: 18-19)

This attack on the bill of the moderate 'Citizens' was furthered by doubts raised as to the credibility of the idea of Personal Status itself. Delegate Djeffal remarked pertinently that the *Statut Personnel* became a body of rules on women's behaviour, rather than stood as the most urgently needed family regulation which Algerian society required (ibid: 17).

4.3.1.2. The Argument of the 'Cousins'.

To these attacks, the 'Cousins' were swift to reply vehemently as they heavily outnumbered the secular 'Citizens'. Delegate Redouani retorted simply that the bill in itself "was a riposte against those impregnated with secular views" and that "Algerians, as Muslims, should not be permitted to ignore the Qur'anic precepts and the teachings of the *Ulamaa* ibid: 22). Delegate Abada, for his part, demanded that:

> secularism should be rejected because it has made of woman a merchandise, prohibited polygamy and encouraged the separation of bodies as well as adultery.
>
> (ibid: 23)

The reference to the 'separation of bodies' as leading to 'adultery' is very eloquent of the 'Cousins'' yearning for the practice of women's seclusion. The phrase "separation of bodies" is a clear reference to

the release of women from seclusion. This process makes them appear as 'bodies' in the streets considered by the 'Cousins' to be men's territory. Indeed the presence of women in the public domain, symbolised by 'the street', can only be seen in its crudest appearance of bodies by the 'Cousins'. Furthermore, this presence can only be interpreted as sexual provocation to minds used to the invisibility of women other than their relatives; hence the allusion to adultery.[24]

However, polygamy remained the dominant preoccupation of the 'Cousins'. Delegate Redouani asked:

> why cast doubt on polygamy, when it provides marriage to women to safeguard them from immoral behaviour; it should in fact be imposed by the State, while celibacy should be discouraged.
>
> (ibid: 22)

Delegate Mezoued saw in polygamy:

> ... a humanitarian action, which helps reduce the rate of divorce, and has a *raison d'etre* in case the wife is sterile, or seriously ill or the husband fears marital discord.
>
> (ibid: 23)

Delegate Belkhadem expressed a deep-seated anxiety at the prospect of proscribing polygamy. He argued that:

> the basic principle of marriage is polygamy; monogamy is only the exception to the rule and is practised by those who fear to be unfair to many wives.
>
> (ibid: 25)

As a 'Cousin', this delegate was anxious to demonstrate his fear of a shrinking extended family and its replacement by the monogamous conjugal family, gradually imposed by the specific conditions of the rising 'Republic of Citizens'.

The heated debates which had marked this first legislature on the bill of *Statut Personnel* led to the withdrawal of the proposals by the

moderate 'Citizens' of the Government, who, through the intervention of the chairman of the Assembly reiterated their eclectic view. Chairman Bitat had this caveat to give to the 'Cousins' and the secularist 'Citizens' alike:

> The Algerian Revolution is at the *avant-gard* of the Arab-Muslim nation. One of its most outstanding achievements is equality between man and woman in the acquisition of knowledge and access to work.[25] ... but... Algeria firmly opposes secularism as well as all forms of extremism and colonial alienation.
> (ibid: 10-11)

The references to "extremism" and "colonial alienation" are subtle allegations to the respective positions of the hard line 'Cousins' and the secularist 'Citizens' in the eyes of the moderate 'Citizens'. Assembly Chairman Bitat's rebuke of these positions was a clear reminder of the moderate 'Citizens' dislike for political discord, as well as a reassertion of their power. The debate was simply drawn to a close.

4.3.2. Loi 84-11 on the Family Code and the 1984 Debates.

It was another two years before the issue of family legislation was raised again. By withdrawing the previous bill of *Statut Personnel*, the moderate 'Citizens' in power sought to temper the passions of the secular 'Citizens' and the 'Cousins'. In fact, their tactics of attrition did wane the energies of the secular 'Citizens' who left the National Assembly *en bloc*. But it was not in any way to affect the resolve of the 'Cousins' who came back to the 1984 legislature determined to win.

Since the events of 1982, a new Party and Government national commission was set up to elaborate a new draft of family legislation. Yet

again, no publicity was given to the process. However, the present author managed to obtain a few details on the composition of the commission in interviews with party and assembly members. By and large it included members of the moderate 'Citizens' who held strong 'Cousin-prone' sympathies and views themselves. Few women took part in the process of elaboration, and were themselves part of the new team of female moderate 'Citizens' who had replaced the former militant secular 'Citizens' at the head of the women's organisation UNFA. The result of their deliberations was yet another version of the preceding projects characterised basically by the adoption of the *Shari'a*, and a unique obsession with women's behaviour.

The bill, entitled *Code de la Famille*, was discussed during the spring session of 1984 at the National Assembly. The plenary sessions devoted to the bill took place on April 15, 16, 21, 22, 23 and May 10, 28, 29 and were issued in the 'Journal Officiel de l'Assemblee Populaire Nationale' (JOAPN), nos. 46, 47, 48 and 52. The bill, which was later adopted as Loi no. 84-11 du 9 Juin 1984 portant Code de la Famille was issued in the 'Journal Officiel de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire' (JORA) no. 24, 12 Juin 1984.

It comprises 224 articles in three volumes:

Volume 1: Of Marriage and its Dissolution;

Volume 2: Of Legal Representation;

Volume 3: Of Successions.

In all three domains, supremacy of man over woman was quite clear, and stands in sharp contrast with the legal and constitutional rights of equality pledged in the public realm. In all its provisions the code treats women as minor subjects to whom it denies any attainment of

majority. Indeed women are to be 'chaperoned' in the marriage as well as the divorce procedures either by male kins or legal guardians. The main provisions of the code stipulated that:

> Although marriage is not any more compulsory (*djabr*), the father may still oppose the wish of his daughter to get married if she is minor (less than 18 years old) (Article 12). No such provision is explicitly addressed to sons.
>
> While the bridegroom represents himself in the contract of marriage, the bride, although present, must be accompanied by a 'matrimonial guardian' (Article 9). Not only the conclusion of marriage is incumbent upon the guardian (Article 11), but the marriage is considered nul and void if he is not present (Article 33).

The same status of inferiority of women is to be found in the conditions they have to fulfill in order to obtain divorce. Article 48 stipulates that:

> ... (divorce) takes place by the will of the husband,...and at the request of the wife within the limits of the cases mentioned under Articles 53 and 54 of the code.
>
> (JORA, 24: 614)

Accordingly, the husband divorces his wife by virtue of the traditional procedure of unilateral repudiation. The latter is irrevocable according to the *Shari'a* in case the husband formulates three pronouncements of the *Talaq* (ie. repudiation). The judge may endorse the husband's decision if the three *Talaqs* have been pronounced. The adoption of repudiation as a divorce formula remains one of the most striking measures in the official endorsement of a status of minority for women.

Divorce is granted to women only under certain conditions related to the husband's 'misbehaviour' (violent temperament, imprisonment, unjustified absence for over a year, sudden incapacity, failure to fulfill his familial duties such as provide for material gain) (Article 53).

The Arabic version of the aforementioned article is unequivocal with regard to women's incapacity (to divorce). The word divorce (*Talaq*) becomes *Tatleeq*, and simply means that the woman cannot divorce, but requests to 'be made divorced' by her husband, through the judge. This is yet another example of the overwhelming male mediation.

However, the most 'Cousin-like' Article remains that which erects into a legal duty a haunting sense of scrutiny over specifically female behaviour. Article 39 stipulates that a wife has to:

> obey her husband ...as head of the family, ...breastfeed his progeniture, ...and respect his parents and kin.

It is indeed most revealing that such aspects are deemed necessary to appear in a family code, and that yet again they should only concern women. Such rules of conduct could only be laid down in the 'purest' ideal typical model of a 'Republic of Cousins'.[26] Article 39 is a unique reminder of the idiosyncrasies and fantasies of the 'Cousins'. On the other hand, it is pertinent to contemplate in such a provision the expression of the lower valuations of the moderate 'Citizens' who have, after all, elaborated the code. Indeed the same doubts should arise with regard to the whole societal programme of the 'Citizens' and its conception of women's place and role.[27]

An examination of the debates which took place in the National Assembly will show that the moderate 'Citizens' are able to circumvent some of the extremist demands of the 'Cousins' without affecting their own legitimacy. The procedure followed in order to pass the Government's amendment of Article 8 on polygamy,[28] will illustrate the ability of the moderate 'Citizens' to ignore the 'Cousins' pressure when they wish

to. Accordingly, it is contended herein, that the adoption of the family code in its 'Cousin' form is not only an illustration of the triumph of the 'Cousins' on the matter, but an expression of the ambivalent attitude of the moderate 'Citizens' with regard to sexual identities and roles.[29] The evocation of Islamic precepts by both, complicates the picture and will require an examination of the Islamic world-view with its peculiar mixture of universalism and particularism, later in this Chapter.

4.3.3. Article 8 and the Conflict Between the 'Cousins' and the Moderate 'Citizens'.

The 1984 *Code de la Famille* would have been a total triumph of the 'Cousins' over the moderate 'Citizens', were it not for Article 8 on polygamy. Indeed in all its provisions, the code was but a reproduction of the *Shari'a* as it was elaborated between the eighth and twelfth centuries by Muslim legal scholars, from the injunctions of the Qur'an on the ideal conduct of Muslim men and women, speeches and behaviour of the prophet Muhammad, *Sunna* , and the interpretation of these two sources by authoritative 'doctors of law' who specialised in the science of *Fiqh* .[30] While leaving most of the provisions of the *Shari'a* intact, the Government bill made polygamy conditional upon the consent of the first and second wife, in Article 8:

> It is permitted to contract marriage with more than one wife within the limits of the *Shari'a*, if the motive is justified, the conditions and intention of equity provided, and after consultation of the preceding and future wives. Either wife may intent a judicial action against the husband..., or request divorce should he ignore her refusal to consent.

This article alone monopolised most debates on the code, to the extent of turning them virtually into a conference on polygamy.[31] Indeed, no

other item of the code provoked so much controversy as Article 8. Hence its extensive treatment below.

The conditions attached to the exercise of polygamy are a departure from the original Qura'nic verse, which stipulates in Chapter 4 (Women), Verse 2:[32]

> ...If you fear that you cannot treat orphans with fairness, then you may marry other women who seem good to you: two, three, or four of them. But if you fear that you cannot maintain equality among them, marry one only or any slave-girl you may own. This will make it easier for you to avoid injustice.

There is a clear difference between the lavish permissiveness of the Qur'anic verse, and the legal and above all, man-made conditional terms of Article 8. These were enough to provoke an uproar among the 'Cousins' of the National Assembly. The ensuing debates on the code, which opposed them to the moderate 'Citizens' on the Government side, were concerned exclusively with the verse and not with the issue of polygamy. There was no trace of interventions by secularist 'Citizens'. Accordingly, out of sixty interventions reported in the minutes of the Journal Officiel of the Assembly mentioned supra , not a single secularist voice was raised, and only one woman delegate was heard. Far from condemning polygamy, she merely proposed that the number of wives should be legally defined (JOAPN, no. 47).

The protests of the 'Cousins' were extreme, and their defence of polygamy was more a defence of the sacrality of the verse, rather than polygamy in itself as a practice. Out of the 60 interventions reported by the JOAPN from the plenary sessions of 23 and 24 April 1984, 45 stood against the conditional terms on polygamy. The arguments mainly

denounced the article for being no less than heretical. Some delegates thought it unrealistic to presume that a judge should decide upon conditions of equity, and that the matter should be left to the husband's conscience (JOAPN nos. 46, 47). Others seemed to compromise with the idea of the judge's interference, but protested that wives need not be informed, since the judge is after all empowered to permit a polygamous marriage (JOAPN no. 47: 5-6). Yet others were outraged at the liability of the husband to prosecution, and the granting of divorce to the wife or wives:

> ...polygamy cannot possibly be invoked as a reason for *Tatliq* since it is legitimised by the *Shari'a*. How can polygamy be considered as a prejudice to the first wife?
>
> (delegate Laouamri, ibid: 8)

As for delegate Bouilfan, the granting of *Tatliq* was potentially dangerous as it would encourage women to get divorce more easily and this "should never be allowed to happen" (JOAPN, no. 48: 2). But most fascinating of all interventions was that of delegate Madhkour who did not seem to be the least affected by twentieth century institutional and social changes in the public realm. Unperturbed in his idiosyncracies, he simply pointed out that:

> Polygamy is not to be disputed whatever the case, for a Muslim state is one based on *Jihad*, and this calls for the involvement of men alone. To whom will the women be left in case of *Jihad*, and how to protect society from subsequent depravity if widows cannot find parties to marry. Polygamy is therefore a must.
>
> (JOAPN, no. 46: 19-21)

Although delegate Madhkour's intervention sounds extreme, it remains very eloquent as it throws some light on the legitimation paradigm of the 'Cousins'. Indeed his legitimisation of polygamy is to be found in the early history of the *Jihad* of the Muslims of Medina against the 'pagans' of Mecca (7th. century AD). Following the death of many

Muslims, in the battle of *Uhud*, there was concern for orphans and widows; hence the Chapter titled 'Women' and its injunctions on the protection of orphan girls, and the endorsement of polygamy with a limit of four wives at a time. However, in his reference to the *Jihad* as the basic duty of the Islamic state, delegate Madhkour is in tune with the higher valuations of the 'Islamic City', and ironically with those of the Algerian 'Republic of Citizens' (especially Article 2 of its Constitution which stipulates that Islam is the religion of state).

The most unorthodox facet of the debate on polygamy was the procedure applied by the Justice Minister in his capacity of Government representative - in connivance with the Assembly's Legal and Administrative Commission - in order to outmanoeuvre an amendment introduced by a 'Cousin' delegate, proposing the unconditional institutionalisation of polygamy. The amendment was introduced by delegate Kaddesh, who had been particularly virulent in his attack on the government bill, and its backing by the chairman of the Legal Commission. He exclaimed:

> Has the Qur'anic verse submitted polygamy to a decision by a judge or to the provision of a legal motive I ask you? Has the Qur'an laid out any such conditions as illness or sterility of the first wife in order to allow polygamy? How is it possible to subject polygamy to the conditions of Article 8? Has the verse stipulated that a wife could prosecute her husband I ask again? The article as presented by the commission is in flagrant contradiction with the *Shari'a*, and grossly violates the Qur'anic verse. The verse on polygamy was concerned with the plight of orphan girls, ...therefore the concept of equity in this matter is of a moral nature. The matter concerns the husband and his conscience and only God is the almighty judge in such a situation.
>
> (JOAPN no. 52: 18)

Nevertheless, the moderate 'Citizens' insisted upon their version of the legalisation of polygamy and defended it as a 'modernised' interpretation of the Qur'anic verse. The chairman of the Legal Commission retorted that:

> the restrictions introduced by the new legislation are only a translation of those evoked in the *Shari'a*.
>
> (ibid: 19)

As for the Justice Minister, he made it clear that:

> even though the Qur'anic verse is addressed to the individual, the legal system today addresses itself to society at large, and not to an individual who would proclaim himself the sole judge of his actions.
>
> (ibid)

Following the above altercations, the delegates were asked to vote. Despite overwhelming support for delegate Kaddeshe's amendment on unconditional polygamy, the Government version was reissued. The minutes of the Assembly remain very obscure about the whole procedure of voting, but some delegates did complain about the unorthodoxy of the voting (JOAPN, no. 52: 19) and were surprised at the reintroduction of the original Article.

Under Article 11 of the internal regulations of the Assembly, the vote is cast first on the Government proposal, then the Commission's amendments, then the delegates' amendments and back to the Commission's again. But according to a delegate, the procedure had not been respected as the vote was carried on three amendments simultaneously (delegate Bedaida, JOAPN, no. 52: 19). The moderate 'Citizens' hastened to recall at this point that rifts and protests were not 'proper' between delegates and Government representives since, "all [were] militants of the FLN party, the source of power, of which the National Assembly was an integral part" (delegate Melaika, ibid: 19). Delegate

Melaika thought it timely to remind members of the Assembly of the limited margin of freedom allowed the legislative in the one party system. He had only to stress the traditional interdependence of the legislative and the ideological under the guidance of the executive in the Algerian power structure. He deplored that Article 8 of the code had unleashed such deep divergences:

> as if Islam were a new religion to this country. Remember that the FLN and the Army of Liberation were led under the flag of Islam, let there be no doubt about this fact.
>
> (ibid: 20)

The 'Cousin' delegates were however to be deterred by more direct threats than those of being found guilty of disloyalty to the party. The Justice Minister warned that votes should be nominal and that "each delegate should assume responsibility for his vote" (ibid). It is difficult to speculate on the implications of such covert warning, but it proved effective as delegate Kaddeshe withdrew his amendment, clearing the way for the Commission's to be adopted, (ie. for the Government bill to be passed as Loi 84-11).

The developments which led to the adoption of a family code in Algeria illustrate the triumphant survival of the 'Republic of Cousins' in matters of personal status and family law. This appears as much in the 1984 debates in the National Assembly, as in the provisions of the code itself. That the row over the issue of polygamy led to the defeat of the 'Cousins' on this particular item should not overshadow the fact that the code in itself is a flagrant departure from the promises of the 'Republic of Citizens' concerning sex equality. It should mainly be remembered that in the 1982 legislative debates, the moderate 'Citizens' were more prepared to discard the secularism of the radical

'Citizens', than to admonish the extremism of the 'Cousins'.

It is also pertinent to retain that the elaboration of the code was the work of the moderate 'Citizens', who hence legalised an inferior status for women, and through it expressed the dynamics of their lower valuations. In this case it is difficult to agree with the idea of progressivism of the legal process in new nations, whereby it is supposed:

> to be ahead of society and social customs, [in contrast with its] classical function of institutionalisation of rules determined by already existing social conditions.
> (Vandevelde-Dailliere: 1980: 391)

In Algeria, the 'Cousins' and the moderate 'Citizens' of the political elite have demonstrated through the *Code de la Famille* that such is not the case in the private realm of personal status and family law. The determinism of predictions such as Vandevelde-Dailliere's (1980), and before her of Borrmans' (1971), who also expected the elaboration of a secular family law in Algeria in view of the modernisation policies, can be misleading. If anything, the process described above confirms the contingency of social change. Here we faced a case of normative no-change in the particular realm of family legislation, complicated by the ambivalence of normative change in the wider proposal of a new societal programme. The Algerian *Code de la Famille* is proof that it is difficult to make *tabula rasa* of a 'Republic of Cousins', especially where its private realms are concerned, for they have their own dynamics. In Algeria, the most sensitive of all private realms is clearly that of sex and gender as related to the family.

4.4. The 1971 Marriage Law Act in Tanzania.

The enactment of a national family law proved less difficult in Tanzania than in Algeria. This may seem paradoxical as the need for such provision was more an exercise of national integration in Tanzania than in Algeria, where the conditions of a more integrated national unity were gathered. Predominance of one religion, one language, and one racial group[33] should have guaranteed a 'unanimity' of opinions on the matter. In contrast, Tanzania is a typical pluralist society, consisting of more than one hundred and twenty ethnic groups "all having different customs from each other" (Muro, 1978: 133). In religious terms, the majority of Tanzania's population (40 per cent) hold traditional religious beliefs, while the remaining 60 per cent is almost equally divided between Muslims and Christians. "The Muslims [are] mainly divided into Sunni and Shia groups. Almost two thirds of the Christians [are] Catholics" (Westerlund, 1980: 8). Faced with such diversity, it is significant that the authorities failed to provide statistics on religious denominations in the 1978 Population Census:

> The Census Administrator,...is reported to have said that Tanzania had developed to a stage where information about religious and ethnic affiliation was outdated. The country was a secular state, and religious bodies which wanted to know the number of their adherents had to make their own surveys.
>
> (Westerlund, ibid: 15)

In matters of family legislation, it seems that the avowed secularism of the 'Republic of Citizens' in power helped to reduce tensions appreciably between the various groups and religious denominations. In the field of family law, the 'Citizens' managed to enact a regulation, which did not upset the religious pluralism of the country. Instead of ignoring the different affiliations, the law was a major *tour de force*

in acknowledging them all, yet abiding by none in particular.

Prior to the 1971 Act, various legal regimes were at work as they were set up by the British colonial policy of "legal pluralism". Each religious or ethnic community had its own legal regime and the whole legal system comprised:

> numerous customary laws;
>
> Islamic forms which varied according to sects;
>
> the Hindu regime;
>
> the civil form of marriage contracted before a registrar, a state official or sealed by a Church ceremony.

The inherited colonial system was seen as reinforcing social and ethnic divisions:

> The regimes varied widely in their ethical and sociological assumptions, so that the specific rules they produced were often in direct conflict. The recognition of different communal or religious regimes tended to reinforce the autonomy and exclusiveness of the various communities, and prevented or at least hindered the emergence and establishment of a national ethic and values in these matters. ...This also meant that no reform in this area was undertaken except at the request of the specific community, and so the more a community was backward and consequently more in need of reform, the less likely it was to be disturbed in its orthodox and rigid customs.
>
> (Ghai, 1971: 101)

As a result of the colonial plural system, the 'Republic of Brothers-in-Law' in Tanzania was reinforced, even though the colonial authorities were heavily biased in favour of Western and Christian forms of marriage in order to introduce the monogamous conjugal family, considered as superior to the polygamous family (Ghai, ibid: 102). However, those who contracted marriage through the civil form did not always abide by the commitment to monogamy:

> The breach of law was widespread however, because the law deviated from the actual social behaviour of the people. Men married under civil law often added a customary law wife or deserted the first wife without a formal divorce. Those who married in Church often paid bridewealth or dowry in the same way as those who had married under customary law.
>
> (Westerlund, ibid: 161)

The policy of legal pluralism continued in the early years of independence. Safe for the Government Notice 279 of 1963 on the Declaration of Local Customary Law 1963 and 1964 which enacted the different forms of customary legal requirements (Muro, 1978: 133), no national family law was issued.

However, the pressures of the process of national integration launched by the newly independent 'Republic of Citizens' increasingly led to the need for reform, so that the autonomy and exclusiveness of the various communities be weakened in favour of national integration. The discourse on traditional values has found itself at odds with these very values when they are effectively at work within social behaviour. By 1969, two years after the Arusha Declaration, the 'Republic of Citizens' started a campaign to enforce the idea of uniformisation of family law. The decision was taken precisely in relation to the deficiencies of those very values praised in *Ujamaa*, which for all their egalitarianism, indisputably held women in an inferior position.

4.4.1. The 1969 White Paper on a Uniform Law of Marriage - Leading to the 1971 Law of Marriage Act.

The issue of a Uniform Law of Marriage in October 1969 by the Tanzanian government was hailed by most observers as a remarkable challenge

(Read, 1972: 19; Rwezaura, 1976: 101). Indeed, there was widespread speculation that in attempting to 'uniformise' personal law in a religiously and ethnically plural society, there was a danger that the Government would inevitably interfere with religion (Westerlund, 1980: 162). Religious variety in Tanzania disguised a variety of 'Republics of Brothers-in-law' who were not prepared to compromise on personal and customary rules. Hence the special procedure adopted by the authorities in order to enact the uniform law.

> The procedure adopted was interesting and unique; as a normal rule, proposals for new laws, are presented directly to Parliament, which enacts them into law within a matter of hours, and there is little public discussion. In this instance however, the government was aware that the subject was close to the hearts of all, and as its proposals were reasonably radical, it had anticipated considerable opposition. ...Considerable public debate took place and the feelings which were aroused were even stronger than the Government had anticipated.
>
> (Ghai, 1971: 102-3)[34]

As the 'Cousins' in Algeria, the various 'Brothers-in-law' in Tanzania have caused an effective exercise of 'democracy' when voicing their conservative and retrograde opinions on woman's status and role. In contrast to their discreet resistance to modernisation policies in the public realm, they did not hesitate to show explicit opposition to legislative provisions which were not congruent with their higher valuations in the private realm of family law. There, the equality of man and woman was explicitly rejected, while the proposals of the White Paper purported to enforce just that. Paragraph 5 of the White Paper stresses that:

> TANU believes that all human beings are equal and that every individual has a right to dignity and respect. The government is therefore anxious to enact legislation to provide for uniformity of law relating to marriages and divorce.
>
> (in Read, 1972: 20)

The emphasis on equality was specifically addressed to the inferior status of women perpetrated through the practices of: compulsory marriage, which was seen as a union between two families and not two individuals (Ghai, ibid: 103); polygamy; and dowry, (or bridewealth), by virtue of which 'a wife was bought' from her kin.

The most controversial items of the White Paper were: the contracting of marriage as a free union of two individuals (para 6), thus discarding the monopoly of families in the matter; para 12 on the freedom of consent for first wives in polygamous marriages; para 14 on the abolition of dowry as a necessary validation of marriage; and above all, para 25 on the compulsory registration of divorce, and the creation of Marriage Conciliatory Boards.

4.4.2. Tanzania's 'Brothers-in-law' Reject Legal Uniformity.

According to some observers who tried to assess the opposition of the 'Brothers-in-law', the strongest resistance came from Muslim quarters[35] (Westerlund, 1980: 66-7; Rwezaura, 1976: 101-125). For instance, Westerlund reported on the discussion of the Paper by *Shia* and *Sunni* Muslim groups who both questioned the necessity for a uniform law. For them, "family law is the very kernel of the *Shari'a* and need not be incorporated in a national system. Both dismissed out of hand the issue of sex equality and in its Memorandum, the *Shia Ithna-Asheri* Council of Tanzania did not recognise "the elevation of the position of women [as] a problem" (Westerlund, ibid: 166). Although the retention of polygamy was saluted, the conditional consultation of the first wife was rejected.

Rwezaura assessed the reluctance of Muslims to abide by the 1971 Act provisions, especially on divorce. It was often argued that Muslims found it difficult to bring to the 'public eye' (embodied by the courts), the dissolution of a marriage. People prefer to keep their private life out of court, and husbands are reluctant to obtain *Talaq* from the courts when they enjoy the power to pronounce it in the privacy of their homes, according to the *Shari'a* practice of the three *Talaq* . Interestingly, Rwezaura has been gradually drawn into depicting resistance among court officials themselves. The Sheikhs, standing as chairmen of Community Boards which play the role of Conciliatory Boards, "do not tell people about the new law and continue to legislate according to Islamic provisions" (Rwezaura, ibid: 108).

Reporting on the 1971 Parliamentary debates on the Government bill, Westerlund pointed out that most male Members of Parliament, both Muslim and Christian, referred to African traditions in order to support their claim of the superior position of men over women. This is a clear indication of the trap which the 'Republic of Citizens' fell into in its ambiguous apologia of these very African traditions which it hailed as examples of equality. Westerlund exclaimed that:

> It is remarkable that references to ujamaa and its ideal of equality were almost completely non-existent in the parliamentary debates.
>
> (Westerlund, 1980: 171)[36]

As for Ghai, although welcoming the boldness of the new law, he nevertheless pointed out that:

> ...it would be idle to pretend that they [women] have been placed on an equal footing with men. The subordinate position of women is strikingly illustrated by the provision for polygamy and the express prohibition of comparable rights for women -polyandry. Similarly, in some communities a woman can be divorced at the whim and discretion of the husband, while the

> woman has to pursue the more cumbersome, complex and uncertain procedure under the law. ...Indeed doubts about the capacity of the legal and administrative system to implement and apply the new laws may well be entertained. It would certainly not be a surprise if many of the provisions of the new law remain merely 'paper provisions', unaffecting the lives, practices and mores of people in large sections of the country for some time to come.
>
> (ibid: 108-109)

From the above, one could conclude that Tanzania's conservative 'Brothers- in-law' have been as triumphant as the Algerian 'Cousins' in retaining their higher valuations more or less intact in matters of personal and family law. By the same token, they have been able to perpetuate the inferior position of women by barring to them the path to individuality. In both countries women will still have to act according to the different functions deemed 'respectable' by the 'Cousins' and 'Brothers-in-law', with the complicity of the moderate, modernising 'Citizens' in power.

The considerable opposition shown by Algeria's 'Cousins' and Tanzania's 'Brothers-in-law' to sex equality, especially in family legislation, can claim institutional and normative legitimations in both cases. In Holmesian terms, the change element (family law reform) suffered from a normative inconsistency, which made room for normative no-change to be manifested (customary and religious rules). The ensuing paradoxical result has been the institutionalisation of no-change, (ie. women's inferiority). Accordingly, it would be pertinent to establish tentatively the likely sources which have informed the various social protagonists in their resistance to women's full legal equality in Algeria and Tanzania. These can be found in the pure types of family

and kin relations which continue to inform the 'Cousins' and the 'Brothers-in-law', as well as the moderate 'Citizens' in power.

4.5. Institutional Models of the 'Traditional Family'; When Function defies History

The expression 'traditional family' is meant to designate the familial system(s) which prevailed in Algeria and Tanzania before the major upheavals of colonisation and nation-building. Radcliffe-Brown's expression of "systems of kinship and marriage" (1950) will be appropriate in drawing ideal types of family relations in the cases of Algerian and Tanzanian social fabrics, as family and kin continue to influence social relations. Above all, they are an important identification for the 'individual' (man/woman), and supersede personal interests. The idea of 'system' is useful in that it refers to the breadth of social relations regulated by familial roles and functions:

> A system of kinship and marriage can be looked at as an arrangement which enables persons to live together and cooperate with one another in an orderly social life.
> (Radcliffe-Brown, 1950: 3)

Radcliffe-Brown's definition appears to be primarily consensual, but it also allows for the study of conflict through the disruptions that are likely to beset the regulatory principle of the system. In fact, the vigorous opposition of the 'Cousins' and the 'Brothers-in-law' to progressive family laws was an opposition to disruptions of a legal nature. In their respective kin systems, allowing for sex equality would have meant the end of their order, and consequently in their eyes, of a whole 'orderly social life'.

Radcliffe-Brown's method of inquiry into kinship is deliberately functionalist and a-historical, so that comparison and analysis are made possible outside historical *a prioris* (ibid: 1-3). Indeed he warns against the pitfalls of historical and pseudo-historical theories of kinship:

> There are many varieties of such theories, but they all have one thing in common. Starting from some known condition in the present or in the historically recorded past, an 'explanation' of it is invented by imagining some condition or event in the unrecorded past and arguing on a priori grounds that the known condition might or must have had its origin in this way. The devotion to pseudo-history has had unfortunate results. It has led to the adoption of false ideas about the facts as they are, and has often influenced or vitiated observation and description. This legacy of erroneous ideas is only gradually being got rid of by field studies aiming at the analysis of social systems as they are without reference to their origin, where that origin is not known from history and can only be conjectured by a priori reasoning.
>
> (ibid: 1)[37]

Among the distinguished proponents of such theories, we can cite Lewis Morgan and Emile Durkheim. Both proposed theories of the 'origin of the family', and a hypothetical social organisation of early human groupings. Not surprisingly, both followed a positivist and evolutionist approach, heavily permeated by a Europeocentric view of family organisation. Indeed, both took the European conjugal family as the ultimate stage of human kin organisation. For instance, Morgan linked the development of the family to stages of human material organisation: 'savagery, barbarism, civilisation' to which correspond 'group marriage, the pairing family, and monogamy'.[38] As for Durkheim, he traced back the origin of the family to a psychological factor: totemism. To this effect, he followed an evolutionary scheme (Figure 4.1) leading up to the modern (European) conjugal family.[39] Durkheim presumed that originally, the unifying factor of the primitive clan is

Figure 4.1 Scheme of the Durkheimian Theory of the Family



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in M. Boutefnouchet, La Famille Algérienne, SNED, Alger, 1982, p.23

the totemic being, "that is the deified object which serves as a collective emblem for the group". Later, "the totem loses its primitive character, ...becoming no more than a collective emblem. The clan becomes a village" of extended consanguinous families based on the community of patrimony with agnatic or uterine descent and several collateral branches. From there develops a more contracted form of kinship, the patriarchal family based on paternal authority as the unifying bond. As for the contemporary conjugal family, Durkheim assumed it was a "separate process of development, which occurred within Germanic and Christian civilisations", and was the continuation of the patriarchal and paternal family.[40]

The pseudo-historicism of such theories is in fact deeply influenced by nineteenth century evolutionism, as well as the development of the newly born bourgeois conjugal family of the industrial revolution.[41] Consequently, all other forms of kin organisation were automatically relegated to more primitive stages, when they in fact exist and function within social frameworks which are as contemporary as the conjugal family.

4.5.1 The Maghrebian *'ayla.*

Bearing in mind the arguments and attitudes of the 'Cousins' during the National Assembly debates and their evocation of the *Shari'a*, one would think that they are clearly informed by an institutional and normative model of the Muslim family. However, it is argued herein that while there is an Islamic regulation of the Algerian family, this has been transposed onto its specifically 'Cousin' type structure.[42]

Accordingly, a depiction of the pure types of the indigenous 'Cousin' family and the Muslim family is necessary so as to comprehend the references of the 'Cousins' as well as the moderate 'Citizens'. Incidentally, these types are by no means specific to Algeria, but to the whole region of the Maghreb with its underlying Berber component, which in a way constitutes the native element of the 'Republic of Cousins'.

4.5.1.1. The 'Cousin-type' *'ayla* .

As already seen with Tillion, the main pillar of the 'Republic of Cousins' was the indivision of patrimony, attained through the retention of women and the practice of endogamy. The corresponding family structure was the extended family or *'ayla* [43] which included a number of nuclear families sharing the same premises[44] (the average size being between 20 to 60 individuals). It is patriarchal and agnatic in as far as descendency is always male, genealogy paternal, and inheritance transmitted exclusively to sons. The patriarchal aspect lies in the reverence due to the father (or the common male ancestor), in his role of spiritual head, as well as manager of the common patrimony and guarantor of the social cohesion of the domestic group (Boutefnouchet, 1982: 38).

The social cohesion of the domestic familial group comes within the wider dynamics of the Khaldunian *'assabiyya* in its original meaning of kin *esprit de corps* . Let us remember that Ibn Khaldun posed blood ties as the focal point of social cohesion. These are provided for by the 'agnatic-cognatic'[45] Maghrebian *'ayla* with its extended collateral branches.[46] At this point, it is interesting to note that, the

Durkeimian model of family evolution develops from the 'totemic clan', contracts into an extended consanguinous family, and is finally metamorphosed into a patriarchal unit (the modern conjugal family). This is far from being the case of the Maghribian *'ayla*. The pattern of this latter is closely connected with the 'circular' development of the Khaldunian *'assabiyya* . Thence the concentric diagrams (circles or half circles) which a number of students have drawn for the Algerian 'traditional' family.[47] The idea of clan is not alien to the Maghrebian social structure. It is the *hayy* , and it is of bilateral descent (an important distinction from the totemic unilateral descent). Indeed, the structure of the *hayy* type clan is literally a family, which does not disappear to make way for the emergence of smaller entities. Rather, it embraces a congregation of smaller families (of the conjugal type), *'aylat* , through intermarriage. This is quite different from the mythical totem as the 'collective emblem' of the human group. But it is a striking reality whose disruption is at the root of the contemporary social malaise in Algeria.

The concentric pattern of Algerian traditional society is more likely to suggest a bursting of the circles into semi-circles, or quarter circles, in the establishment of new ties. But not a rupture resulting in the emergence of a new superior form of the family as happens in Durkheim's model. The mechanism of indivision of patrimony has created a concentric social structure, with units of different sizes (Figure 4.2); but all strongly linked by the *'assabiyya*.[48] The circles evolve from smaller to wider ones, and fulfill different functions ranging from domestic to social, political, and economic. The *'ayla* (as an extended family) is at the heart of five other circles linked by kin

Figure 4.2 Traditional Social Structure



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in M. Boutefnouchet, La Famille Algérienne, SNED, Alger, 1982, p.44

relations (consanguinous or by alliance)[49] and, most important of all, by different layers of solidarity all evolving around the focal concept of the *'assabiyya*. Megherbi has argued that Ibn Khaldun has surrounded this latter with:

> a constellation of subsidiary concepts entertaining a direct relationship with the dynamics of sociability such as: *nasab* (ascendency, parentage, lineage); *iltiham* (cohesion); *sharaf* (nobility); *hasab* (prestige); *hilf* (alliance); *wala* (clientele); *bayt* (gentiles); *riassa* (leadership), etc...
>
> (Megherbi, 1971: 160)

This complex web of solidarities has nevertheless been seriously undermined by the establishment of a national society. And while national solidarity has been internalised in lieu of the tribal *'assabiyya*, those solidarities linked with the private realm of kin (ie. *nasab*, *sharaf*, and *hasab*) are still valued by Algerians at large. They are still regulating relationships between individuals. Most important of all, they dictate to a great extent the roles and behavioural attitudes of a multitude of Algerians in their daily family lives. Thus, conformism and banishment of a distinct individuality are appreciated:

> In the first place, fidelity to the ancestors' traditions dominates... almost entirely actions pertaining to family life. Reference to tradition permeates the life of the individual [dictating] specific behaviour [to display] at ceremonial and familial circumstances. *L'art de vivre* of an individual... is not only based on respect for others, and in particular his own people, but on a sort of abolition of individuality itself in favour of the interest of the group; ...the individual [is expected] to be in second position, even in situations of direct interest to [him/her] and should mediate [his/her] behaviour through conventional and conform [practices]. ...If the principles of conformity and convention of social life seem to stifle personal life, it is worth underlining that the individual does not perceive it as an oppressive constraint. For the maintenance of social solidarity is a principle more fundamentally grounded

> and vital for the individual than the expression of individual originality.
>
> (Boutefnouchet, 1982: 52-53)

The above enunciated principles of respect, conformity and effacement of individuality are nevertheless regulated by those of age and sex. On the whole, they follow a hierarchical order which gives precedence to male and elder individuals over young and female ones. But most marked of all practices is that of the separation of the sexes, determined both by physical space and educational socialisation. Accordingly, boys are allowed outside the domestic premises (usually to play), whereas girls are confined inside (usually to help with household chores). Furthermore, the preference for male children is openly expressed, whereas girls are literally cursed as potential sources of *hechouma* (shame) for the *'ayla*.[50] The notion of *hechouma* is very closely linked with the so-called physical and moral integrity of the virgin girl. The obsession with virginity is closely linked with the 'nobility' of the endogamous clan whose perpetuation was to be insured by the 'absence of mingling' as Ibn Khaldun put it. However, the preservation of a girl's virginity is still a tangible and haunting reality today, and cannot be said to be residual. This is because it is officially legitimised by Islamic cosmogony, and constitutes one of the most fascinating meeting grounds between the closed 'Republic of Cousins' and the universal Islamic City.[51]

So far, general characteristics of the typical 'Cousin-like' family have been drawn. It is predominantly a patriarchal, agnatic, extended family, with clear cut sexual and generational divisions. It seems to rest on strict conventional sets of behaviour assigned to its

individual members, and mainly based on a certain aloofness between the sexes, backed by their confinement to different physical spaces, namely public for men and domestic for women. Above all, it is an oppressive family in as far as its individuals have to efface their egos in order to preserve the collective facade of the *'ayla*. On the other hand, this oppressiveness is more or less willingly accepted by the individual. It serves as a token of recognition, and provides a sense of belonging which no other solidarity can match. But most significant of all, it rests on a complex web of interrelationships between individual members, the chief characteristic of which is the separation of sexes, and the value-ridden status given to each; men being indisputably superior to women, and more apparent:

> Woman, in Algerian traditional society entails effacement, reserve, discretion, secrecy, compared to man who represents appearance, prestige, honour, pride.
>
> (Boutefnouchet, 1982: 70)[52]

The attributes of the *'ayla* and their repercussions on the individual's role, status and behaviour as described above, leave no doubt as to the likely residues they might imprint on collective consciousness. Thence their survival as a dominant set of norms despite the disintegration of the 'Republic of Cousins' in its broader solidarities and loyalties, (ie. those of the wider political *'assabiyya*). As Bourdieu put it, the 'Cousin-type' family is:

> the Alpha and Omega of the whole [social] system: structural primary grouping for all other groupings; unbreakable social atom which assigns its members [their] place, function, raison d'être, and in a sense [their] very being.
>
> (Bourdieu, 1961: 86)

Is this to say that the *'ayla* as an extended family has remained unchanged? Far from it; the combined effects of urbanisation, industrialisation and rural migration have brought about new configurations of the family structure in Algeria.[53] For instance, there has been a marked tendency towards the establishment of the smaller conjugal family as the basis of new households.[54] But despite the growing trend of this type of family, links between the different layers of parentage of the now physically separated *'ayla* remain very strong, albeit formal. While economic atomisation has now become a predominant reality, occasions such as marriage or birth or circumcision, are still discussed collectively. Marriage rarely involves the mere participation of the bride's and bridegroom's immediate families. Weddings are often reunions of the extended family, and beyond it of the *beni 'amm* (ie. paternal cousins) who symbolically represent 'the tribe' (*'arch*) or a fraction of it (*ferqa*). This is where the 'Republic of Cousins' has cogently survived; in the regulation of the union between man and woman, the most intimate of all human groupings. But in this, it has been sustained by the 'Islamic City' where the "family structure is assumed to be unchangeable, for it is considered divine" (Mernissi, 1985: 18).

4.5.1.2. Islam and the *'ayla*.

There is a widespread belief amongst students of Islam that:

> the creation of the institutions of the Muslim family ...was quite unlike any existing sexual unions. Its distinguishing feature was its strictly defined monolithic structure.
>
> (Mernissi, 1985: 18)[55]

However, it is argued here that this might have been the case in Arabia where, for instance, a variety of forms of marriage prevailed before

the advent of Islam,[56] but not in the already monolithic world of the Maghribian 'Republic of Cousins'. That the Islamic universalist message of the *ummah* (community of believers) stumbled against the particularist clanic and tribal allegiances of the closed 'Republic of Cousins' is left in no doubt.[57] But, by and large, the body of Islamic regulations of family and sexuality found a favourable echo in the rigid customs of the 'Cousin' family.[58] First of all:

> ...Islam recognizes only blood ties and/or marital bonds as the true foundations of the family.
>
> ('Abd al'Ati, 1977: 38)

For instance adoption is strictly forbidden, and this was divinely decreed in Surah 33, verse 1 to 5:[59]

> Allah has never put two hearts within one man's body. He does not regard the wives whom you divorce as your mothers, nor your adopted sons as your own sons. These are mere words which you utter with your mouths: but Allah declares the truth and guides to the right path. Name your adopted sons after their fathers; that is more just in the sight of Allah. If you do not know their fathers, regard them as your brothers in the faith and as your wards. Your unintentional mistakes shall be forgiven, but not your deliberate errors. Allah is forgiving and merciful.

The Qur'anic prohibition of adoption was in total agreement with the consanguinous *'assabiyya* of the predominantly endogamous 'Republic of Cousins' in the Maghreb. On the other hand, the Qur'an entreated Muhammad to marry his cousins of the paternal and maternal line (Qur'an, 33:50), thence reinforcing the practice of endogamy amongst the Maghrebian 'Cousins'. Although there is little evidence to establish a preference for endogamous marriage in Islam,[60] the fact that a Qur'anic verse enjoins the prophet himself to indulge in such unions, is enough to bestow an aura of preference if not sacrality upon the practice.[61] This is not to say that the ideal Islamic family ought to be endogamous, or for that matter extended or nuclear, but:

> Although Islam does not prescribe any specific organizational family type, there can be little doubt that traditional Muslim family structure has actually been closer to the extended than the nuclear type. This is probably the result of continuity, and not the outcome of innovation by the Muslims. ...But whether the extendedness of the Muslim family structure was a function of historical continuity or of other social conditions, Islam apparently accepted this form.
>
> ('Abd al'Ati, 1977: 30-31)

But it is argued here that Islam has not accepted this form (extended, patrilineal and patriarchal) all that fortuitously. The very Qur'anic injunctions on the relations between the sexes and kin are bound to reinforce the 'Cousin' type family, albeit not necessarily in its extended form, but almost inevitably in its patriarchal and patrilineal shape, and above all in its puritanical code of conduct. For instance, extra-marital relationships are not admitted and are liable to severe punishment. There is in the Qur'an an obsession for chastity to match that of the 'Cousins': "Let those who cannot afford to marry live in continence until Allah enriches them" (Qur'an, 24:33); "The adulterer and the adulteress shall each be given a hundred lashes. Let no pity for them cause you to disobey Allah, if you truly believe in Allah and the Last Day; and let their punishment be witnessed by a number of believers" (ibid, 24:1); "You shall not commit adultery, for it is foul and indecent" (ibid, 17:32). But the most clear injunction against extra-marital relationships came in Surah 5 verse 4:

> ...Lawful to you are the believing women and the free women from among those who were given the Scriptures before you, provided that you give them their dowries and live in honour with them, neither committing fornication nor taking them as mistresses.

The punishment reserved for illicit lovers is in perfect agreement with the 'Cousins'' conceptions of 'honour' and 'prestige' of the *'ayla* ,

closely linked with the purity of the lineage, exclusively derived from legal unions. Indeed, in the 'Republic of Cousins' of the Mediterranean basin, women who indulged in extra-marital sexual intercourse (especially virgin women) were put to death, 'to wash the honour' of the family.[62] Up to this day in Algeria, marriageable girls are expected to be virgin on their wedding day.[63]

In the Islamic cosmogony, good believers are promised eternally virgin wives, the *houris* , to attend upon them in Paradise: "And theirs shall be the dark-eyed *houris*, chaste as hidden pearls: a guerdon for their deeds (Qur'an, 56:15); and "We created the houris and made them virgins, loving companions for those on the right hand...(ibid: 56:36). The image of the *houris* is unmistakably that which haunts Algerian 'Cousins' and moderate 'Citizens'. We have only to remember Boumediene's concern for the 'preservation of morality' by women. In Algeria, women are expected to remain unaffected by the upheavals of social change, and are enjoined to retain their so-called 'dignity',[64] exactly as the *houris* maintain their virginity despite repeated intercourse. Another example of what might be called the *'houri* syndrome' has been a series of amendments added to Article 12 of the Family Code by the legislators (ie. moderate 'Citizens'). The Article allows the guardian (of the woman) to oppose her if she wishes to marry and she is minor (under 18 according to Article 7 of the Code). Disagreement arose as to whether the terms, 'minor' or 'virgin' or *bikr* (Arabic for virgin or pubert) should be used in the Article.[65]

At this point, it would be pertinent to suggest that the argument on Islam's position towards family organisation, and more specifically the

Maghrebian *'ayla* , amounts to an argument on Islamic injunctions on individual behaviour. Indeed, short of presenting an ideal familial type, the Islamic code of conduct for individual believers is in agreement with the rigidity of the Maghrebian *'ayla*. In this context, Qur'anic injunctions will be taken as the main source of reference of the code of conduct of the 'good' Muslim. Very few human secular references will be mentioned since they all strived to be mere interpretations[66] of the main source, that is the Qur'an as it was revealed to Muhammad in seventh century Arabia.

As one reads the Qur'anic text, one cannot fail to notice the advent of an open world in the sense that the individual believer is freed from particularistic allegiances (Qur'an 49:10, 64:13), particularly Surah 9, verse 24:

> Those that have embraced the faith and fled their homes and fought for Allah's cause with their wealth and their persons are held in higher regard by Allah. It is they who shall triumph... Believers, do not befriend your fathers or your brothers if they choose unbelief in preference to faith. Wrongdoers are those that befriend them. Say: 'If your fathers, your sons, your brothers, your wives, your tribes, the property you have acquired, the merchandise your fear may not be sold, and the homes you love, are dearer to you than Allah, His apostle and His cause, then wait until Allah has fulfilled his decree. Allah does not guide the evildoers.

However, the paradox of such a universalist allegiance is that it has replaced the closed world of the family, the clan and the tribe, with an equally binding and closed world; that of the exclusive relationship with the creator. Believers are often reminded of their creator's omnipotence and of their own powerlessness.[67] They are reminded of this through the theme of creation as the exclusive capacity of Allah.[68] The overall message is that because they are [His] creation they owe [Him]

total submission and obedience, and exclusive worship, as in the following Chapters and Verses:

> Men, have fear of your Lord, who created you from a single soul. From that soul He created its mate, and through them He bestrewed the earth with countless men and women.
>
> (4:1)

> To Allah alone is true worship due... . He created you from a single being, then from that being He created its mate. ...He moulds you in your mothers' wombs by stages in three-fold darkness.
>
> (39:1)

> Such is Allah, your Lord. His is the Kingdom. There is no god but Him. How then can you turn away from Him?
>
> (39:5)

> If you render him no thanks, know that Allah does not need you. Yet the ingratitude of his servants does not please Him. If you are thankful, your thanks will please Him.
>
> (39:7)

> It was He who created you from a single being. From that being he created his mate, so that he might find comfort in her.
>
> (7:189)

It might be objected that the theme of creation is neither exclusively Islamic, nor does it entertain a direct bearing on family organisation and the relationship between the sexes. But the Qur'an strongly suggests that they are basically entertwined. Indeed, not only [Allah] creates the universe and human beings in pairs (ie. male and female) (Qur'an, 36:36; 51:43; 30:16; 49:13; 16:70), but he bestows fertility onto woman as he pleases:

> Allah created you from dust, then from a little germ. Into two sexes He divided you. No female conceives or is delivered without His knowledge.
>
> (35:11)

> He alone has knowledge of the Hour of Doom. No fruit is borne, no female conceives or is delivered, but with his knowledge.
>
> (41:47)

> We cause to remain in the womb whatever We please for an appointed term, and then we bring you forth as infants, that you may grow up and reach your prime.
>
> (22:5)

This divine monopoly over both creation and procreation has far-reaching consequences on the status of individuality and interaction of the sexes. To make sure that this exclusiveness is not impinged upon, a whole array of regulations for individual conduct is displayed, strangely tantamount to the effacement of individuality and ego for which the *'ayla* of the Maghrebian 'Republic of Cousins' was distinguished. Not only man and woman are addressed as the servants of their creator, but they are left no privacy. Individuals of opposite sexes are strongly advised to avoid meeting each other if not related by kin. In order to obtain this separation the Qur'an addresses both men and women:

> Enjoin believing men to turn their eyes away from temptation and to restrain their carnal desires. This will make their lives purer. Allah has knowledge of all their actions.
>
> (24:30)

> Enjoin believing women to turn their eyes away from temptation and to preserve their chastity; to cover their adornments (except such as are normally displayed); to draw their veils over their bosoms and not to reveal their finery except to their husbands, their fathers, their husbands' fathers, their sons, their step-sons, their brothers, their brothers' sons, their sisters' sons, their women-servants, and their slave-girls; male attendants lacking in natural vigour, and children who have no carnal knowledge of women. And let them not stamp their feet in walking so as to reveal their hidden trinkets.
>
> (24:31)

It seems that the rules of modesty are more explicit with regard to women's conduct. This is to be reiterated in other verses:

> Prophet, enjoin your wives, your daughters, and the wives of true believers to draw their veils close round them. That is more proper, so that they may be recognised and not molested. Allah is forgiving and merciful.
>
> (33:59)

The minute regulation of men's and women's behaviour is in fact no other than the regulation of their sexuality. It has been argued that Allah could not tolerate the intimacy between man and woman, for it endangered the exclusive adoration he requires of Muslims (Sabbah, 1984: 98-108). Consequently, the pairing conjugal family is discouraged, for it is there that man and woman learn to be together, intimately:

> At stake in Muslim society is not the emancipation of women (if that means only equality with men), but the fate of the heterosexual unit. Men and women were and still are socialized to perceive each other as enemies. ...Muslim ideology, which views men and women as enemies, tries to separate the two, and empowers men with institutionalized means to oppress women.
>
> (Mernissi, 1985: 20)

Mernissi argues that this enmity between Muslim men and women finds its rationale in the Islamic perception of female sexuality. Accordingly women are perceived as sexually powerful beings, whose control is necessary. Hence the institutions of polygamy, repudiation,[69] and segregation of the sexes (Mernissi, ibid: 19, 27-45). But most significant of all is the Qur'anic consecration of men's superiority over women:

> Women shall with justice have rights similar to those exercised against them, although men have a status above women. Allah is mighty and wise.
>
> (2:228)

and:

> Men have authority over women because Allah has made the one superior to the other, and because they spend their wealth to maintain them. Good women are obedient. They guard their unseen parts because Allah has guarded them. As for those from whom you fear disobedience, admonish them and send them to beds apart and beat them. Then if

> they obey you, take no further actions against them. Allah is high, supreme.
>
> (4:34)

Thus not only are men unequivocally superior to women by divine decree, but they are entitled to dispose of them as they wish, either to exercise authority as in the above, or as pleasure:

> Women are your fields: go then into your fields as you please.
>
> (2:223)

or as part of 'worldly things' which men enjoy:

> All good things have this day been made lawful to you. The food of those to whom the Book was given is lawful to you and yours to them. Lawful to you are the believing women and the free women, from among those who were given the Scriptures before you... .
>
> (5:5)

Thus, suppression of the individual ego, segregation of the sexes and finally women's inferiority may be said to constitute the kernel of the Muslim sexual order. Effacement of the ego evolves into the debasement of women, who despite being granted 'rights' (inheritance) are nevertheless treated as objects, either of scorn or pleasure. The Qur'anic vision of women is on the whole that of minor individuals in a predominantly male social structure. Women are rarely addressed directly by Allah, unlike male believers.[70] Although the Qur'an is by and large 'compassionate' towards women, and has widely treated their case, they play the role of background figures on whom Allah's will is mediated through men. Hence the authority and predominance given to the latter in matters of divorce (Qur'an, 4:20; 2:227; 2:236; 65:1), and marriage. Indeed, the Qur'an is particularly generous in its provision on polygamy (4:2) even though it warns against unfair treatment of co-spouses. Accordingly, men are only accountable to their own conscience and to a very mild divine rebuke:

> Try as you may, you cannot treat all your wives impartially. Do not set yourself altogether against any of them... . If you do what is right and guard youselves against evil, you will find Allah forgiving and merciful.
>
> (4:129)

The Qur'anic principles of man's authority over woman and this latter's confinement to an eternal status of 'minor' do not fail to appear in the Algerian *Code de la Famille*.[71] It is no wonder also, that armed with such divine commandments on the 'ideal Muslim female' as obedient and pleasurable, the 'Cousin-delegates' of the National Assembly staunchly opposed any attempt at giving women an active role in family matters. In their eyes, any reform in this sense would have entailed the violation of Allah's will. Indeed, if women were to rise as active agents in the family unit, the very divine order based on the effacement of the ego, and the separation of the sexes would be endangered. For women would then be free to exercise their potential sexual power, hitherto controlled by the rules of polygamy and repudiation. It is worth remembering that the 'Cousin-delegates' of the Algerian National Assembly were not anxious to discuss the status of women in the code. Rather, they concentrated their attention and wrath on the article providing for conditional polygamy. They were fearful of the possibility given to women to consent to or reject a polygamous union; for this was a move which harbingered women's attainment of an all round majority. It is important to stress that the opposition of the 'Cousins' to conditional polygamy is the more significant that it is purely formal, since polygamy is rarely practised. Indeed, they were more preoccupied with keeping the Qur'anic verse intact, rather than securing the practice of polygamy. They were even more

anxious to bar women from having a say in family matters altogether, since this would have undermined the divinely bestowed authority of men over women. But it has been argued that the ban on women's emergence as active social agents concerned mainly the public realm:

> The desegregation of the sexes violates Islam's ideology on women's position in the social order: that women should be under the authority of fathers, brothers, or husbands. Since women are considered by Allah to be a destructive element, they are to be spatially confined and excluded from matters other than those of the family. Female access to non-domestic space is put under the control of males.
>
> (Mernissi, 1985: 19)

However, the history of family law reform in Algeria, and the passionate debates which preceded the enactment of the 1984 *Code de la Famille*, illustrate different social dynamics from Mernissi's. Instead, the present author argues that female access to non-domestic space in Muslim areas has been relatively tolerated, through schooling and access to the modern professions (women's production in the traditional sector is not taken into account by statisticians and planners). By contrast, women were never consulted about the reorganisation of the domestic space, the family *per se*, whenever the issue arose in Muslim countries.[72] The paradox is astonishing; it is as if sex roles and statuses were taken for granted given their consecration by divine law. Thus, while there has been a *de facto* participation of women in public life, albeit alien to the Qur'anic order of the separation of the sexes, granting women a *de jure* personal status equal to men's was by and large seen as heresy.

Despite its socialist principles, Algeria was no exception. If anything its rapid modernisation reached an anti-climax when the 1984 *Code de la*

Famille sealed up women in a perpetual position of minority and incompetence. The violation of constitutional and socialist principles of equality went virtually unnoticed by the vast majority of public opinion, immersed in the pervading routine of the 'Cousin-like' *'ayla*, with its well defined gender roles, and the deeply-seated Islamic code of conduct whereby 'men have authority over women'. But is this vision of women unique to the Maghrebian 'Cousins' and Islamic cosmogony?

4.5.2. Woman in the 'African Systems of Kinship'.

The diversity of Tanzania's ethnic configuration and the plurality of its religious creeds make it difficult to draw a national ideal type of womanhood, as in Algeria. The 1971 Law of Marriage Act, discussed above, had to take into account traditional customary rules, as well as Christian, Hindu and Muslim laws on family and personal status. What transpired from the Act was an institutionalisation of women's minority, especially through the retention of polygamy (para. 12) and the difficult procedure in obtaining divorce (para. 25). Indeed women have to suffer ill-treatment of some sort or other before aspiring to divorce, whereas men have only to decide and register the divorce with a local authority.

The status of minor, retained for women in the Law of Marriage Act, can however disclose a uniformity in the lower valuations which have informed the law-makers (ie. the moderate 'Citizens' in power). They are to be found in the organisation of kin relationships:

> For the understanding of any aspect of the social life of an African people - economic, political, or religious - it is essential to have a thorough knowledge of their system of kinship and marriage.
>
> (Radcliffe-Brown, 1950: 1)

In Tanzania, as: "In most African societies, kinship constitutes the primary basis for the individual's rights, duties, rules of residence, marriage, inheritance and succession" (Ayisi, 1980: 18). This entails the effacement of the individual. As in the Algerian *'ayla* :

> The extended family has served to perpetuate the low status of women in certain ways. A wife is expected to be subservient to her husband, father-in-law, mother-in-law, older sisters-in-law, and all her brothers-in-law, as well as to relatives extending beyond the immediate family of the husband. She is expected to contribute to their material well-being, by giving them surplus crops, general care, and financial help. She is not expected to give such assistance to her own family.
>
> (Mbilinyi, 1972: 66)

Furthermore, generation and sex determine the place of the individual in the kin hierarchy. In both Bantu and Nilotic systems, elders are more highly ranked than youngsters, and men more than women (Mair, 1969: 46-7; Wilson, 1977: 85). By and large, the position of women in Tanzanian traditional customs was that of subservience and obedience. Among the Nyamwezi in northwestern Tanzania:

> ...by definition women occupied a socially subordinate place; although a few upper-class women attained considerable wealth and authority, men possessed political power, judicial rights, the right to inherit cattle and land. ...The few women who were able to rise above their sexually assigned standing did so by gaining the favor of a male superior, often by such means as manipulation, lying or flattery. Women of all social levels were expected to be subservient and obedient.
>
> (Berger, 1981: 160)

Wilson's study (1977) of the Nyakyusa people of Southern Tanzania disclosed for instance that:

> A wife's duties to her husband were carefully taught by her mothers at the conclusion of the puberty-marriage ritual. She must cook and brew beer, fetch water and

> firewood, clean the house and byre, mud the walls and floor, work in the fields... . Cooking was the primary duty of a wife, closely identified with sexual intercourse, and the most conspicuous activity of the favourite [wife].
>
> (Wilson, 1977: 129)

Another feature of the 'best' wife is to be wedded preferably virgin.

Although the rules of most of Tanzania's ethnic groups allow for a fair amount of sexual freedom (as initiation rites) (Mair, 1969: 49), virginity is particularly appreciated:

> ...In some cases physical virginity formerly received public congratulation, as with the Ganda and some of the Luhya tribes, where a special present was sent to the mother of a girl who was found to be virgin at marriage, the Hehe, where this news was received with rejoicing, or the Kipsigis, where virgins had a place of honour at the initiation dances. The Vugusu attached sufficient importance to the point to require that a bridegroom should deflower his bride in public, as do the Luo of Central Nyanza. ...Of the Birwana and Sumbwa of Sukumaland, ...the girls who were married with full formalities were nearly always virgins.
>
> (Mair, 1969: 50)[73]

Among the Chaga of Mount Kilimanjaro "girls were harangued on the importance of virginity at marriage, [while] boys were reminded of the law imposing death penalty on a girl who became pregnant before initiation and on her lover" (Mair, ibid: 47).

Although these educational rituals do not always hold sway as they are originally taught, they nevertheless constitute an important set of values for the majority of Tanzanians. This has appeared for instance in the cautionary manner with which the 1971 family reform was introduced (see supra).[74] Even more revealing was the response of traditionalist Members of Parliament (ie. spokesmen for Tanzanian public opinion) to the timid reforms of the Act. Of conditional polygamy[75], one M.P. had this to say:

> If a man has to get his wife's consent to a second marriage, the African tradition where man has always been superior to a woman will be endangered. Unless the Law of Marriage Bill intends to change men into women this clause should be removed.
>
> (The Standard, 22 Jan. 1971)[76]

According to Mbilinyi, this M.P. was summing up the general feeling of his peers, whose deeply held sentiments of woman's inferiority were in fact admitted openly.

Thus, in Tanzania, as in Algeria, family reform helped 'exorcise' a well-established conservatism with regard women's position in society. While normative equality was received with the least controversy in the public realm, it was bluntly rejected in the more private realm of the family. Indeed, bestowing an equal status to woman was more directly felt as a threat to the whole familial structure itself. This latter rested on the predominance of patrilineal and patriarchal structures. Consequently, a new code of conduct establishing women's majority in familial rights would entail upheavals in the privileged position of men. On the other hand, even though the familial structure itself was markedly affected by the wider political and economic changes (division of labour, migrations, national identity, individualism), the values which regimented the status, role and position of women proved tenacious.

The institutionalisation of the traditional status of women's inferiority and minority in Algeria's and Tanzania's family legislation constitutes a serious discrepancy with their constitutional rights as citizens. The combination of higher and lower valuations in each legislation may prove to be detrimental to women's participation in the

public realm, although this latter is not closed to them in either country. By institutionalising a preference for women's domestic roles, the 'Citizens' in power in Algeria and Tanzania may encourage an already weak presence of women in the formal political, economic and social sectors. The common thread to these is that they are almost exclusively manned by educated people; and women's presence in them is highly determined by their educational attainment, as will be demonstrated in the following Chapter.

NOTES: CHAPTER 4

1. This author refers to the models of the pre-colonial social formations in Algeria and Tanzania. However, it is important to retain the changes forced on these by colonial exploitation. As a consequence, their normative pattern was converted into a defence mechanism, which instead of developing, became fossilised into a transcendental system. As seen in the previous Chapter, this mechanism continued to operate in the post-colonial 'Republic of Citizens' in Algeria and Tanzania.

2. Habermas (1977) has argued that the increasing rationalisation of human societies has created the conditions for expedient technocratic decision-making. This was permitted by the growing legitimation of political decisions through science and technology, and threatens to seriously undermine political democratic debate in advanced capitalist countries. See J. Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, Heinemann, London 1977, pp. 102-3. However, Habermas' argument can readily be extended to 'developing nations' where the discourse of 'development' and its underlying axioms of 'technological and scientific progress' have constituted a paramount legitimation in political decision-making. That traditions of 'democracy' are lacking there can also be explained in Habermas' terms of expedient technocratic decision-making; probably even more so than in advanced capitalism.

3. The use of 'lower valuations' refers here to the actual 'mental states' and 'social actions' of the 'Citizens' as opposed to their 'higher valuations' found in the official discourse of what 'ought to

be done' to create a progressive, 'Republic of Citizens' professing equality of the sexes. The terms 'lower and higher valuations' have been coined by Gunar Myrdal in his An American Dilemma, McGraw-Hill, New-York, 1964. Holmes interpreted the distinction between the two as "what individuals assert ought to be done, their mental states, and their social actions" (Holmes, 1981: 112).

4. See Mernissi F., "Women's Work: Religious and Scientific Concepts as Political Manipulation in Dependent Islam" in Halim Barakat (ed.) Contemporary North Africa: Issues of Development and Integration, Croom Helm, 1985, pp. 214-228.

5. Articles 39, 41 and 42 of Algeria's Constitution are contained in the provisions on 'Fundamental Liberties, Human Rights and Rights of the Citizen' (ibid: 24-30).

Article 39: Fundamental liberties, human rights and rights of the citizen are safeguarded. All citizens are equal in rights as well as in duties. Any discrimination based on sex or race or occupation is proscribed.

Article 41: The State insures equality of all citizens by removing economic, social and cultural obstacles which limit [this] equality, hinder the development of the human person, and hamper the effective participation of all citizens to political, economic, social and cultural life.

Article 42: All political, economic social and cultural rights of the Algerian woman are guaranteed by the Constitution.

In view of the above mentioned constitutional provisions, family law in Algeria should be in breach of the Constitution, but Article 2, which

provides for Islam as the religion of state, legitimises it. The dilemma is formidable.

6. Sheikh Abdel Hamid Ibn Badis was the instigator and leader of the Algerian *Ulamaa* movement in the late 1920s and early 1930s, who used cogently the message of scripturalist Islam to counter the assimilationist projects of the colonial administration. In his writings, talks and courses, Ibn Badis used mainly a spiritualist message as well as a historical one to confirm the profound Islamic identity of the Algerians. See Chapter 5 for further details on his work in the educational field.

7. Cf. Journal Officiel de la République Algérienne (JORA), Débats Parlementaires, nos. 23-29, June 20, 24, 27, 1963 and July 1, 15, 22, 1963. The emotional content of the interventions is particularly compelling apropos religion and its 'organic' link with personal status.

8. The marriage of minors is far from being considered an offence in Islam, and is best explained by Muslim scholars. In his The Family Structure in Islam, American Trust Publications, Indiana, 1977, Hammudah 'Abd al'Ati has argued for instance that:

> Marriage in minority would seem to imply a betrothal or some formal agreement, deferring final consumation to a later date. This type of Child "marriage" is probably best explained by the desire to draw families together and to facilitate social integration.
> Given the low sex ratio and racial plurality of Muslim society, the need for social integration and the high value of sexual purity and virginity, it may become understandable why Islam set no age limits on marriage.
>
> (ibid: 76)(emphasis added)

It should be added that the marriage of minors coincided also with the practice of arranged marriages betwen cousins in Algeria's 'Republic of Cousins'. Accordingly, Loi 63-224, was easily circumvented as people would not report on child betrothal within the same kin.

9. Traditionally, the reading of the Exordium not only sealed the union of a man and a woman, but that of two families. The ceremony involved the strict presence of agnates of each family. No women attended, for this part of the ceremony amounted to a 'gentleman's agreement' which involved the 'word of honour' of each party. The bride was not present but was represented by a male guardian (father, brother, uncle).

10. According to 'Abd al'Ati, the rationale behind forbiding a Muslim woman to marry a non-Muslim man is to provide for religious and spiritual equality between the two partners:

> In the new order [Islam], it became lawful in theory and accepted in practice for any free Muslim man to marry any Muslim woman so long as his religious integrity remained intact. What was required in marriage was the "religious" not the traditional "social", equality. Thus, a non-Muslim man is forbidden to marry a Muslim woman because he is not her equal in religion. Nor is it lawful for a debaucher to marry a continent, decent woman for the same reason. If religious compatibility obtains, any other consideration is of secondary importance. This is the logic of the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet particularly as interpreted by jurist critics.
>
> (ibid: 88)

By logic of the Qur'an, one should understand the unequivocal superiority it bestowed on men over women in a number of verses. See later discussion. Suffice it to note here that 'Abd al'Ati's fear for woman's 'religious' equality is also the best obstacle to her acquiring 'social equality'.

11. See Chapter 3 on the internecine power struggles which marked early Independence.

12. All of these are provisions of the *Shari'a* and the Qur'an, and will be examined later in this Chapter.

13. M. Bedjaoui was one of the most eloquent spokesmen of the war of liberation in international venues. This particular comment was issued in Révolution et Travail, 3 March 1966, the organ of the UGTA (Union Nationale des Travailleurs Algériens).

14. See this Chapter, and in particular the detailed discussion of the Qur'an and *Shari'a* views on the relation between the sexes and the status of womanhood.

15. The term 'decay' is underlined by the present author to mark the extreme reluctance expressed by Boumediene, (a 'Citizen') at seeing women entirely emancipated as free individuals. The obsession with morality is a fascinating corollary of women's access to the public domain. Boumediene's ambivalent appeal to socialism and Islam at the same time is typical of the lower valuations of the 'Citizens' in power. Their yearning for 'chaste' domestic women is all too apparent despite the socialist promise of universal equality.

16. Underlining added to mark again the leitmotive of morality. Note that this latter is never explicitly described. Nevertheless it need

not be so. For the average Algerian, it is clearly attached to 'chastity' as will be seen in the National Assembly's debate on the Family Code.

17. See section 4.5.1. and related subheadings.

18. The Justice Minister, Kacem Nait Belkacem, was a virulent advocate of the transcendence of Islamic values. He launched one of the most impressive Islamic cultural venues: *Multaqa al Fikr al Islamiy* (The Conference of Islamic Thought), which, every year, gathers thousands of participants from all over the world. He made this declaration to the Fifth Conference held in Oran (Western Algeria) in July 1971, and reported by the daily El Moudjahid, 27.7.1971.

19. The dismissal of the secretariat of the UNFA expresses above all the mood of the 'Citizens' in power. It is significant that they are more prone to compromise with the excesses of the traditionalist 'Cousins', than with the radicalism of secularist 'Citizens'. In fact, they were equally eager to dismiss them in the early years of the Boumediene regime, whilst even then showing tolerance towards the 'Cousins'.

20. Boumediene's death unleashed the long-repressed growth of proponents of economic 'liberalisation' in the polity and army, backed by a new body of entrepreneurs who thrived on small industries. Almost simultaneously, religious fundamentalists brought their claims into the open. Whether the two movements were associated is yet to be established. A most fascinating item of social research would be to

investigate the legitimation discourse of the advocates of 'liberalisation'; whether it be Islam or westernisation. It is most likely to be Islam as the two are not necessarily antithetical. See Maxime Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism, Penguin Books, 1980. Accordingly, the joint rise of both tendencies would throw some light on the likely social conservatism of 'liberalisation'. However, it is still too early to establish any lasting connections.

21. The participation of women war-veterans in the feminist protests was over-estimated by organisers. Although the legitimacy of nationalism is still paramount in Algeria, it does not seem to hold sway where family and women are concerned. The public realm of the nation is, in the eyes of the 'Cousins' and the moderate 'Citizens', best served by women holding on to their domestic status. Indeed, the weak participation of Algerian women in nation-building, following their active role in the anti-colonial war, has baffled many an observer, who had awaited a continuation of the radicalism of the war in future social relations in independent Algeria. The most virulent indictment of the 'betrayal of the woman's cause' can be found in the writings of Fadéla M'rabet: La Femme Algérienne, Paris, Maspero, 1964; Les Algériennes, Paris, Maspero, 1967.

22. Reporting on the interventions of secularist delegates was very scanty in the consulted issues of the Journal Official de l'Assemblée Populaire Nationale, compared to the faithful reproduction of those of the 'Cousins'.

23. See further discussion in this Chapter on the principle of 'guardianship' over women and their inclusion in the category of the 'incapacitated' in Islamic law.

24. Whenever the public sector, as opposed to the private domestic sector of the home, is made accessible to women, sexual morality seems to haunt the minds of Muslim men (as shown by Boumediene's speeches, and the interventions of delegates). For instance, Mernissi has pointed out that:

> ...the perception of the woman who works for a wage outside the domestic unit [is that of] someone who is taking up unmentionable activities that are seen as prostitution. As she violates the separation of the social fields and transgresses the sexual limits of the division of labor by moving into the economic, public space, she is seen as only able to sell that which she administers as a commodity in the domestic space, in private intimacy - sex.
>
> (in Barakat, 1985: 217)

Mernissi rightly points out that this perception is somehow shared by "illiterate peasants" and "highly trained industrial managers and factory owners as well as technocrats and state planners" (ibid). In our models it is certainly shared by dominant 'Citizens' (Boumediene), and 'Cousin' delegates of the National Assembly.

25. Emphasis added to mark the explicit limits set by the ruling 'Citizens' on women's aspirations for equality: knowledge (ie. education) and work (wage labour). Chairman Bitat's message is that, any other equality is not and cannot be envisaged (ie. legal equality).

26. Yet, they are a reproduction of the *Shari'a* provisions on the relations between the sexes. See 'Abd al'Ati, op. cit. pp. 146-182. The

husband's duty of 'maintenance' is handsomely made up for by the wife's duty of 'obedience'. A courteous master-slave relationship would be an accurate description of the *Shari'a* model for marital relationships. See details later in this Chapter.

27. Discussing Muslim men's aversion for women's work outside the home, Mernissi pointed out that: "These men are not to be condemned for thinking in this way. They are in total harmony with their own frame of reference, the Muslim concept and definitions of masculinity and feminity shaped by *Shari'a* laws and values" (in Barakat, ibid: 216). However, when 'these men' also happen to profess progressive principles of socialist equality as in Algeria, the Islamic frame of reference becomes latent among the ruling elite. Hence the ambivalence of their stance and the apparent opportunism of their legitimations (Socialism/Islam).

28. The term 'polygamy' in the sense of plurality of wives is not technically correct. 'Polygyny' is the anthropological term to designate such plurality, and polygamy applies to the practice by both sexes. 'Polyandry' is the plurality of husbands. However, 'polygamy' will be used here in its lay sense of 'more than one wife' as it is used thus in the debates on the Family Code in Algeria, and the Marriage Law of Tanzania.

29. Cf. note 27 above.

30. 'Abd al'Ati, op. cit., pp. 13-18.

31. Polygamy is far from being an extended practice in Algeria. On the contrary it has been on the decrease and superseded by monogamy. It emerged from the Assembly debates that 'only' 3% of men practice polygamy. But, the Qur'anic sacrality of the principle (Surah 4, verse 2) prevented the hard line 'Cousins' from accepting any conditional wording of it, let alone its abrogation. In the meantime, it is left to intellectual moderate 'Citizens' of the legal profession to 'scientifically' rationalise the retention of conditional polygamy. An example of such rationalisation is that of 'Abd al'Aziz Saa'd (chairman of Annaba's Legislative Committee): "given that Algeria's population is constituted of 48% males and 52% females, four girls out of 52 would remain unmarried and would fall prey to non-Muslim unions or even depravation; therefore polygamy is justified in a statistical sense". See his article Nidham Ta'adud Azaujat fi Qawa'id al Shari'a wal Qawanin al Wadh'iya, (The Principle of Polygamy in the Rules of the *Shari'a* and Positive Laws), in al Thaqafa, no. 95, Sep./Oct. 1986, pp. 197-211. al Thaqafa is issued by the Ministry of Culture. However, Saa'd's figures say nothing about the ratios for different generations, (but relate only to the overall population ratio), and therefore marriageable groups. Such simplistic statistical conclusions are surprisingly convenient as a pseudo-scientific evidence for the retention of polygamy as a principle.

32. This and the following verses are N.J. Dawood's translation, The Koran, Penguin Books, 1981. However, this author has adopted the transliteration Qur'an, as it is closer to Arabic.Subsequent references from the Qur'an will consist of the Chapter's number followed by the verse's, as in 4:2.

33. Cf. Nicholas Hans, Comparative Education, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978. Hans "enumerated five factors which make an ideal nation: unity of race, unity of language, unity of religion, compact territory, and political sovereignty" (ibid: 9). However, he warns that "Neither character is potent enough if separated, only the combination of at least four of them can result in creating a social unit called "nation" clearly distinct from other "nations" (ibid: 10). The cases of Algeria and Tanzania suggest that such proposals are not universally valid.

34. Emphasis added to stress the importance of the private realm which, as in Algeria, attracted public debate and controversy.

35. It is significant that the strongest opposition to a progressive piece of legislation came from Tanzanian Muslims. This can be explained by the sacrality of Islamic cosmogony and the divinely regulated relations between the sexes (see infra, section 4.5.1.2, of this Chapter).

36. The lack of reference to *Ujamaa* recalls the indifference in Algeria towards the egalitarian principles of the National Charter and the Constitution.

37. Radcliffe-Brown makes a distinction between 'history' and 'pseudo history'. The latter tends to distort knowledge of non-literate societies, where written records are scanty if not totally absent.

38. Cf. Lewis Morgan, cited by Engels in his Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1981.

Engels' interest for Morgan's theory of the early matriarchal gens is justified by its materialist outlook:

> This rediscovery of the primitive matriarchal gens as the earlier stage of the patriarchal gens of civilized peoples has the same importance for anthropology as Darwin's theory of evolution has for biology and Marx's theory of surplus value for political economy.
> (Engels, 1981: 83)

Such argument illustrates the thin divide between materialism and evolutionism in Western epistemology. The idea of positive evolution did not fail to appear in the then new science of anthropology. A product of colonial times, anthropology inevitably looked at tribal societies as an illustration of early human groupings, and not as a variety of social organisation.

39. Cf. Steven Lukes, Emile Durkheim, Penguin Books, 1977, pp. 182-3.

40. Ibid. Note that Durkheim is not concerned with 'how' evolution occurs, but describes it as a finite product, thus giving us pseudo-historical assumptions. Note also how Germanic and Christian forms are taken as superior.

41. Cf. Engels, op. cit., especially his analysis of the evolution of the bourgeois conjugal family of the industrial revolution and the exploitation of women as its corrollary.

42. See Chapter 3, note 7.

43. *'ayla* is the Arabic word for family. In this context it designates "the extended family, of a patriarchal type, of agnatic descent, and

indivisible". See Boutefnouchet M., La Famille Algérienne, SNED, Alger, 1982, p. 38.

44. Cf. R. Basagana & A. Sayad, Habitat Traditionnel et Structures Familiales en Kabylie, C.R.A.P.E.S, Alger, 1974.

45. In the agnatic structure, descent is traced through the male line; in the cognatic structure descent is bilateral as both parents are equally important. The combination of the two is a characteristic trait of the endogamous form of kinship prevalent in the Maghreb. This particularity was noted by Ibn Khaldun, but went unnoticed by anthropologists imbued with the Durkeimian totemic clan as being exclusively agnatic. See A. Megherbi, La Pensée Sociologique d'Ibn Khaldun, SNED, Alger, 1971, p.161.

46. Cf. Boutefnouchet, op. cit., pp. 41-2, and p. 56.

47. Cf. Basagana & Sayad, op. cit, p. 51, as well as R. Descloitres & L. Debzi, Système de Parenté et Structures Familiales en Algérie, Aix en Provence, Centre Africain des Sciences Humaines Appliquées, 1965; also reproduced in the Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, Paris, 1963.

48. Megherbi explains that the term *'assabiyya* does not only render the political aspect of power and sociological change, but also carries a biological meaning, that of blood ties. See A. Megherbi, op. cit., pp. 159-160. The fluidity of such concept reminds us of more recent anthropological findings in Africa on the close links between political relations and kinship relations. See M. Fortes & E.E. Evans-Pritchard,

African Political Systems, International African Institute, Oxford University Press, 1961.

49. The circles represent the different levels of integration of the individual, who entertains primary social relations with the immediate kin within the *'assab*, and secondary relations within *el-kherrouba* (the segment), *el-deshra* (the sub-clan), *el-ferqa* (the clan), *el 'arsh* (the tribe), and finally *el-bled* (the confederation of tribes). See Boutefnouchet, op. cit., p.55.

50. Cf. Nefissa Zerdoumi, Enfants d'hier, l'éducation de l'enfant en milieu traditionnel algérien, François Maspero, Paris, 1970, p. 79.

51. The Algerian *Code de la Famille* is a good example of the intermingling of 'Cousin' type lower valuations and orthodox Islamic precepts on the issue of women's virginity and minority. In the original Code (JORADP, 23eme année, no. 24, 12 Juin 1984), the father as a guardian may oppose the marriage of his daughter if she is minor (Article 12, 2nd. paragraph, p. 612). Two subsequent amendments were brought in to replace the word minor. In the JORADP, no. 31, 31 Juillet 1984, p. 801, the term 'minor' was replaced by 'virgin', thus emphasizing the physical status of virginity so jealously cherished by the 'Republic of Cousins' and the Islamic cosmogony alike. The other amendment appeared in the JORADP no. 41, 19 Septembre 1984, transforming 'virgin' into its Arabic transcription *bikr*, thus epitomising the confusion and paranoia surrounding the control of female sexuality.

52. Only with old age do women gain respectability and trust. See Boutefnouchet, op. cit., p. 72.

53. A reading of the 1966 and 1977 National Censuses discloses that respectively 65 per cent, and 63 per cent of Algerian families were of the conjugal type. The slight decrease in the 1977 figure was more an indication of the difficult housing conditions which caused families to assemble, than a wilful retention of the extended type. The analysis was made for the FLN preparatory commission on the Family Code prior to its issue in June 1984. Cf. Hizb Djabhat al-Tahrir al-Lajnah al-Wataniah li-Tahdhir Milaf Siassat Tandhim al-Usrah, al-Tatawar al-Tarikhi lil-Usrah al-Djazairia hata al-Marhala al-Rahinah, (The Historical Evolution of the Algerian Family), mimeo, n.d.

54. There is a growing reluctance among young couples in maintaining the extended structure of the family. Boutefnouchet's study on the Algerian family (op. cit.) disclosed that this latter is by and large evolving into a conjugal type family, but dominated however by the paternal component. His sample of 86 families nationwide demonstrated that they were developing from a 'traditional composed structure' into a 'modern simple structure' under the special circumstances of urbanisation and industrialisation, within a span of time of three generations (1885/1914; 1915/1945; 1946/1976).

55. Cf. Fatima Mernissi, Beyond the Veil, Male-Female Dynamics in Muslim Society, Al Saqi Books, 1985. Mernissi is ironically in agreement with apologetic writers on Islam and the family structure, who equally thought that Islamic family reforms were unique. But they

saw in them a purification of decadent practices of the so-called dark ages (*al-Djahilia*), in Arabia. Cf. Mustapha al-Saba'i, al-mar'a baina al-fiqh wal-qanun (Woman between Theology and Law) al-maqtabah al-'arabiyyah, Halab (Aleppo, Syria), 1966. In the case of North Africa the rupture with previous familial practices occured in relation to women's right to inherit in Islam, but not in the rigid control of sexual behaviour already insured through endogamy.

56. See Hammudah 'Abd al'Ati, The Family Structure in Islam, American Trust Publications, 1977, pp. 98-102, on the variety of marriage forms in pre-Islamic Arabia. At least 10 out the 12 forms compiled by 'Abd al'Ati were free relations between men and women, a remarkable contrast with the strict Islamic form of licit *nikah* (declared marriage).

57. Cf. Qur'an, 9:24, 49:10, 64:15. All emphasize the primacy of religious brotherhood over all other ties including blood and marriage should they conflict with it.

58. See footnote 51 above.

59. The reference is to the unhappy marriage of Zeyd, the Prophet's adopted son, with Zaynab the Prophet's cousin. Following their divorce Muhammad married Zaynab, but to do so a verse was issued in order to prohibit adoption; as otherwise an adopted son was to be treated as a real son, and marrying his divorcee was one of the unlawful union in Islam (Qur'an, 4:23).

60. Pertaining to be a universal message, Islam encouraged exogamy. The

Prophet's nine marriages were mostly known for being politically motivated unions. See, Nabia Abbott, Aishah the Beloved of Mohammed, Al Saqi Books, London 1985, and Qur'an, 49:13.

61. Muslims hold Muhammad's conduct as exemplary, hence the elaboration of the Sunnah, a compilation of the Prophet's sayings (*hadeeth*), and behaviour. The active participation of Muhammad in his community (as a husband, father, religious and political leader) established a tenacious tradition among Muslims at "reinstating in their integrity a series of stereotypical conducts [laid down in the] universal logos of Allah, and the ideal behaviour of the Prophet". See Abdelwahab Bouhdiba, La Sexualité en Islam, PUF, Paris, 1975, pp. 11-12. Bouhdiba is of the opinion that "in its essence, Islam is orthodoxy, hence the continuous fundamentalist and regressive temptation" (ibid:11) at best reviving the original ideal model. The 'Cousins' of the Algerian National Assembly behaved accordingly when insisting upon the adoption of the *Shari'a*, so much so that reform of family law to them simply meant a return to the original model, and not its adaptation to present circumstances. The a-historicity of the divine word and the Prophet's conduct is to them matter of fact.

62. Cf. Tillion, op.cit., pp. 113-119. She argues that the Mediterranean notion of 'honour' is intrinsically linked with female virginity.

63. The wedding feast has to be made public, since "publicity is the element which distinguishes legitimate unions from illicit ones. This was probably the reason for the Prophet to recommend marriage feasts"

('Abd ad'Ati, ibid: 61). On the other hand custom has it in Algeria, that marriage be consummated on the wedding night, so that the bride's virginal blood (on her blouse) be shown in public. The absence of bleeding is sufficient proof that the bride is not virgin.

64. See Boumediene's remarks, earlier in this Chapter.

65. See note 51 above.

66. Two kinds of interpretations of Qur'anic injunctions may be drawn. The theological schools of the Sunni tradition: *hanafi* , after Abu Hanifa (699-769); *shafii* , after Abu Abdullah Muhammad al-Shafi'i (770-819); *malekite*, after Malek Ibn Anas (705-795); and finally *hanbalite*,after its founder Abu Hanbal(780-855). The *malekite* rite, the most puritanical of all is predominant in Algeria. The other type of interpretation has been proposed by Muslim philosophers, the most comprehensive of all being Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (1058-1111). Ghazali is best known for his Ihya 'Ulum al-Din, (The Revivification of Religious Sciences), where he drew ideal models of the Muslim man, woman, society and knowledge. He gave particular attention to the ideal behaviour of the Muslim woman who "on the whole, ... must remain in her private quarters and never neglect her spindle. She must not make frequent trips to the balcony nor spend her time gazing down from there. Let her exchange but few words with her neighbours and refrain from visiting them. She should be satisfied with her husband's lot and give in her rights to preserve his" (Ghazali, 1980: 163-4). This passage was taken from Volume 2 of Ghazali's Ihya 'Ulum al-Din, Dar al-Fikr, 1980. In brief, effacement, obedience, discretion, seclusion

are recommended for the Muslim woman. All features are in agreement with the Qur'an, and their interpretation is but a variant of the divine word.

67. The etymology of the term Islam in Arabic includes submission and obedience.

68. The will of Allah is often invoked in popular beliefs such as *mektoub*(it was written, predestined) and *qadar* (fate, destiny), whereby Allah's designs are inevitable: "To Allah belongs the kingdom of the heavens and the earth. He creates what He will. He gives daughters to whom He will and sons to whom He pleases. To some he gives both sons and daughters, and to others He gives none at all. Mighty is Allah and all-knowing" (Qur'an, 42:49).

69. The verses on repudiation are a very interesting mixture of tolerance for men's excesses and arbitrariness, and compassion for women. These latter have, nevertheless, to follow strict rules of 'waiting periods' following repudiation in case they are pregnant. See Qur'an 4:20, 2:226-232, 65:1,6. Women are generally treated as a comodity which men can 'put away' (65:1) or 'exchange' (4:20), albeit 'kindly'.

70. Women are hardly addressed by the Qur'an even though no less than 7 Surahs (Chapters) were devoted to them (The Cow, Women, Divorce, Light, The Confederate Tribes, The Table, She Who Is Tested). Ibn Khaldun in his Muqaddimah noticed that "God ...only addresses his order to him who has the power to carry it out. ... The majority of religious laws are

are not addressed to women. Women are not mentioned in the discourse. Nevertheless, these laws apply to them as they apply to men. ...women are included by analogy (*bil-qiyas*). Laws are not addressed to them because they are without power. It is men who control their acts, save in regard with the acts of worship properly speaking (*al-'ibada*). For these acts, women are directly mentioned in the discourse; they are not included by analogy". Cited in Fatna A. Sabbah, Woman in the Muslim Unconscious, The Athene Series, Pergamon Press, New York, 1984, p. 70. Also Cf. Qur'an, 33:35, a rare occasion whereby women are addressed directly as believers.

71. See earlier discussion of the code in this Chapter.

72. Cf. White, E.H., "Legal Reform as an Indicator of Women's Status in Muslim Nations", in Lois Beck & Nikki Keddie, (eds.), Women in the Muslim World, Harvard University Press, 1978, pp. 52-68.

73. Mair had covered the ethnic groups of Eastern Africa. Most of these are to be found in Tanzania.

74. See this Chapter.

75. As in Algeria, polygamy was made dependent on the consent of the first wife.

76. In Marjorie Mbilinyi, "The 'New Woman' and Traditional Norms in Tanzania", in The Journal of Modern African Studies, 10, 1, 1972, pp. 57-72, Cambridge University Press, p. 67. Emphasis added.

CHAPTER FIVE: CAN LITERACY DESEGREGATE THE 'CITY OF WOMEN'?

In the previous Chapter, we have seen how the ambiguities of the discourse of 'specific socialism' in Algeria and Tanzania inadvertently made room for the expression of traditionalist and conservative trends *vis à vis* women's emancipation into equal 'Citizens'.[1] This was mainly expressed in the rejection of legal equality for women in the private realm of the family.

It is still early to assess the implications of the institutionalisation of women's status of minority on their economic and social participation. Now that, by virtue of family legislation, a segregated 'City of Women' has been erected in the midst of a modernising 'Republic of Citizens', it is important to consider whether other social processes could help alleviate the segregation. In particular, the role of education will be evaluated in this Chapter in the light of the universal beliefs that education and literacy lead either to economic integration, or liberate from political and cultural alienation.

5.1. Education and Literacy: the Rise of a World 'Republic of Citizens'

Education has been greatly expanded by Algeria's and Tanzania's modernising 'Citizens' as a 'fundamental human right', following the recommendations of the United Nations (Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights), and a strong political will to make up for a segregated colonial policy in educational provision.[2] As a basic principle, both educational rhetorics have included equal educational provision for both males and females, since Independence in the early

1960s.[3] Furthermore, education has been used deliberately in the systematic inculcation of new values pertaining to the principle of social and sex equality.

The Algerian Charte Nationale stipulates for instance that:

> part of the Cultural Revolution in creating a new man in a new society... will be the educational effort based on fighting all prejudices of race, class, sex and manual work...
>
> (Charte Nationale, 1976: 64)

In Education for Self-Reliance, Nyerere links educational function with the whole societal programme:

> Only when we are clear about the kind of society we are trying to build can we design our educational service to serve our goals. ...We have said that we want to create a socialist society which is based on three principles: equality and respect for human dignity; sharing of the resources which are produced by our efforts; work by everyone and exploitation by none.
>
> (Nyerere, 1967: 5-6)

Accordingly, Tanzanian education is required to develop in each citizen:

> ...an Ujamaa or socialist outlook, particularly the principles of equality and brotherhood entail a sense of individual and collective responsibility in all areas of activity and a willingness to co-operate and share on equal terms.
>
> (Ministry of National Education, 1980: 3)

These noble intentions are not exclusive to Algeria and Tanzania, but are national interpretations of a universal faith in the power of education in creating peaceful and just millenia worldwide. The idea was expressed forty years ago with the creation of Unesco (The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation).[4] With regard to non-industrial and newly independent nations, Unesco's regional conferences (Addis Ababa, Karachi, and Santiago de Chile) were

organised in the early 1960s, to recommend that Universal Primary Education (UPE) be achieved within two decades (1960-1980).[5]

However, the vision of 'education as a human right' was soon superseded by the more utilitarian approach of the 'economic returns' of educational provision.[6] This development followed criticisms of UPE as costly, and led to the elaboration of a new millenium through cost-benefit analysis of educational provision. A policy shift from primary to secondary and higher education was recommended so that an educated manpower is supplied to growing and modernising economies.[7] But, it was not long before a 'World Educational Crisis'[8] was diagnosed, and the formal sector of education bitterly accused of training non-relevant manpower.[9] The main target of policy revision seemed again to be the so-called Third World countries. Formal educational systems there were denounced as having:

> resulted, on the one hand, in an increase in the number of educated unemployed, alienation of rural youths, migration to urban centres and overseas in search of jobs and, on the other, lack of properly qualified people to fill jobs in some critical areas of development... .
>
> (Prospects, IV/1, 1976: 137)

As an alternative, the motto of 'non-formal or informal' education was launched, claiming that it was more 'relevant' to the non-industrial and agrarian nature of most Third World societies.[10]

> With a world-wide food shortage looming ever more ominously, and with the economic growth of many developing countries being hobbled by lack of sufficient effort to modernize their agricultural and rural sectors, it is clear that farmer training, extension services, and the training of rural leaders (innovators and entrepreneurs of several sorts) must be a major objective of nonformal education in the years immediately ahead. Fortunately, it has already been shown - in Kenya, to cite but one example - that well - conceived short training courses for practising farmers and their wives (even if they cannot read) can have a

> quick and handsome yield, provided they are followed up with effective advisory services and are complemented by the other necessary ingredients of a well-integrated agricultural development campaign.
>
> (Coombs, 1970: 143)

Coombs' proposition to generalise the Kenyan experiment in non-formal rural education to a whole host of countries, just because their socio-economic structures are predominantly agrarian, is a telling example of the inductive procedure followed in international social planning.

5.2. Methodological Shortcomings of World Educational Planning.

The methodological procedure followed by international and national experts in educational planning has its roots in the positivist and hypothetico-inductive tradition in Western epistemology.[11] Holmes has described such method in the following terms:

> The essential features of this method are (1) the collection of data using objective observation, (2) the careful classification of data, (3) the search for explanation by ascribing to each event an antecedent cause or causes, (4) the formulation of tentative hypotheses, (5) the collection of further confirming evidence and finally (6) the statement of universal laws whose validity can be provided.
>
> (Holmes, 1981: 39)

As a result, there is a propensity to try and establish correlational links between different variables, such as educational provision and economic growth. Again, Holmes has warned that:

> There is no logical justification for asserting from a general proposition (in the form of a relationship statement) which has been confirmed by this kind of comparative research that an increment of change in one variable in any of the countries tested (and by extension to any other country) will result in an increment of change in the other variable unless, and this is the crux of the matter, that these general propositions have universal validity (ie. hold good regardless of circumstances), and that social events are determined by factors such as those operationalised by many social scientists. To use such testing to justify

> policy decision a planner must be a positivist and a determinist.
>
> (Ibid: 67-8)

Indeed, the next step in the saga of international educational planning has been that:

> In practice planners have advised governments to adopt panaceas as universal solutions to macro-problems. They have tried to find the residual 'causes' of failure, underachievement, slow economic growth, political instability, and get rid of them. At the same time they have tried to promote the causes of success. Had they succeeded, a worldwide educational millenium might indeed have arrived. It is not yet on the horizon.
>
> ibid: 69)

It is unlikely that the millenium will ever be achieved precisely because it is a millenium, ie. an absolute promise which takes little account of specific social relations subject to the unpredictable tides of social change.

Besides the shortcomings of a methodological order, an analogy can be made between colonial educational policies, and those advised by international experts or even undertaken by national leaders. Most worrying in the view of the present author is the idea of 'basic, non-formal, community' education for 'local and rural needs'. Indeed, the above mentioned Coombsian plea is significantly reminiscent of 1920s British 'adaptationist' educational policies in Africa, and the French 'colon'(settler) conviction that the 'colonised' should only acquire 'basic vocational training'.[12] The British philosophy of 'adaptation' was devised for the colonial authorities by the American funded Phelps-Stokes commissions between 1921 and 1924.[13] Significantly enough, the commissions included an American 'expert' on 'Negro' education in the American South, Thomas Jesse Jones. A strong advocate

of the idea of 'education relevant to the needs of the African natives', he had this to say:

> The temporal salvation of the colored race for some time to come is to be won out of the ground. The Negro race will succeed or fail as it shall devote itself with energy to agriculture and mechanical arts, or avoid these pursuits, and its teachers must be inspired with the spirit of hard work and acquainted with the ways that lead to material success. Teaching and farming go well together in the present condition of things. The teacher-farmer is the man of all times, he is essentially an educator throughout the year.
>
> (in Harik & Schilling, 1984: 57)

The idea of rural and vocational 'salvation' is not only tantamount to Coombs' plea for non-formal education, but it is the more disturbing that it has also been advocated by African national leaders. For instance, Nyerere's Education for Self-Reliance (1967), is in its own way an 'adaptationist' philosophy, as will be examined later in this Chapter. Suffice it to note at present that Nyerere's vision of a peasant Tanzania, whose majority need only to have a basic literacy to yield more agricultural produce, and apply basic principles of hygiene and home-economics is uncomfortably reminiscent of colonial 'adaptationist' education.

The reminiscence is interesting to retain in as far as it is not entirely fortuitous. It can be explained in the light of Hyden's argument of the 'need' for the ruling elite to 'capture' an autonomous and scattered peasantry;[14] a task which he claimed, was left to national ruling classes to achieve in lieu of the former colonial authorities. In the light of this argument, educational provision answers theoretical claims that the educational system is an 'ideological state apparatus' (Althusser, 1971)[15] endowed with the function of 'social and cultural reproduction' (Bourdieu, 1973).[16]

Accordingly, it should come as no surprise that national educational reforms often inadvertently revive colonial educational programmes.[17] On the other hand, such a scenario would be incomplete without the international experts who play a vital role as couriers of technical assistance often tied to vested interests. Indeed, the establishment of international organisations has systematised 'cultural borrowing' at a global level. The ensuing policies have represented macro-solutions which have often conveyed ethnocentric biases. It did not only take radical scholarship to denounce such practices as 'cultural imperialism'.[18] Holmes noted for instance that:

> Such technical advisers are neo-colonialists. Unwittingly they are cultural imperialists imposing, with the best will in the world, models of educational provision which may be ill-adapted and indeed not capable of adaptation by the nations whose governments have asked for help and advice. The difference between present day technical experts (whether under contract to an international agency or on a bilateral programme) and the missionaries and former colonial officials is that the modern adviser rarely stays long enough in any country to be held personally responsible for either success or failure.
>
> (Holmes, 1981: 33)

Holmes' remark helps draw our attention to the methodological aspect of problem-solving. Besides global structural links, interpreted in the light of colonial, neo-colonial and dependency relations, there runs a methodological link. Common ground of the colonial official, the international adviser, as well as the national expert and political leader is to be found in their systematic use of inductivist and positivist methods of investigation and policy planning. Accordingly, it is contended here that the issue at stake in educational reform, (or in applying education as social reform) is not ill-adapted 'cultural borrowing', or the need to conform to so-called 'local needs', but the

necessity to carefully examine the trends of local social dynamics. This is what Holmes has called "the specification of initial conditions",[19] that is the identification of societal data, relevant to the [social] problem under investigation. This is done with a view to anticipating the outcomes of policy formulation or of hypothetical solutions (Holmes, ibid: 76). It is important to emphasize in problem-solving techniques the difference between 'specific initial conditions' associated with the Holmesian 'problem' in the sense of 'asynchronous social change', and pseudo-sociological diagnoses pertaining to the 'nature' of 'local needs'. While the latter are taken as *a priori* axioms from which to confirm an already established policy, the former call for the prediction of likely outcomes of policy (or hypothetical solution), as they draw attention to the predominant 'national character'.[20] This latter should not however be understood as a corpus of static and intrinsic characteristics, but as the result of social interaction, both intra- and inter-nationally. It is out of such interaction, that a predominant set of values and cultural distinctiveness is established, and not out of some absolute condition. Our earlier models of interaction between ruling 'Citizens' and pressure groups of 'Cousins' and 'Brothers-in-law' have shown the fluctuations as well as the continuity of 'national character'.

In the context of the present investigation, the provision of adult literacy for women will be considered hypothetically as a measure to alleviate women's domesticity. Two types of adult literacy philosophies will be examined as solutions to women's marginalisation from the 'Republic of Citizens'. These are Unesco's functional literacy through the Unesco/UNDP 1967 'Experimental World Literacy Programme' (EWLP),[21]

and Paulo Freire's 'conscientization' method in adult literacy,[22] which will be taken as examples of macro solutions. Finally it will be argued that the specific socio-cultural conditions in Algeria and Tanzania suggest that such solutions are handled with care and circumspection, for the question will remain as to whether basic literacy is enough to 'conscientise' women, or increase their participation in the public processes of either country.

5.2.1. The Unesco/UNDP 'Functional Literacy' Programme.

The project was the first of its kind to be implemented after years of international rhetoric on the 'scourge of literacy' and the necessity to fight it.[23] When launched in 1967, the Experimental World Literacy Programme was presented as a 'revolutionary' method in the acquisition of literacy. The idea:

> ...was to test and demonstrate the economic and social returns of literacy and, more generally, to study the mutual relations and influences which exist and may be established or strengthened between literacy training - particularly among the working population - and development.
>
> (Unesco, 1976: 10-11)

Previous Unesco recommendations on adult literacy as 'basic' or 'fundamental education'[24] were issued as early as 1947. The prevailing proposition then was to provide a 'vocational' education to local communities. In 1958, the International Conference on Education, recommended that in 'under-developed areas, adult education [would] take the form of literacy and basic education campaigns'.[25] In 1960, the World Conference on Adult Education gathered in Montreal and pledged to 'eradicate' illiteracy within a few years by organising an international campaign.[26] In the meantime, the United Nations Organisation (UNO) issued resolutions on the 'eradication' of

illiteracy.[27] However, all these recommendations and resolutions remained without effect, until the convening of the Tehran World Congress of Ministers of Education on the Eradication of Illiteracy,[28] which adopted the principle of 'functional literacy'. The conference argued that:

> Rather than an end in itself, [functional] literacy should be regarded as a way of preparing man for a social civic and economic role that goes far beyond the limits of rudimentary literacy training consisting merely in the teaching of reading and writing. The very process of learning to read and write should be made an opportunity for acquiring information that can immediately be used to improve living standards; reading and writing should lead not only to elementary general knowledge but to training for work, increased productivity, a greater participation in civil life and a better understanding of the surrounding world, and should ultimately open the way to basic human culture.
>
> (Unesco, ibid: 10)

It is significant that the economistic approach was dominant despite its camouflage behind ill-defined notions of civil participation, such as the millenium of 'basic human culture'. The holism of such a notion denotes a lack of concern for the more concrete outcomes of the policy of 'functional literacy'. The formulation of the latter is a good example of inductively-formulated policies.

As a consequence, the subsequent adoption and implementation of EWLP in the countries concerned,[29] yielded results largely determined by the specific societal conditions of each recipient country. And, on Unesco's own admission, the project had by and large been a failure since it provided "technical solutions ...to non-technical problems" (ibid: 122-123).

In another criticism of the EWLP, it was pointed out that:

> The concept of functionality, although valid, was too technical a solution to a problem which was only partially technical. It also showed that to be effective, functional literacy should deal with political, cultural and social aspects of development as well as purely economic ones.
>
> (Prospects, VI/1, 1976: 65)

Note that this critique of the economistic bias of EWLP neither questions the principle itself, nor does it pose the crucial question of the specific conditions of each social context where the project was applied. The concept is retained as valid, and it is suggested that it could be improved with the addition of *ad hoc* auxiliary assumptions', as Popper shrewdly remarked of the positivist and inductivist approach to theory formulation.[30] As a result, the failing theory is not refuted, but reformed. For instance, pseudo-relativist lessons have been drawn for EWLP as appears in the following passage:

> For example, does the simple fact of being literate endow the European city dweller with community spirit, reduce his or her superstition, or increase his or her human value?
>
> (Unesco, 1976: 119)

It is very significant that the literate 'European city dweller' was implicitly taken as a model to achieve regardless of the variety of social and national contexts EWLP was addressing. The implicit admission that this model has informed the initial formulation of EWLP, reveals the ethnocentric bias of the project.

However, the lessons drawn from the evaluation of EWLP were ultimately used in the salvation of the principle of functional literacy. Little attention was given to the outcomes of the policy in the conditions of each national and local context. Such methods of policy formulation, adoption and implementation cannot claim to be scientific. The

confidence with which functional literacy had been presented as an enhancement of agricultural and industrial productivity in societies as different as Ecuador, Ethiopia, Guinea, India, Iran, Madagascar, Mali, Sudan, Syria, Algeria, and Tanzania, could yield hardly more results than rain-praying rituals. Furthermore, the project had sometimes been adopted by local authorities for dubious reasons, as admitted by Unesco:

> Certain countries wanted national literacy campaigns and seem to have bought the EWLP product in part because they were not aware of all its implications, and in part because they saw no prospect of obtaining international aid in any other way.
>
> (ibid: 125)

Thus, expediency motivated policy choices, rather than problem-solving social planning. It is worth remembering that EWLP was presented as a package to any client willing to buy it. It was not tailored to the demands of a specific problem analysis. Thence the dramatically different results it yielded in each national context. To illustrate this point, a comparison of the implementation of EWLP in Algeria and Tanzania will be made later in this Chapter.

5.2.2. Freire's 'Literacy for Liberation'.

The 'technocratism' of EWLP in the field of adult literacy places it inevitably within the scope of modernisation theory with its positive millenium of the 'achieving, performing, secular and universalistic' society. However, no radical critique has been made of cultural programmes such as EWLP. The conventional contribution of dependency theorists to the critique of 'modernisation' took an exclusive interest in the analysis of international market relations.[31] Nevertheless, an 'alternative' to programmes such as EWLP has been proposed by

proponents of the more radical approach of 'non-formal participatory' education.

Apart from the euphoria of the 'deschoolers' such as Ivan Illich,[32] viable methods had been experienced in Cuba during its 1961 mass literacy campaign.[33] Although most students of Cuba ascribed the resounding success of the campaign to the revolutionary nature of social change there,[34] the present author argues that the Cubans' assessment of local and national circumstances for the campaign was as determinant as the revolutionary uprising of 1959. Indeed, it is worth remembering that Cuban revolutionaries did not formulate a communistic societal programme at the outset. Instead, their premise was a national and popular uprising, and it was within this framework that the literacy campaign was launched.[35]

The more orthodox revolutionary regimes opted for more piecemeal adult literacy campaigns,[36] and gave priority to the formal school system in order to train the new scientifically-oriented 'communist man'. The Cubans gave precedence to adult literacy, closing all formal educational institutions for nine months in the course of 1961; not only to mobilise all literates in the operation, but in order to break down barriers between the educated urban elite and the rural 'masses', and create the conditions for the emergence of the 'revolutionary socialist man'. This is to say that a radical alternative to the technocratically-based functional literacy as devised by Unesco should not be seen as a unique formula undertaken by all revolutionary regimes, in all revolutionary circumstances.

The success of the Cuban campaign, and more recently of the Nicaraguan one[37] led to the belief that this kind of revolutionary mass campaigning is more prone to succeed, in view of its corollary of 'political awareness' or *consciencia* it uses. One of the most renowned champions and initiators of such method has been the Brazilian educator Paulo Freire.[38] *Conscientização* translated into 'conscientisation', was launched by Freire in the early 1960s in literacy experiments in the North East of Brazil, among illiterate slum dwellers, victims of a process of sub-proletarisation. The squalid living conditions they experienced, led Freire to argue that they were alienated from their very condition of 'humans'. Hence his 'humanist' stance in his approach of adult literacy.[39]

His idea was to try and create a method whereby the illiterate person recovers his/her 'humanity' by knowing how to place himself/herself *vis à vis* the physical as well as social environment. Freire assumes that the 'illiterates' are immersed in a 'culture of silence',[40] whereby they are estranged both from the physical and social world. Accordingly the primary task of a literacy action would be to lead the illiterate person into discovering his/her role as active 'subject' vis a vis the natural world, as 'creator of culture',[41] and thenceforth develop his/her critical reflection upon the social environment itself. In short, Freire proposed a method of anthropological self-discovery for the illiterate to achieve a critical appraisal of the environment, and a subsequent capacity to change it and make an 'impression' upon it.

'Conscientisation' involves the use of literacy methods which induce the creative participation of the learner in that the latter is drawn

into reconstructing words and expressions, and not in repeating them ready made after memorisation, as is the case in more conventional literacy packages. Freire argues that this method of 'generative words and themes'[42] helps inculcate a sense of control over the outside world. "To speak a true word is to transform the world"[43] has been the motto of this method which purports to transfer the learner from the state of mythological, magic thinking into the world of rational perception and critical thinking.[44] To achieve this it is imperative that the learner enjoys a relationship of dialogue with the 'educator'. Hence Freire's notion of 'dialogics',[45] and his thorough reappraisal of the pedagogical relationship between learner and tutor. He suggests that educator and learner are engaged in a kind of positive 'dialectical' exchange whereby they learn from each other. He carefully distinguishes such process from the Socratic and Platonic 'dialogical' tradition which took knowledge to be a recollection,[46] and not an empirical pragmatic appraisal of man's reality.

The social and political ramifications of Freire's methodology are quite obvious. The aim is to achieve a democratic millenium wherein the educational process liberates people from alienation to the dominant social and political order. It is pertinent to remember that Freire's conception of adult literacy is linked principally with situations of exploitation (in the economic sense) and oppression (in the social and political sense); hence his emphasis on 'humanisation', and 'critical awareness'. The underlying assumption is that a social revolution is necessary so as to establish a 'liberating' education (from alienation) in lieu of the previous 'domesticating' education, which socialised people into the acceptance of the status quo.[47]

Freire himself warned that the 'oppressors' cannot organise 'education for liberation':

> But if the implementation of a liberating education requires political power and the oppressed have none, how then is it possible to carry out the pedagogy of the oppressed prior to the revolution? This is a question of the greatest importance. ...One aspect of the reply is to be found in the distinction between systematic education, which can only be changed by political power, and educational projects which should be carried out with the oppressed in the process of organising them.
>
> (Freire, 1972: 31)

Freire poses here a very significant dilemma which unfortunately he avoids answering. When he realises that non-revolutionary circumstances might jeopardise 'conscientisation', he proposes somewhat evasively the adoption of 'educational projects' to lead the 'oppressed' to liberation. Exactly how, remains unanswered. Instead, stages of liberating education are described. At this point it is worth quoting Freire's vision at length. For him:

> The pedagogy of the oppressed, as a humanist and libertarian pedagogy, has two distinct stages. In the first, the oppressed unveil the world of oppression and through the praxis commit themselves to its transformation. In the second stage, in which the reality of oppression has already been transformed, this pedagogy ceases to belong to the oppressed and becomes a pedagogy of all men in the process of permanent liberation.
>
> (ibid)

This last passage is reminiscent of Unesco's millenium of the attainment of a 'basic human culture' discussed earlier. Indeed, the Freirian alternative becomes also a panacea in view of its inductivism and holism. From a Brazilian experiment, it was all too quickly hailed as a systematic alternative to more orthodox methods of adult literacy, especially in the Third World where the mechanisms of oppression are assumed to be the same everywhere.[48]

There is no doubt that Freire's method can be effective in specific revolutionary situations such as Cuba or Nicaragua. The present author would go as far as to point out that these two experiences took place in contexts where cultural and linguistic unity was secured, where expertise was mostly national (Cuba) or regional (from Cuba to Nicaragua) and where popular mobilisation was systematically channelled. One cannot claim that such conditions are obtained in many parts of the Third World. Neither do we find the same pre-revolutionary conditions of oppression such as they were prevalent in Cuba or Nicaragua. Accordingly, no matter how noble the liberating objectives of the radical alternative in adult literacy, their effectiveness remains tributary of specific societal conditions. Above all conditions of oppression need to be more explicitly defined.

The present investigation suggests for instance that a liberating education is desirable for women in Algeria and Tanzania, to reduce their domesticity and help their integration as equal citizens. However, the conditions of oppression and domestication of women have their own dynamics in each case, and this should determine policy choices in terms of adult literacy. On the other hand, we have to take into account the wider societal and educational changes and their bearing on women's integration as 'producing Citizens', as opposed to their traditional status of 'reproducing' social actors.

5.3. Adult Literacy in Algeria: An Overview.

The history of adult literacy campaigning in independent Algeria is an eloquent challenge to the inductively devised alternatives of functional literacy and liberating mass literacy alike. As will be

demonstrated in the following discussion, neither revolutionary mass campaigning of early independence, nor EWLP functional literacy could make a breakthrough in the Algerian context. For the Algerian 'City of Women' this meant a disturbing marginalisation from the mainstream institutionalisation of a 'Republic of Citizens' which chose to invest in its younger generations through formal schooling. Specific cultural dynamics placing Francophone 'Citizens' in opposition to Arabophone peers on the one hand, and spiritualist fundamentalist 'Cousins' on the other, may account for the confusion which precluded the clear formulation and implementation of adult literacy in Algeria.

Literacy campaigning, presumably a corollary of all twentieth century revolutions has been conspicuously absent in the Algerian 'Revolution'.[49] However, since Independence, it has been copiously reiterated in the official rhetoric. Reference to illiteracy (and the necessity of making greater provision for literacy) has, in the last twenty years, evolved from revolutionary fervour to economistic and functionalist considerations, ending in total oblivion in the 1980s.

5.3.1. The 1963 National Literacy Campaign.

In 1962, the Programme de Tripoli, Algeria's first comprehensive societal programme emphasized:

> the extension of the methods of mass education mobilisation of all mass organisations to fight illiteracy and teach all citizens to read and write in the shortest period of time.

The Charte d'Alger, another product of revolutionary fervour, stipulated that:

> The fight against ignorance concerns the whole country. It calls for the participation of large popular masses. The Party is the animator of this action which must

become a paramount national duty.

These two documents were the putative radical rhetoric of the Algerian 'Citizens' before the Boumediene 're-adjustment' of 1965, and obviously render the emotional tide of the primitive euphoria of early independence. In this very atmosphere was launched the only mass literacy campaign of Algeria, in the summer of 1963, only to end in total failure six months later.[50]

The National Literacy Campaign, La campagne nationale d'alphabétisation was prepared by a National Literacy Commission in February 1963 and launched in July of the same year. The literature of the campaign gave prominence to the theme of "Revolution" and suggested for example that "revolutionary vocabulary should be introduced" as well as slogans such as:

> "long live liberated Algeria";
>
> "Algeria has thrown out colonialism";
>
> "there will be no socialist revolution without the active participation of woman".
>
> (CNA, 1966: 2-3)

The last slogan in particular denotes the radicalism of the members of the national commission. This contrasts sharply with the subsequent rhetoric which emphasized the reproductive and domestic image of women as wives and mothers, as seen through Boumediene's speeches and the Family Code.

However the campaign was doomed to failure as the political climate was riddled with internal political and ideological rifts between socialist radicals and liberal nationalist members of the polity.[51] As a result, clashes sparked off within the National Commission for Literacy and

some of its members resigned (CNA, 1966: 3). It was admitted that the campaign was never considered a national priority (CNA,ibid:3). In fact the results proved to be rather poor as it was "not possible to give precise statistical information" (ibid: 4). There were 5,000 literacy teachers out of the planned 100,000, and it was guessed that "maybe" (ibid: 4) 10 to 20,000 people enrolled out of the five million illiterates whom the campaign initially sought to reach. "Classes were open for a few days only" and volunteers went back to their initial occupations (ibid). Too much enthusiasm and too little preparation seemed to constitute the main factors of failure. However it is more likely that ideological clashes took place as "many adults [did] not admit that yougsters explain political problems to them" (ibid).

Indeed, the radical slogans of the campaign and their emphasis on values typical of a secular and revolutionary 'Republic of Citizens' were likely to clash with the by and large illiterate 'Republic of Cousins' they were addressing. The generational clash was more likely to be an ideational one, ie. a clash between two antithetical sets of higher valuations. The early sixties was a period of intense activity by radical secularist 'Citizens' in the government, party and trade unions in their last bid to retain power. However, as seen earlier in Chapter 3, they were to lose the battle to the moderate technocratic 'Citizens' who were less keen on antagonising the existing 'Republic of Cousins'. Consequently, adult illiteracy was given little priority, and was to be only timidly tackled through selective functional literacy operations.

The failure of the Campagne was due ironically to an overzealous revolutionary euphoria on the part of its organisers. These had been impressed by the results of the Cuban experience, whose revolutionary character was interpreted as the main cause of its success.[52] A propensity to establish a rapprochement between anti-colonial revolutionary experiences and Third World social revolutions such as Cuba's was inevitable in the early 1960s. The ensuing 'cultural borrowing' from one context to the other was more than tempting. In the case of Algeria, the radicalism of the anti-colonial struggle was often mistaken for a total revolutionary upheaval, and its paraphernalia of social and economic rituals naturally awaited. Of these a literacy campaign had to be part. But as a revolutionary panacea it could only fail in the highly ambiguous societal programme of modernity and authenticity promoted by the polity, and the peculiar interaction between 'Citizens' and 'Cousins' in the process of social change.

5.3.2. The EWLP 'Algeria 11': When Technocratism Fails Functionalism.

> When three quarters of a country's population are illiterate, a national literacy campaign is hard to achieve: priorities should be defined and an experimental approach proves necessary. The organisation of literacy cannot rely solely on the voluntary work of young people and militants; as any coherent and continuous action, literacy needs permanent cadres specially trained for the task, as well as it requires an administrative structure which will associate the mobilizing force of revolutionary zeal with the efficacy of technical competence.
>
> (CNA, 1966: 7)

This appeared in an internal document of the Centre National d'Alphabétisation (CNA), created in 1964 following the spectacular failure of the 1963 mass literacy campaign.[53] The new technocratic approach is not fortuitous, but merely the product of the 1965

political shift following the Boumediene coup. As seen in Chapter 3, this latter was characterised by the discourse of technical and administrative efficiency held by a team of pragmatic technocrats. In educational matters, precedence was to be given to manpower planning through schooling and to the training of younger generations.[54] Accordingly, the approach of 'functional literacy' professed by Unesco's EWLP appealed to the new authorities who adopted the project in 1967.

The project was to affect farmers and industrial workers of the state-run farming domains and industrial enterprises. The selected areas were: the agricultural region of Staoueli near the capital Algiers, the oil and gas plant of Arzew in north western Algeria , and the steel complex and agricultural zone of Annaba in north-eastern Algeria. The project consisted of two phases: from 1967 to 1971 was the implementation of the EWLP package; and between 1972 and 1974, a mass literacy component was added as Algeria was embarking on its four-year plan of 1970-1973.

Initially the project was to affect 1200 agricultural workers and 1500 industrial workers in the first phase (Unesco, 1976: 18). But enrolment increased during the second phase as the Algerian authorities launched their programme to open functional literacy classes to 100.000 workers of different professional categories.[55] On the other hand, an ambitious programme providing for a national literacy campaign base on the EWLP methods was also incorporated. Its target was to affect one million people for the duration of the four-year plan.[56]

The Unesco assessment of EWLP in Algeria, 'Algeria 11', remained vague in its evaluation, so that it is impossible to discover how many candidates had actually completed the whole literacy cycle.[57] Although it did report a "30 percent drop out rate in the first cycle, and a 21 percent rate in the second cycle" (ibid: 19), it did not mention the total population enrolled in each cycle, neither classified it by sex. The absence of women in 'Algeria 11' did not seem to be worthy of the evaluators' attention. The assessment estimated that "only one in every two entering the programme finished the second cycle, which implies about fifth grade reading ability in writing and calculation" (ibid). According to Algerian estimates, the operation affected 54,000 workers (40,000 in agriculture and 14,000 in industry) out of an initial target of 100,000.[58]

In the light of the inconclusive results of EWLP and the dubious figures given by local authorities in Algeria (CNA, 1970), 'Algeria 11' can be considered a major failure. *Prima facie* , relative success would have been expected, given the convergence of positions between Unesco experts and Algerian technocrats. However, it has been acknowledged that 'indifference and even hostility had met functional literacy and indeed the whole idea of adult literacy'.[59]

Paradoxically, it can be argued that the very technocratism of the 'Citizens' in power in Algeria was more likely to hamper any programme of non-formal education, albeit functional, rather than foster it. For the ruling 'Citizens' and their developmental strategy of the polytechnical individual, society and knowledge; only formal education was worth the investment.[60]

The failures of the 1963 Campagne and the 1967-72 EWLP functional literacy programme in Algeria raise a number of questions. That neither alternative yielded positive results is revealing of the expediency of both operations, and their adoption as ready-made panaceas by the 'Citizens' in power. But above all, they disclose a lack of consideration for the specific societal conditions of the Algerian national scene. If one takes into account the ambiguities of the overall societal programme as it is contained in the discourse of 'specific socialism', and the interaction between 'Citizens' and 'Cousins', one might find the answer to the above failures. Such an approach promises also to help predict outcomes of future hypothetical solutions.

Incidentally, neither the National Campaign for Literacy nor EWLP provided data related to women, so as to measure the impact of literacy on their integration in the modern 'Republic of Citizens'. Consequently, the tentative solutions envisaged herein call for the analysis of selected societal data. In the following discussion, particular attention will be given to the national educational strategy of the 'Citizens' in power since Independence, to its reception by different social protagonists, and finally to its repercussions on women's integration in the public processes of the new 'Republic of Citizens'. The crucial question of whether educational provision has permitted women's access to the public realm is posed, and answered. From there, a further question is raised as to whether non-formal adult literacy could be at all viable in the specific circumstances of Algeria, and could it help liberate women from their domesticity?

5.3.3. Education Expands but Illiteracy Persists.

In one of its most recent publications,[61] the Ministry of National Education reiterated the main principles which have informed Algeria's educational strategy since independence in 1962. These were: "Algerianisation, democratisation and a technical and scientific orientation".[62] The top priorities were spelt out as "the development of technical education, the adaptation of training to the employment market, and the reinforcement of the technical and scientific orientation [of the educational system]".[63] This orientation was not novel but had been a traditional concern of nationalist leaders since the mid 1950s.[64]

As a consequence of this position, the 'Citizens' in power since Independence invested heavily in the formal educational system as part of their overall technocratic stance towards 'development'. Faith in the returns of the formal organisation of education have never faltered for the last three decades, despite serious ideological rifts in the educational and cultural arena, as will be examined later. Accordingly, the formal educational sector grew to absorb regularly between 20 to 25 percent of the total government expenditure.[65] The results were to prove spectacular.

Between 1962 and 1980-1981, primary school enrolment increased by 300 per cent, from three quarters of a million to over three million pupils; secondary school enrolment increased by almost 20-fold from 50,000 to over one million; and higher education enrolment showed a dramatic 50-fold increase from approximately 2000 students in 1962 to over 100,000 in the academic year 1982-83 (Rapport sur le Mouvement

Educatif: 1984). Female enrolment has been increasing substantially. The proportion of female pupils and students in 1978-79, was respectively, 41 per cent in the primary cycle, 37 per cent in the secondary, and 23 per cent in higher education .[66]

However, universal primary education, which was targetted for 1980, is far from being reached despite the dramatic investments consented to education. Hence the equally spectacular figures concerning wastage and illiteracy. In 1981 the Bulletin d'Information Economique de l'APS, (Algeria's national press agency) released alarming figures on the 6 to 13 year olds who were unschooled.[67] In 1974-75, the rate was over 31 per cent, and by 1979-80 it was still over 27 per cent. Between 1977 and 1982 three million youngsters were expected on the job market without specific qualifications, given that technical institutes which traditionally delivered job qualifications, could only cater for a few thousands within the 15-18 age group (AAN, 1981: 711). In 1980, it was calculated that the rate of success in the passage from primary to secondary was only 55 per cent (AAN: ibid).

Such high rates of failure as well as a total neglect of adult education and adult literacy, led to a most interesting configuration of illiteracy in Algeria. It remains bewildering that despite huge efforts in formal education, the adult illiteracy rate remains high, and the absolute number of people is actually growing. In 1982, the number of illiterates (ie. those unable to read or write in either classical Arabic or French)[68] was estimated as 6.3 million people out of a total population of 20 million, with a rate of 47 per cent for the Unesco reference population of those aged ten and over. Of this group,

39 per cent were men and 61 per cent were women (Statistiques, 1/IV, 1983: 69).

It is interesting to see how this compares with earlier figures since Independence as the rate of illiteracy was cut by over half in a period of twenty years (Table 5.1), mainly through the progress of formal education.

TABLE 5.1

Illiteracy Trends in Algeria 1962-1982

Year	Population (millions)	Number of Illiterates (millions)	Rate of Illiteracy (per cent)
1962	9.0	5.600	85.0
1966	12.0	5.885	75.0
1977	18.0	6.214	57.7
1982	20.0	6.342	47.2

Source: Centre National d'Alphabétisation, 1984: 1.

According to the latest estimates (Statistiques: ibid), the rate of schooling for the age group 6-14 years developed from 50 per cent in 1966, to 70 per cent in 1977 and nearly 78 per cent in 1982. But, regional disparities have caused uneven rates of schooling, as in some areas of the country the rate is as low as 53 per cent, while the drop

out rate remains rather high at the end of the primary level (a six-year cycle), with less than 53 per cent of children who have enrolled reaching first year lower secondary (CNA, 1982: 3). Hence the recent creation of the *Ecole Fondamentale*[69] which expands the period of minimum compulsory schooling to nine years, and caters for the 6 to 14 year olds of both sexes. The *Ecole* is hoped to reduce the drop out rate and the relapse into illiteracy which threatens most primary school leavers given the absence of non-formal literacy facilities.

However, the new system of the *Ecole Fondamentale* is a long term project of no immediate consequence for the nearly one million illiterate children aged between 6 and 14 out of school at present (Statistiques: ibid), of which girls make up the majority. Indeed, the number of female pupils (aged 5 to 15) decreases substantially in the primary cycle as they grow older (Figure 5.1).

The configuration of illiteracy in Algeria is marked by substantial gaps between urban and rural areas, between age groups, and of course between the sexes. The overall tendencies are a significantly higher rate of illiteracy in the rural areas (nearly 30 percentage points higher), a steady increase among older age groups (under 18 per cent for the 6-14 years; nearly 91 per cent for those aged 60 and over), and finally a notably higher rate of illiteracy among women (Table 5.2).

Figure 5.1 Rate of Female Schooling in the Elementary Cycle (Algeria 1975-76 and 1978-79)



TABLE 5.2

Illiteracy Rates by Age and Sex in Algeria 1982

Age	Males (per cent)	Females (per cent)	Total (per cent)
6-14	9.01	27.24	17.95
15-17	10.34	30.82	20.45
18-19	13.41	40.62	26.69
20-24	20.99	49.87	34.39
25-29	28.95	66.22	47.72
30-59	63.89	89.02	77.05
60 and over	86.14	97.43	90.76

Source: Statistiques, No. 1/IV, 1983.

A detailed national survey issued in 1977 by the Ministry for Planning[70] disclosed some very significant figures for the 31 *wilayate* (counties) of the country. The rates calculated concerned the population aged 9 and over, male and female, in the rural and urban sectors (Table 5.3).

The table discloses constant high rates of illiteracy approximating 90 per cent in the rural sector, with the majority of those affected being women. Besides, while the absolute number of illiterate men tends to decrease, that of the female population has increased (Table 5.4).

TABLE 5.3

Illiteracy Rates in Urban and Rural Areas

(population aged 9 and over, 1977)

Areas	Male (per cent)	Female (per cent)	Total (per cent)
Urban	37.1	66.2	44.3
Rural	57.7	85.2	71.1
Total	44.8	70.9	58.1

Source: Ministère du Plan, Statistiques sur l'Analphabétisme dans les Wilayate: Evolution 1966-1977.

TABLE 5.4

Changes in the Illiterate Population: 1966-1977.

	Number of Illiterates (millions)		Difference (millions)
	1966	1977	
Male	2.479	2.353	- 0.127
Female	3.406	3.862	+ 0.456
Total	5.885	6.215	+ 0.330

Source: Ministère du Plan, op. cit.

The persistence of adult illiteracy in Algeria can bewilder many an observer if an explanation is sought within the confines of the educational arena. Presumably, the aggressive educational strategy, and the means put at its disposal, ought to have cut the rates of illiteracy to a minimum. But the facade of unity and coherence displayed by the formal educational system stands in fact in the midst of a unique cultural turmoil, which can be summarised in one word: Arabisation. Indeed, the attempt to generalise the use of standard Arabic (the national and official language) since Independence, clearly had to involve the educational sector. The urgency of the policy of Arabisation was a matter of national consensus. However, in the wake of its implementation, significant conflicts arose which can indirectly explain the notable lack of interest for the idea of adult literacy, already nurtured by the predominant technocratic stance of the ruling 'Citizens'.

5.3.4. The Issue of 'Arabisation': Educational Repercussions

The pledge to expand and revive the use of standard Arabic in independent Algeria can be seen as an emotional response to the French colonial policy of 'cultural assimilation'.[71] The policy of the colonial authorities to dismantle the pre-colonial educational network, which dispensed all teachings in Arabic, assumed genocidal proportions.[72]

As in most Muslim areas, Algeria had a formal educational system in the shape of co-educational day-schools or *medressah*, and boarding schools for boys or *zaouiah* . The first dispensed a kind of elementary instruction, while the latter prepared its recruits for further

education in the university-like institutions of the *jami'att*.[73] Although these latter were not available in Algeria, candidates were often sent to neighbouring Tunisia or Morocco, as well as Egypt and the Middle East where universities thrived.[74]

The subsequent systematic dismantlement of the Algerian network by the colonial authorities led to an unprecedented rise of illiteracy among the Muslim population.[75] It also seriously hampered the use of classical and standard Arabic as the French gradually extended the metropolitan educational system to the colony.[76] It was not before the 1930s that an attempt was made to revive the Islamic educational legacy, and by the same token instil the urgency for the recovery of the Arabic language. This was organised by the religious movement of the *Ulamaa* led by Sheikh Ibn Badis.[77]

Since that time, the issue of 'Arabisation' never failed to appear in the nationalist rhetoric.[78] However, serious divergences were to mark the process of Arabisation between the Francophone and Arabophone nationalists in power (ie. between the 'Citizens' themselves). The hesitations of the Francophones, who opted for a gradual and selective Arabisation of the educational system, were challenged by the Arabophones who wanted a more forceful implementation of the policy at all levels of the educational system. They were particularly resentful of the Francophones' distinction between 'popular Arabic' and 'classical Arabic', which implied that the classical form could not convey a modern culture and created divisions between a literate elite and illiterate masses.[79]

From 1963 to the early 1970s, the debate was restricted to the polity and the intelligentsia; between the secularist 'Citizens', most of them Francophones or bilingual, and the more fundamentalist Citizens almost all a product of the *Ulamaa* movement. While the most passionate polemics were exchanged between prominent spokesmen of these two trends in the press and in the decision-making process (Adam in AAN: 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967), the more discreet trend of religiously-inclined 'Cousins' were active in expanding the few religious educational institutions established by the *Ulamaa* tradition. A ministry of *Habous* (or religious affairs) was created in 1963 and a decree on the 'organisation of religious instruction'[80] gave full autonomy to religious education dispensed by special institutions exclusively in standard Arabic. The organic link between Islam and classical Arabic, and its modern derivative standard Arabic[81] transpired clearly in such teaching. It marked the whole process of Arabisation, and was behind an ever-mounting pressure for the provision of 'religious and ethical' instruction along Islamic principles in the public school sector.

As early as 1963, Adam had rightly pointed out:

> The traditionalist and religious milieus have, since Independence, dramatically increased their pressure and even their audience. One party political regimes are as prone as the others to the fluctuations of public opinion.
>
> (Adam in AAN, 1963: 547)

Indeed, the aura of unanimity which has characterised Algeria's educational system as one and indivisible structure, has been riddled throughout the years with debates and conflicts between Arabophone and Francophone 'Citizens', with the 'Cousins' working discreetly within

the institutions of religious instruction. By 1970, the Ministry of *Habous* was to become the Ministry of *l'Enseignement Originel et des Affaires Religieuses* (Religious Affairs) and launch an unprecedented expansion of religious instruction, by cleverly combining it with the provision of secular subjects. The aim was to "revive the Islamic heritage as well as the flame of scientific research, thus linking efficiency with our ethics" (Turin in AAN, 1973: 98).

> The ministry is composed of arabophones, men with no direct link with Western culture, but this does not exclude bilingualism or even multilingualism.
>
> (Turin, ibid)

The Ministry concentrated its activities on the provision of informal instruction in mosques,[82] as well as formal secondary education which numbered by 1974 over 200,000 students. Recruits were urged to "back the battle of Arabisation, the aim being to return to the sources which were the basis of our nation and the foundation of our national personality, as well as the fight against habits and practices contrary to our traditions, and to the letter and spirit of Islam" (Turin, ibid). Most significant of all was that the secondary education institutions affiliated to the Ministry taught a curriculum as varied as that of the public school sector.[83]

But, most important to this dissertation is the interplay between the different tendencies of Arabophone and Francophone 'Citizens' and the religiously inclined 'Cousins'. Indeed the debates between the three were to be translated into serious clashes between university students throughout the 1970's (AAN, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975). By that time the gradual Arabisation in the public educational sector was being generalised fairly quickly to all literary and social science

disciplines. Meanwhile, Arabophone students grew seriously impatient with the lip service paid to their integration in the job market.[84]

In the meantime, the secular 'Citizens' in the polity exploited the clashes to clamp down both on the traditionalist 'Cousins' as well as Marxist students by dissolving their associations.[85] However the most serious clashes occurred between 1979 and 1980 when the discontent of Arabophone students was also accompanied by demonstrations of religious fundamentalist groups in many cities of the country (AAN, 1979: 668-669). The events led the 'Citizens' of the polity to take measures such as:

> the unification of the educational system to avoid future rifts between Arabophones and Francophones. This was announced by the Education Minister (AAN, 1979: 666);
>
> the Algerianisation and Arabisation of higher education, and their extension to the sciences and technological disciplines, announced by the Minister for Higher Education (AAN, ibid);
>
> finally, as a conciliatory gesture to the 'Cousins', whose system of *Enseignement Originel* was to be taken over by the public sector, religious education was to be "present at all stages of schooling and training, and be a compulsory discipline in all exams and tests" (AAN, ibid: 667).

Once more, the moderate 'Citizens' of the polity managed to erect the spectrum of national unity, by discarding the secular 'Citizens' represented this time by Francophone writers and political figures of the cultural scene who, by the early eighties, had lost a number of decision-making positions.[86] On the other hand, despite a heavy clamp down on the fundamentalist movement, whose leaders were arrested in 1982,[87] the moderate 'Citizens' found it harder to maintain a firm grip on them in view of the overwhelming popular support they attracted.[88] These events were not totally dissociated from those of

the process which led to the adoption of the Family Code in June 1984, when the moderate 'Citizens' had to comply to the pressures of the 'Cousins' in the National Assembly. A similar pattern of interplay was followed between the moderate 'Citizens' in power, discarding the secular 'Citizens' of the intelligentsia and professional strata, but yielding to compromises with the fundamentalist 'Cousins', in the cultural battle of Arabisation and religious instruction.

The bearing that such events have on the issue of education in Algeria, and particularly women's education, may seem remote. But figures on educational enrolment, wastage, and especially illiteracy cannot be explained only in the linear fashion of structural difficulties encountered by educational institutions. The events described above have in fact had a tremendous impact on the persistence of illiteracy in Algeria, in view of the complexity of the cultural and educational 'question'. Again behind the unitarian facade of the modernising moderate 'Citizens' there lied deep divergences between various protagonists, which were too divisive to allow the adoption of a coherent literacy strategy.

5.3.5. Illiteracy Marginalises the 'City of Women'.

Any student of Algeria indulging in matters pertaining to adult illiteracy is bound to encounter both surprise and indifference. Surprise because the subject does not seem to have caught the imagination of the authorities, and indifference because the subject is often dismissed as having no priority for the 'development' strategy.

This was what the present author encountered in a number of interviews with national officials.[89] The surprise and indifference are even greater when the student attempts to specifically research illiteracy among women. The notable absence of data concerning women's participation in EWLP or the National Campaign for 100,000 people, has been referred to earlier. So have the specific conditions of the ideological and cultural disputes on language policy, as well as the dominant technocratic stance of the polity, which can provide a plausible explanation for this lack of concern for adult literacy. However, the official rhetoric abounds in revolutionary statements about the 'scourge' of illiteracy, and the necessity to 'eradicate' it, to reinforce the creation of a new society. The Charte Nationale states:

> It is obvious that a Revolution can only be limited in its objectives when a majority of the people who are making it are illiterate and when it is backed by alienated mentalities and modes of thought and action often contrary to the stated goals.
>
> (ibid: 63)

And it goes on:

> The fundamental basis of cultural transformation is the struggle against illiteracy and the expansion of public instruction. The struggle against illiteracy, residue of colonisation, should be reinforced in the coming years so that all citizens concerned, without distinction of sex, are affected.
>
> (ibid: 68)

However compelling these statements, they express but a token interest in adult literacy as they were made at a period of triumph for the technocratic trend of the 'Citizens' in power. For no known programme or campaign is known to have been organised to alleviate the disturbing rates of illiteracy among adults. Meanwhile, national figures and a number of social research projects were showing a bewildering

marginalisation of women from mainstream public processes. Literally, an isolated and domestic 'City of Women' stood in the midst of an otherwise modern 'Republic of Citizens'. Accordingly, the following discussion will examine how women's participation in the public arena in Algeria is very much tributary of their educational attainment.

5.3.6. Economic Marginalisation

In terms of the marginalisation of women from the 'development' process the rate of illiteracy has devastating economic effects. Indeed, female figures comprised a mere 2.3 per cent of the national workforce according to the 1977 national census, Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat (RGPH);[90] an insignificant increase from the 1.8 per cent reported by the 1966 RGPH. In the meantime, the female population increased approximately from 6 to 9 million in the period 1966-1977, which meant that "1,633,722 women of working age (15 years and over) joined those who, in 1966, represented a potential workforce" (Talahite-Hakiki, 1980: 293-294). The figures are the more intriguing in that Algeria has long been seen as one of the most modern states of the Arab world and yet, these figures place it well behind most Arab countries with regard to women's integration in the modern and officially reported economic sector (Paquot, 1982: 94-5; 142-5).

Official statistics fail to report on female household production of an artisan or agricultural kind, and refer to this sector as *aides familiaux* (family aids) since it does not answer the technocratic criteria of labour evaluation. Abdelkrim (1980: 325-343) has for instance demonstrated the reluctance of Algerian statisticians to consider the economic impact of *aides familiaux* , by including them in

the category of the 'inactive population'. This attitude, she ascribes to the permeating model of the 'inactive women' hidden in the seclusion of the domestic realm. Thus, Algerian statisticians not only hold a 'Citizen-like' technocratic bias by counting as labour only that which serves the formal sector of the economy, but they betray as well a 'Cousin-type' lower valuation when they prefer to look upon women as inactive rather than active in the informal sectors of agriculture and artisanship. It is thus that 3.6 million women, of whom 2.3 million resided in the rural areas, were considered by the 1977 RGPH as part of the 'inactive population', as *femmes au foyer* (women at home) (Talahite-Hakiki, 1980: 294).

The majority of active women recorded by the 1977 census had proportionately a higher education than men. 50 per cent of working women had a "formation specialisée" (specialised training) which, according to the 1977 RGPH definition, is a formal training in "a school, centre, institute with a view to acquiring a profession" (Talahite-Hakiki, 1980: 294). In a recent survey of the *Office National des Statistiques*, the correlation between literacy as indicated by possession of a formal qualification, and women's access to work has been confirmed.[91]

Released in 1985, the survey attempted to find out more about "women's opinion" on taking up employment. It was based on interviews with women aged between 16 and 50 years, and covered 13,000 households nationwide. The most interesting finding of the survey is that "a woman who works or seeks work is by definition an educated woman".[92] The other pertinent finding is how far women's opinion is determined by

their social status. While celibacy and education encourage them to envisage or indeed take up employment, marriage seems to dissuade even some of the most educated from joining the job market (Table 5.5).

TABLE 5.5

Women's Attitude to Work After Marriage

(single women aged 16-50)

Educational level	Envisaging work after marriage (per cent)
Illiterate	3.5
Literate	7.5
Primary level	14.5
Lower secondary	42.2
Higher secondary	61.1
Higher education	80.4
Overall	28.0
(Don't know 15.6 per cent)	

Source: Algérie-Actualité, no. 1118, 19-25 Mars, 1987.

The status of 'married woman' is often seen and lived as a way to reintegrate the domesticity of home life, ie. the traditional security of the 'Republic of Cousins'. This new self-imposed seclusion is in fact a result of diffuse familial pressures, for women's access to work is seen as superfluous in a culture accustomed to women's confinement to the domestic realm. This is how nearly 62 per cent of

housewives who had previously worked, doubted whether they would work again because of familial opposition (45 per cent), or because of devotion to homelife (47 per cent). Of women who had never worked, barely 5 per cent would like to work, and 95 per cent discounted the possibility in view of familial opposition (over 41 per cent) and devotion to domestic duties (54 per cent). Most of these women were illiterate or semi-literate.

The picture is quite the opposite as far as younger educated women are concerned. When asked whether they would work after completing their studies, over 80 per cent were affirmative (nearly 78 per cent of those aged 16 to 19, and nearly 94 per cent of those between 20 to 24). Again, these figures denote more uncertainty among secondary school girls, and a higher determination among university students. The overall climate however, remains that of a timid assault of women in the public realm in Algeria,[93] and this is to a great extent dictated by the educational level of women. Women's access to work is on the whole not fully accepted. Already, at a rhetorical level, the Charte Nationale, hesitated to encourage the productive role of women in the modern economy:

> However, the integration of the Algerian woman in the circuits of production should take into account the constraints inherent to the roles of mother and spouse in the construction and consolidation of the familial home, which forms the basic cell of the Nation. ...Woman's access to work must be accompanied with ... the necessary adaptations to women's activities so that it is a factor of familial and social cohesion.
> (Charte Nationale, 1976: 144-5)

This means that to be integrated in the 'development' process of the 'Republic of Citizens' in Algeria, women would not only have to be literate, but go through formal schooling. It is also implied that

once they are educated they are invited to join selected jobs so that the underlying 'Republic of Cousins' is not radically upset by women's new role of producers. This latter is not likely to be promoted in view of the concerted action of at least three factors: the lower valuations of the 'Citizens'; the opposition, both overt and latent, of the 'Cousins' within the public at large; and, the confinement of women to domesticity, partly in view of the widespread illiteracy among them.

However, there is evidence that women are willing to make a breakthough in the public arena, especially as political participants. In this field, illiteracy is to be again a serious obstacle.

5.3.7. Political Marginalisation.

The widespread illiteracy among adult women, combined with the exclusive recognition of formal education by the Algerian 'Republic of Citizens', have not only led to a derisory presence of women in the labour force, but to an even weaker political participation.

In a one-party unitarian system such as the Algerian political regime, political participation is to be measured in terms of commitment (to official policies) and not in terms of opponents and supporters. Although opposition may be voiced, it is admitted only in as far as it is contained within the limits of the existing structures. In terms of political participation, the bulk of women have by and large been excluded from the various processes, and only the most educated have been able to join the ranks of the main political protagonists. Otherwise, illiteracy has kept women as part of the 'Republic of Cousins' which thrives on their domesticity and role of reproducers.

But, in view of wider changes in the normative and institutional patterns brought about by the societal project of the 'Citizens', increasing numbers of women were exposed to 'modern rituals' which gave them access to the public realm, such as voting.[94] This access to the larger world outside the domesticity of home, gave women the opportunity to raise their expectations in terms of public participation. The ensuing re-appraisal of the values held by the 'Republic of Cousins' *vis à vis* women's place and role was inevitable. However, as very little data were available on this particular issue, the present author had to rely on a single reference in order to illustrate her suppositions, that of Helene Vandevelde-Dailliere.[95]

For instance, Vandevelde-Dailliere has demonstrated how women reject 'Cousin-like' customs (such as seclusion and excessive male and patriarchal authority) as stifling, but hold to Islamic precepts as sacred (Vandevelde-Dailliere, 1980: 223). That the distinction has been made by mostly illiterate women is extremely significant, as it contrasts with the views of male 'Cousins' who legitimise customs with the evocation of Islamic precepts. The National Assembly debates on the Family Code were for instance riddled with such amalgams of customary and religious legitimation of 'Cousin' claims on women's inferiority.

However, most central to the present thesis are Vandevelde-Dailliere's findings on women's weak political participation. Although not explicitely interested in the issue of illiteracy, Vandevelde-Dailliere's investigations disclosed illiteracy as one of the major reasons for women's political marginalisation (ibid: 336-344). Almost invariably, those who were politically participant or

active were educated women, mostly the product of the formal educational system and usually professionals or higher degree holders (ibid: 289-333).

In her treatment of women's attitudes towards politics, Vandevelde-Dailliere resorted to a scale of political apathy and political participation which ranged as follows:

(i) absence of participation;

(ii) formal participation;

(iii) desire to participate;

(iv) conscious participation.

The first three categories corresponded to secluded women, both in rural and urban areas (including slum dwellers), all sharing one common feature: they were illiterate. The last category embraced professional and student women (ibid: 337). Reactions to the degree of participation ranged from estrangement to revolt (ibid: 339-342):

> weak revolt and strong estrangement (characterised by apathy, passivity and absence of participation) experienced by 60 to 70 per cent of rural, and 50 per cent of urban women; most did not vote and did not understand the significance of voting;
>
> weak revolt and weak estrangement (characterised by submissiveness) experienced by 30 per cent of urban and 10 to 20 per cent of rural women; but exposure to media enhanced the "ritualistic visit to polling stations";
>
> strong revolt and strong estrangement, displayed by secluded women with a sense of revolt, bred by powerlessness and a strong desire to take part in the public world, experienced by 20 percent of urban and rural women;
>
> strong revolt and weak estrangement involving a greater degree of civic participation, political awareness and competence to organise political commitment, were displayed exclusively by urban, professional or student women (70 per cent wished to be politically active and not only vote).

The first three categories involved almost invariably illiterate women,

with rare cases of primary education for the third. The fourth was the only group with a high level of education (higher secondary, university level).

Vandevelde-Dailliere's findings help corroborate the hypothesis that illiteracy marginalises women politically to a great extent. This is also witnessed in the representation of women in political instances at a national level. The main elections held in the country since the 1967 *Reforme Communale* disclose a derisory representation of women. Three main instances which call for women's participation are the city councils *Assemblées Populaires Communales* (APC), the county *Assemblées Populaires de Wilaya* (APW), and the parliamentary *Assemblée Populaire Nationale* (APN). In all three, the percentage of women's representation has remained minimal between 1967 and 1979:

YEAR	APC	APW	APN
1967	1	-	-
1969	-	3.9	-
1971	0.5	-	-
1974	-	4	-
1975	1.4	-	-
1979	-	3	3

The slightly higher rates in the APW and APN are due to the fact that "only professional women are elected" (Vandevelde-Dailliere, ibid: 299)

and this entails not only literacy but higher formal education.

The combination of widespread illiteracy among women and the valuation of higher formal education and professionalism, have helped obtain in Algeria one of the most paradoxical 'Republic of Citizens', with nearly half of its population still constrained within the confines of a surviving 'Republic of Cousins'. Far from being supporters of the latter, adult illiterate women wish to break free, and believe that education should help them. Vandevelde-Dailliere's investigation has disclosed that the majority of women in her sample, and in particular those from rural areas, evoked "lack of education" as a major factor in their ignorance and domestication, along with "customs and prejudices, and men's opposition" to their participating in the 'public realm' (ibid: 191-196).

In the light of these findings, a Freirian 'liberating' education can be evoked as a possible answer to Algeria's illiterate women. *Prima facie* all the ingredients for the success of 'conscientisation' pedagogy can be found in the context of adult illiterate women: the 'culture of silence', the sense of 'being immersed' in the world and not 'subjects' in it, the culture of superstition and mythical beliefs, 'oppression' by authoritarian males. However, the technocratism of the 'Citizens' in power in Algeria has left them sceptical,. if not indifferent, to the whole philosophy of non-formal education. Indeed their societal programme provides for the necessity of literacy as a major characteristic of the Algerian modern man and woman; but only in as far as literacy is preferably scientific, technological and dispensed by the formal channels of education, ie. schools, institutes

and universities. The prevailing attitude towards illiteracy is that it will disappear with the universalisation of the formal educational system, and there is no sign of future shifts towards non-formal education as yet.

But, is the provision and expansion of literacy among women sufficient guarantee for the enhancement of their public role, and the weakening of their domesticity? In some circumstances the opposite could well be witnessed, as will be examined in the case of Tanzania.

5.4. Education for Self-Reliance in Tanzania.

As in Algeria, the 'Citizens' in power in Tanzania, have been heavily investing in education since Independence in 1961. Public expenditure on the educational sector, both formal and informal, absorbed between 15 and 17 percent of total government expenditure in each year between 1966 and 1986.[96] A similar faith was ascribed to the economic returns of education. In his presidential address to Parliament in 1965 (12 May), Nyerere had this to say about educational strategy:

> The purpose of government expenditure on education in the coming years must be to equip Tanganyika with the skills and the knowledge which is needed if the development of the country is to be achieved.

However, unlike the Algerians, the Tanzanians were to concentrate on investing in their adults. Thus Nyerere went on in the same venue:

> ...first we must educate adults. Our children will not have an impact on our economic development for five, ten or even twenty years.

This unorthodox strategy was nonetheless economistic, but was to evolve differently from the technocratic stance of Algeria's policy. It

was to shift dramatically towards the development of informal adult education together with the primary cycle, to the detriment of the secondary and tertiary stages of the formal educational system. The shift occurred in 1967 following Nyerere's issue of Education for Self- Reliance[97] (ESR) in which he expounded the main principles of an education he wanted to be 'relevant' to the predominantly peasant society of Tanzania. Following in the footsteps of the wider societal programme of *Ujamaa* and The Arusha Declaration, both issued in 1967, the philosophy of Education for Self-Reliance was part of Nyerere's scheme to create a 'Republic of Citizens' where 'basic needs' would be met so as to avoid social inequality:[98]

> ...Most often of all, our Government and people have stressed the equality of all citizens and our determination that economic, political and social policies shall be deliberately designed to make a reality of that equality in all spheres of life.
>
> (ESR, 1967: 5-6)

In the educational sphere, Nyerere argued that social equality could only be achieved through 'basic education'. This entailed the provision of primary education as "education for life, and not a preparation for secondary school [whose] only justification is that it is needed by the few for service to the many" (ESR: 15). Stressing the peasant and agrarian nature of Tanzanian society, Nyerere proposed that the educational system should be reorganised in such a way that it caters for the training of the many as future farmers. Hence his conception of 'terminal primary education' and self-reliant schools which would function as productive units, securing their own upkeep. Accordingly, the main features of self-reliant education in Tanzania were:

to relate the curricula to immediate social tasks;

to organise the schools into productive communities;

to raise the entry age to seven years and over so as to obtain an employable school-leaver at the end of a cycle of seven years.

Nyerere's proposals on education were a mixture of revolutionary and populist rhetoric. The most salient features of the socialist (-revolutionary) educational tradition which appear in Nyerere's discourse are: the unity between theory and practice; the amalgamation of manual and intellectual work; and finally, the combination of education with productive work (Carnoy & Wertheim, 1977: 573-587). It is significant that in ESR Nyerere should point out that "Tanzanian education must counteract the temptation to intellectual arrogance" (ibid: 7). This is reminiscent of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) and its pugnacious attack on intellectualism. However, the similarities between the Tanzanian and Chinese educational reforms should be handled cautiously. Hawkins (1982)[99] has usefully summed up the Chinese experiment in education as the "Red and Expert Debate". This latter was posed within the framework of the Marxist-Leninist construct of the ideal Communist student, who should be both "politically aware [Red] as well as highly skilled [Expert]" (Hawkins, 1982: 412). Against this, the Tanzanian Ideal Typical Student [learner] is set up within the eclectic framework of *Ujamaa* 'specific socialism', whereby high expertise matters little, and political activism is far from being 'Red', but is 'cooperative'. The conciliatory tone of ESR is indeed far from the class struggle injunctions of Chinese militantism; it calls instead for:

> the development in each citizen of three things: an enquiring mind, an ability to learn from what others do, and reject or adapt it to his own needs; and a basic

> confidence in his own position as a free and equal member of the society, who values others and is valued by them for what he does and not for what he obtains.
>
> (ESR: 8)

Nyerere goes as far as to exort Tanzanians to become free thinkers; an original call within the socialist tradition:

> ...the free citizens of Tanzania will have to judge social issues for themselves; there neither is nor will be a political "holy book" which purports to give all the answers to all the social, political and economic problems which will face our country in the future. ...But the educational system of Tanzania would not be serving the interests of a democratic socialist society if it tried to stop people from thinking about the teachings, policies or the beliefs of leaders... . Only free people conscious of their worth and their equality can build a free society.
>
> (ibid: 8-9)

This recalls Freire's humanist pedagogy of liberation, rather than the more conventional socialist tradition of the subordination of education to political action (Lilge, 1977: 556-572), and the primacy of scientific and technological expertise. Ironically, Algeria's technocratic penchant is more in agreement with this latter tradition.

In order to obtain his 'basically-literate and 'basically-skilled free thinking farmer', Nyerere dismissed academia and expertise as irrelevant to the majority of Tanzanians:

> We should not determine the type of things children are taught in primary schools by the things a doctor, engineer, teacher, economist, or administrator need to know. Most of our pupils will never be any of these things.
>
> (ESR: 16)

And,

> It will probably be suggested that if the children are working as well as learning they will therefore be able to learn less academically and that this will affect standards ...in the professions and so on throughout our nation in time to come. ...But even if this suggestion were based on provable fact, it could not be allowed to

> over-ride the need for change in the direction of educational integration with our national life.
>
> (ESR: 24)

Nyerere is providing here a good example of a politically and ideologically formulated policy, which takes little account of the specifications of the problem it purports to solve. On his own admission, provable predictions, as he put it, should be of no consequence, as opposed to the rightousness of a visionary societal plan. This would prove fatal for Nyerere's wholistic dream of a 'content and basically literate nation of farmers' he had for Tanzania. For Tanzanians nationwide would be pressing for further expert-based education, as will be examined later in this Chapter. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the so-called 'majority' of Tanzanians could have genuinely accepted that the acquisition of the 3Rs was enough together with the teachings of "history, workings of Government, and skills necessary to earn a living" (ESR: 24).

Nyerere's scheme of Education for Self-Reliance is indeed unique as a socialist model, for it has sacrificed modernity, science and technology at the alter of basic needs, knowledge and skills. The repercussions on the formal and nonformal sectors of education were to be far-reaching.

5.4.1. The Pressure for More Formal Education.

In his vision of the ideal equal society in Tanzania, Nyerere hastened to visualise a uniform society of happy farmers, literate but not expert, led by 'intellectually non-arrogant selected few' whose education is justified by "service to the many" as "there can be no other justification for taxing the many to give education to only a

few" (ESR: 15). However, Nyerere's utopia became a recipe for social differenciation rather than equality. Not only did the selection from primary to secondary witness a dramatic drop, falling from 36 per cent in 1962 to less then 6 per cent in 1980 (Dreuth et al., 1983: 103), but ironically it was found to:

> restrict access to secondary and higher education (and therefore knowledge) to a very few, who tend increasingly to be children of the bureaucracy and petty bourgeoisie.
>
> (Mbilinyi, 1979: 112)

Restrictive access to public secondary education indirectly encouraged the mushrooming of fee-paying private secondary schools, most of which were denominational; and thus not only contradicted the socialist principle of free public education, but that of secular education sought by the 'Citizens' in power. When Nyerere was reported to deplore the expansion of private secondary schools, "which he argued were exploiting smallholder peasants":

> The political elite were dismayed and privately said they would oppose putting a lid on expansion and operation of private schools.
>
> (Omari et al., 1983: 19)

A clamp down on private schools was made impossible; not only in view of the importance of the sector which accounts for over 40 per cent of national enrolment; 28,000 pupils against 40,300 in public schools (Ministry of National Education, 1980: 31), but also by the discreet resistance put up by the religious missions which administer most of these schools. It was estimated that "in 1961, about 70 per cent of the school children were being educated in church-sponsored schools" (Westerlund, 1980: 118).

The nationalisation of the educational system by the 1969 Education Act, did not precipitate "the end of eighty years of mission participation in public education" as expected by some observers (Mbunda, 1979: 88). It is probable that church leaders took advantage of the severe restrictions imposed on secondary enrolment, to start private secondary schools as a sector where they could continue to operate. Westerlund pointed out the reluctance of church leaders to abide by the new secular public educational system (Westerlund, 1980: 121), and it is not surprising that they found a haven in private secondary schooling.

But Westerlund helps disclose another subtlety of the educational debate in Tanzania, behind the idyllic uniformity of education for self-reliance, and that is the conflict between Christian and Muslim leaders *vis à vis* the secular content of state education. While Church leaders accused the Muslims of dominating the party apparatus and of promoting secular and state education, Muslim organisations also denounced the secularism of state education as a euphemism for Christian domination (Westerlund, ibid: 93-119). This is an interesting example of the interplay between the secular 'Citizens' in power, and the leaders of the Muslim and Christian 'Brothers-in-law' concerning education. However, while the Christian 'Brothers-in-law' benefited from their massive participation in pre-independence educational provision by converting to private secondary schooling, their Muslim counterparts were not allowed to operate by the more moderate Muslims holding power within the *Chama Cha Mapinduzi*.

The above conflict did not prove of notable consequence for the adoption and implementation of 'Education for Self-Reliance' except in the sense that Christian private schools might undermine both the principles of secularism and equality promulgated by the rhetoric of the 'Citizens', mainly represented by Nyerere. It has been observed that:

> Many of the private schools have inherent religious and class biases because admission is by religious denominations or by ability to pay, influence... .In fact, the existence of private schools is defeating government measures for equalisation such as regional and sex quotas in selection because several of the private schools are for boys only, and parents still prefer to pay for boys rather than girls in coeducation schools.
>
> (Omari et al., 1983: 19)

In the long run, it is likely that such developments would lead to a structural inequality of class and sex and to a clear distinction between 'mass non-formal basic education' and 'elitist, formal and expert education'. Instead of 'the two legs'[100] of Tanzanian education, the former would become 'the wooden leg' of Tanzania's socio-economic development as it dangerously limits its access to scientific and technological knowledge in favour of basic skills.

Indeed, the expansion of 'basic education', whether in the form of Universal Primary Education (UPE) or non-formal literacy (mass or functional) is bound to heighten people's expectations towards further education, which ESR denies to an overwhelming majority. There is a disquieting disproportion between primary and adult education provision on the one hand and secondary and higher education on the other (Table 5.6).

TABLE 5.6

Pupil, Student and Adult Education Population 1981-83

	1981	1982	1983
Primary	3,530,622	3,512,799	3,582,923
Secondary			
- public	38,365	38,983	39,737
- private	29,513	30,162	31,482
Technical College	1,360	1,409	1,164
University of Dar es Salaam			
- undergraduate	2,852	2,980	3,531
- postgraduate	528	460	446
Adult Education			
- Functional Literacy	3,526,565	1,051,957	2,771,162
- Post Literacy	1,388,069	1,403,524	1,637,073

Source: Country report submitted to the 39th session of the International Conference on Education, Geneva, 16-25 October 1984.

However, Nyerere's vision of 'education for basic needs' was to be implemented as from the Second Five Year Plan (1969-1973), and was combined with a systematic campaign of adult literacy (from 1970) and of course the most dramatic social transformation of all: villagisation. The combination of the three gave Nyerere's vision of Tanzanian society a wholistic, comprehensive character. But of interest to the present thesis is the extent to which 'Education for

Self-Reliance' has helped expand literacy, especially among women. The pertinent question is whether it has succeeded in changing attitudes towards formal education, and whether it helped women be integrated in the new 'just and equal Republic of self-sufficient farmers'.

5.4.2. The Expansion of Adult Literacy.

'Education for Self-reliance' had a resounding impact on adult education on the whole, and in particular on adult literacy campaigns in the 1970s. Prior to this period, adult literacy campaigning was tackled haphazardly. Most students of Tanzania's community and adult education (Hall, 1975; Kassam, 1978, Malya, 1979; Ishumi, 1981) pointed out the lack of consistency and coordination in the drive to organise adult education and literacy prior to the Arusha Declaration, and Education for Self-reliance. They also emphasized the importance of a coherent societal vision, especially that of Nyerere, in encouraging a systematic organisation of adult education.

The philosophy of 'basic needs' and self-reliance answered most accurately the non-formal nature of adult literacy and education. Hence the subsequent success of Tanzania's campaigns, which reduced illiteracy from 70 per cent to 21 per cent within a decade (1971-1981) (ILO, 1982: 107). Being consecrated by the presidential seal on many occasions, adult education, including literacy campaigning became a formidable institution in the country's educational structure. As from 1970, which was declared 'Adult Education Year', Tanzania proceeded slowly but surely to overcome illiteracy among adults (over 15 years old) through a variety of campaigns, and the progressive institutionalisation of post-literacy courses for adults.

The originality of Tanzania's experience in this field is that it has been able to combine functional literacy with mass literacy campaigning, yielding most encouraging results. Indeed none of the revolutionary methods of systematic and immediate political mobilisation of the population through literacy was adopted. However the rationale of Freirian 'conscientization' is shared by Tanzania and only there could it be said to have a 'revolutionary' component as the "purpose [of education] is the liberation of Man from the restraints and limitations of ignorance and dependency" (Nyerere, 1976), and "the first objective of adult literacy [is to help people] shake [themselves] out of resignation" (Nyerere, 1969-1970).

But a careful reading of Nyerere's rhetoric reveals a functionalist attitude rather than a revolutionary stance:

> The first job of adult education is to give us the ability to reject bad houses, bad jembes [hoes], and preventable diseases: it must make us recognise that we have the ability to attain better houses, better tools, and better health.
>
> (Nyerere, 1969-1970)

Nyerere was here addressing the nation on New Year's Eve to announce 1970 as 'Adult Education Year'. His emphasis on the functional objectives of adult education and literacy was strongly influenced by the Unesco/UNDP Experimental World Literacy Programme which Tanzania benefited from in the period 1968-69. The five-year pilot project was initiated in Mwanza (around Lake Victoria) a most important economic zone for the authorities in the sense that it produced cash and foreign exchange crops. It was designed (Malya, 1979: 143-144):

> to teach illiterate men and women [peasants] basic reading and writing, and to solve simple problems of arithmetic utilizing as

basic vocabularies the words used in agricultural and industrial practices;

to help them to apply the new knowledge and skills to solve their basic economic, social and cultural problems;

to prepare them for a more efficient participation in the development of their village, region and country;

to integrate the adult literacy and adult education programmes with the general agricultural and industrial development of the country;

> to provide the necessary and adequate reading materials, impart the knowledge of community and personal hygiene, nutrition, child-care and home economics, which will help to improve family and community life, provide opportunity for a continuing education and avoid relapse into illiteracy.

The population to be affected by the project (2 million people) numbered in 1970, 60 per cent of male illiterates and 90 percent of female illiterates (EWLP, 1976). The initial Plan of Operation hoped to reduce illiteracy rates to 25 per cent among the 15-45 years old, that is provide them with standard 4 primary level. Between 1971-1973, 200,000 people became literate but held Standard 2 level (EWLP, 1976). On the other hand, the functional aspect of the project was vaguely attained as there was (Malya, ibid: 145-146):

> indication that the training of approximately two years was not enough for the majority of the participants to become functionally literate;
>
> indication that the training cycle was affected by high drop-out rates and drop-in rates...;
>
> indication that although the majority of participants in most programmes were women, it was they who dropped out more often than men;
>
> indication that individual deficiency in the knowledge of the Swahili language acts as a stumbling block in the learning process.

However, no attempt was made to carry out an investigation into the cultural and socio-economic factors that could have been partly responsible for the weak response of the participants. Although only

marginally successful, the objectives and methods of the project were to be adopted subsequently as the basis of future adult literacy and adult education in Tanzania. Coupled with Nyerere's philosophy of 'learning by doing' and 'lifelong education', functional literacy was to become the backbone of adult education in Tanzania.

In the period 1971-1975, a series of measures were taken to launch a national mass literacy campaign. The process was piecemeal and started with another experimental project, the Six-District Literacy Campaign in 1971, following a speech by Nyerere on New Year's Eve (Kassam, 1978: 32). It proved "difficult to obtain reliable statistics on the number of illiterates who, after registration, continued to attend literacy classes on a regular basis and the number of people who actually became literate" (Kassam, ibid: 35). However enrolment figures showed high percentages of participation, and the whole experience served as a base for the nationwide literacy campaign decided towards the end of 1971 (Kassam, ibid: 37).

5.4.3. The National Literacy Campaign 1972-1975.

Literacy campaigning in Tanzania was a piecemeal process. It was initially planned to last 4 years (1972-1975) but was extended until 1981 when the last literacy test at national level was undertaken. The initial plan of TANU to eradicate illiteracy by 1975 was not only delayed, but had to resort to different phases and campaigns to achieve progressive literacy rates.

The most intensive period of the National Campaign was between 1972 and 1975, when phenomenal results were achieved. A formidable institution-

alisation of adult education provision took place at national and regional levels, integrating adult education into the educational system by creating special bodies within the Ministry of Education.[101] The campaign also involved political instances as a great deal of mobilisation work was needed to attract people. Although the authorities did not close the schools in order to mobilise students and teachers, campaigning was nevertheless intense. Party cells, 'Adult Education Committees' at regional, district and ward level, primary schools and a variety of offices were assigned to conduct adult literacy classes. Twelve functional literacy primers were produced, all on agriculture except for one on the political ideology of TANU and home economics (mainly designed for women). About 25 million primers were distributed free as well as 12,500 spectacles (a notable borrowing from the 1961 Cuban experience). Some 98,000 teachers were involved in the campaign, of whom 84,000 were voluntary primary school leavers and 14,000 experienced teachers (Kassam, 1978: 62-64).

The campaign was targeted on an illiterate population of 5.9 million from a total population of 13 million. Enrolment developed dramatically from 745,000 in 1971, to 2.5 million in 1973, and 5.2 million in 1975. Thus 88 per cent of the total number of illiterates enroled (Kassam, ibid: 65). The figures are indeed spectacular but they do not indicate rates of attendance or dropping out.

Nevertheless, the 1975 National Literacy Examination was very encouraging as 3.8 million persons (77 per cent of enrollees) took the

test, and 2 million of them were estimated literate, that is able to read and write simple sentences and messages.

> At the end of 1975, therefore, the total number of illiterate persons aged 10 years and over was estimated to be about 3.9 million which constitutes about 39 per cent of the total population of Tanzania. To put it in another way, the illiteracy rate in Tanzania was reduced from 67 per cent in 1967 to 39 per cent at the end of 1975.
>
> (Kassam, 1978: 68)

The slogans accompanying the campaign marked three phases and were predominantly functional. They were:

1972 - 'Politics is Agriculture';

1973 - 'Man is Health';

1975 - 'Food is Life'.

Subsequent campaigns were reported to have involved 5.82 million people in 1977, reducing the national illiteracy rate from 27 per cent in 1977 to 21 per cent in 1981 (ILO, 1982: 108) (Table 5.7). The mass campaigning effort was backed by a whole network of post-literacy institutions in the shape of 'Folk Development Colleges', rural libraries for the distribution of functional literacy primers, radio programmes and the production of rural newspapers. For those who had advanced beyond the post literacy level, the Institute of Adult Education organised correspondence courses to further their education up to university level under the 'mature age entry scheme' (ILO, ibid: 109).

TABLE 5.7

Literacy Test Results in 1975, 1977 and 1981

millions

		1967	1975	1977	1981
Population age 10 years and over	M	3.95	4,80	5.15	6.1
	F	4.21	5.10	5.49	6.3
	T	8.16	9.90	10.64	12.4
Estimated illiterates age 10 years and over	M	2.12	2.56	1.67	1.32
	F	3.33	3.30	2.42	2.07
	T	5.45	5.86	4.09	3.39
Participants achieving levels III and IV	M		0.95	0.45	0.49
	F		0.96	0.35	0.42
	T		1.91	0.81	0.91
Remaining illiterates	M		1.61	1.22	0.83
	F		2.34	2.07	1.65
	T		3.95	3.28	2.48
Estimated illiteracy rates (per cent)	M	54	34	24	14
	F	80	46	38	26
	T	67	40	31	20

Source : Ministry of National Education (1981)

5.4.4. The Campaign and Women.

One of the most salient features throughout the campaign was the overwhelming appeal it seemed to have had amongst women:

> ...[the] reason may well be propagation of the political philosophy which aimed to create social and sex equality. It would seem that women who have always been neglected in this respect, have rallied behind this philosophy. Thus for example, of the 5.82 million adults enrolled in literacy classes during 1970-1977 3.3 million were women and 2.54 million men, a pattern found to be typical for most years and regions.
> (ILO, 1982 :108)

Owing to the predominantly rural economy of Tanzania, women have traditionally been a most active labour force, both in the actual production process and in the domestic realm, which can hardly be

distinguished from the first in a subsistence economy. Hence the high rate of women's participation in productive labour; 74 per cent according to ILO estimates (ILO, 1982: 142-143).

However, with the introduction of the wage economy as the formal sector, women's activity on the farms has been relegated to the so-called informal sector, thus reducing their participation to a mere 12 per cent in 1978 "according to the narrow definition of the labour force [as] those who are looking for and are available for work (mostly wage-paid jobs)" (ILO, ibid: 143). It is ironic that wage labour, as a prominent feature of the modern 'Republic of Citizens', should debase women's work, and threaten to relegate them to domesticity. A number of observers have warned against the loss of economic autonomy of women (especially peasants) with the expansion of the money sector (Mbilinyi, 1972: 61), as well as that of villagisation which tends to address male household heads rather than female heads (Caplan, 1981: 98-108; Brain, 1976: 265-282).

Furthermore, wage labour is often linked with the attainment of a minimum educational standard; often provided by the formal educational system which delivers the qualifications so scornfully condemned by Nyerere in Education for Self-reliance. Formal qualifications nevertheless remain the dominant rule for social promotion, and access to white collar and executive jobs as attested by the formidable expansion of private secondary schooling. As in Algeria, women more than men need formal qualifications in order to be employable in the

formal economic sector (Table 5.8).[102] Hence their low participation in this, 12 per cent as opposed to 66 per cent for men (Shields, 1980: 38).[103]

TABLE 5.8

Educational Distribution of Female Wage and Non-wage Earners in Tanzania

Level of Education	Percentage of Wage Earners	Percentage of Non-wage Earners
None	21.3	65.7
Standards 1-4	13.1	16.0
Standards 5-8	38.5	16.6
Forms 1-4	23.6	1.8
Forms 5-6	1.9	0.0
University	1.6	0.0
(Number of cases	314	513)

Source: NUMEIST, 1971

Accordingly, the acquisition of a literacy level through the non-formal sector, so widely acclaimed to be popular with women, will not necessarily help them shift from a domestic-reproductive status to a public-productive one. It has been argued that the policy of informal education and functional literacy and their enforcement among women, were but structural adjustments to the international market:

> At this moment in history, capital is able to extract more surplus from the peasants without raising the level of productive forces, by increasing the number of producers who produce for the market and depend on the market for basic consumption and producer goods, and at the same time increasing the proportion sold of what is produced, and through labour intensification. This is why women are so crucial, since they have been the most obviously overlooked potential labour force among peasants.
>
> (Mbiliny, 1977: 500-1)

Indeed, with 90 per cent of Tanzanian women involved in agricultural production, Mbilinyi's dependency analysis would have been accurate if at least a majority of women were involved in the formal agricultural sector, but this is not the case, since the majority of peasant women are active in the economy of subsistence.[104]

The question remains whether their formidable participation in the literacy campaigns will further their 'capture' by the modernising 'Republic of Citizens' in power. What is certain, is that the 'Citizens' would like to see women improve their attitudes towards so-called basic needs such as health, hygiene, family planning and 'home economics',[105] which have been considered specifically female concerns. It has been argued that "women are [the] major home-makers, and as mothers and housewives require retention of literacy for the benefit of the nation" (Malya, 1978: 2-3). This statement illustrates the attitude of the Tanzanian 'Citizens' towards women's education and its ultimate domestic functionality. Women's domesticity is required to become more effective and more modern through the instillation of basic educational principles. This type of attitude, coupled with the non-recognition of women's work in the informal sector may well jeopardise their future participation in literacy campaigns, and can hardly help those who have become literate to retain their skills.

5.5. Specific Initial Conditions: The Lessons from Algeria and Tanzania

The comparison of the Tanzanian and Algerian contexts helps identify more saliently the phenomenon of women's seclusion as specific to Algerian traditional society. Their ensuing identification with the domestic private realm has prevented them from playing a constructive part in the production process. Their participation in the political arena and the educational one, especially among adult age groups, has remained very limited.

In Tanzania on the other hand, the involvement of women in informal agricultural production could be said to have encouraged their spectacular enrolment in adult literacy campaigns. But should their economic autonomy be discarded, the *raison d'être* of their participation would wane. Their possible confinement to the home and to domestic concerns such as suggested by Malya, would weaken their drive to become literate. The Tanzanian experience in terms of female involvement in literacy teaches two important lessons:

> the necessity for women to take part in public processes in order to be drawn to literacy;
>
> public participation of women is not necessarily a result of modernisation, but could well exist in so-called traditional society, and paradoxically be jeopardised by modern processes such as concentrated urban groupings, or wage labour.

Conversely, the Algerian experience discloses:

> the conspicuous absence of women as adult learners in view of their domestication;
>
> the necessity for further modernisation as the sole guarantor of a public participation of women faced with a powerful tradition of female seclusion and domesticity.

The Algerian and Tanzanian experiences in adult literacy are valuable in revealing the linearity of the modernity/traditionality dichotomy, especially with regard to women's status. In Holmesian terms, the specific conditions of each context have not always revealed a progressive continuum from tradition to modernity. Women's participation in literacy campaigns in Tanzania has shown that they have been encouraged in this by their 'traditional' status as producers in the informal agricultural sector. In Algeria, on the other hand, an aggressive modernisation through industrialisation and urbanisation has only marginally affected women's 'traditional' domestic status primarily as 'reproducers'; and did not not live up to its promise of the egalitarian 'Republic of Citizens'. In fact the 'Citizens' in power have often declared that it was up to women to merit their emancipation as the latter was dependent on their moral behaviour (Boumediene, Charte Nationale). This usually meant the non-emulation of Western women, and the preservation of reproduction and family roles as paramount (ie. of domesticity).

With regard to women's education, both the 'Citizens' in Algeria and Tanzania have clearly favoured, if not imposed, indiscriminate schooling for both sexes. In both countries, girls involvement in the primary cycle has reached parity with that of boys. However, the weak female quotas in the secondary and higher stages remain notable as cultural resistance to women's further education after puberty (Algeria), or economic necessity (Tanzania),[106] lead to the withdrawal of girls from the secondary level.

But however keen on women's education or women's work, the Algerian and Tanzanian 'Citizens' have hardly supported their educational policies with provisions intended to alleviate the domestic chores which, by and large accrue to women. In classical socialist regimes, two provisions are immediately enforced:

> legal equality for women (Rowbotham, 1980), which cannot be said to have been the case either in Algeria or Tanzania. On the contrary, the family laws of both countries have been rather retrograde and are helping to institutionalise sex inequality;
>
> family planning to weaken woman's role as reproducer, and the provision of community-run kindergartens to liberate women as labour force (ie. as producers), which again have failed to appear as priorities in either country (Paquot, 1982: 93-97; 127-128).

The sole provisions of adult literacy is unlikely to help women join the modern and egalitarian 'Republics of Citizens' in Algeria or Tanzania, as long as the 'Citizens' in power remain normatively ambivalent about the 'Ideal Woman Citizen' in their Republic. While the bulk of Algerian adult women are likely to remain marginalised by their overwhelming illiteracy; Tanzanian women are threatened with marginalisation by a growing formal sector from which they are excluded in view of their low educational qualifications (in the form of basic literacy).

NOTES: CHAPTER 5

1. The institutionalisation of sex inequality through family legislation in Algeria and Tanzania sharply contrasts with the more progressive legislation of conventional socialist regimes such as the Soviet Union, China or Cuba. This is not to say that the latter do not experience a lag between a progressive rhetoric and slow changing institutions and values. Cf. Sheila Rowbathem, Women, Resistance and Revolution, Penguin Books, 1980. Rowbathem reports discrepancies between revolutionary rhetoric, namely that of sex equality and sexual liberation, and slow changing traditional practices in a number of socialist regimes. However, Algeria's and Tanzania's family legislations contain at the outset a 'normative institutionalisation' of the status of minority for women. While Algeria and Tanzania have not enacted radical legislation freeing women from domesticity, radical socialist regimes have forthrightly condemned domesticity in favour of women's disposition of their own bodies, and a strong work ethic. Cf. Barbara Wolfe Jancar, Women Under Communism, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.

2. While 'obscurantism' and illiteracy are seen as directly resulting from colonialism in Algeria, (Charte Nationale, 1976: 63,68), Nyerere condemned the colonial educational system as inadequate in Education for Self-Reliance (1967).

3. In both cases, the public sector is coeducational. However in Tanzania private secondary education provides separate education for boys and girls. See section 4 of this Chapter.

4. Unesco came legally into being in November 4, 1946. For further details consult J.P. Sewell, Unesco and World Politics, Princeton University Press, 1975, for a good overview of the international conditions of Unesco's birth. See also J.C. Aggarwal, Unesco's Contribution Towards World Education, Arya Book Depot, New Delhi, 1971, and P.I. Hajnal, Guide to Unesco, Oceania Publications, 1983.

5. See Unesco: Conference of African States on the Development of Education in Africa: Final Report, ED/181, Paris, 1961; Report on the Needs of Asia in Primary Education, 11C/PRG3, Paris, 1960; Report of the Meeting of Ministers of Education of Asian Member States Participating in the Karachi Plan, ED/192, Port Publishing Company, Bangkok, 1962; Conference on Education and Economic and Social Development in Latin America: Provisional Report, UN Economic and Social Council, Unesco/ED/CEDES/37, Paris, 1962.

6. A real economistic fever took over the educational scene worldwide. The presumably alarming rates of wastage and drop out from the primary cycle (see Unesco's regional conferences above) led to the emergence of a new breed of international experts: the economists of education. They were to launch the more utalitarian view of the economic returns of educational provision. It is beyond the scope of the present study to mention all the related literature. However a representative sample is best rendered by The Policy Conference on Economic Growth and Investment in Education, OECD, Paris, 1962; Parnes H.S., (ed.), Planning Education for Economic and Social Development, OECD Mediterranean Regional Project, Paris, 1963; Harbison F. and Myers C.A., (eds.), Manpower and Education: Country Studies in Economic

Development, McGraw Hill, New York, 1965; Anderson C.A. & Bowman M.J., (eds.), Education and Economic Development, Aldin Publishing Co., Chicago, 1965; Vaizey J., The Economics of Education, Faber and Faber, London, 1962.

7. The expediency of such argument is best illustrated by statements such as "It is unquestionably true that the cost of primary education must be kept down, otherwise it will consume most of the resources which are more urgently needed for secondary and higher education". Cf. Frederick H. Harbison, "The Strategy of Human Resource Development in Modernizing Economies", in Policy Conference on Economic Growth and Investment in Education, op. cit., p. 25. For a good compilation of representatives of this school of thought, see Don Adams, (ed.), Education in National Development, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1971. This 'liberal' trend was criticised by radical social scientists who argued that human capital theory had had little effect on either occupational structure or income distribution, both in the capitalist centres and peripheries. See J. Karabel and A.H. Halsey, (eds.), Power and Ideology in Education, Oxford University Press, New York, 1977; in particular part three, pp. 307-365. But an earlier critique of the economistic trend was issued by Holmes, who warned (1981: 14) that:

> ...economists of education who have flirted with comparative education have done nothing worse than raise wastage and stagnation rates in education throughout the world by convincing governments that there were sound economic reasons for doing what they had already decided to do on the grounds of expediency, political necessity or ideology.

Holmes reminds us that the 1956 Year Book of Education had 'initiated the comparative study of the economics of education' but that little

progress had been made since, in view of the expediency and ideologically ridden nature of policy planning.

8. Cf. Philip H. Coombs, The World Educational Crisis, Oxford University Press, New York, 1970. Coombs argued, amongst other things, against the overproduction of educated unemployed yielded for instance by the ambitions of the 1960s human capital theory. A decade earlier Coombs was promoting this very approach as chairman of the Policy Conference on Economic Growth and Investment in Education, op. cit., p. 87. By the late 1960s, he was urging the adoption of nonformal education, unfortunately along the same inductivist premises.

9. The very proponents of manpower theory admitted defeat in the early 1970s, and questioned whether increased expenditures on education were an effective means of achieving either economic growth or social equality. See OECD, Education, Inequality and Life Chances, Paris, 1975. This was preceded by Unesco's Learning to Be, edited by Edgar Faure, Paris, 1972; and the ILO's Employment, Incomes and Equality, Geneva, 1972. All heralded that a more prosperous era could be attained through 'basic education for local needs'. According to these, the Shumacher panacea of Small is Beautiful, Abacus, London, 1974, was automatically deemed effective for 'developing' societies.

10. Cf. for instance Castle E.B., Education for Self-Help: New Strategies for Developing Countries, Oxford University Press, London, 1972; and Wood A.W., Informal Education and Development in Africa, Mouton, The Hague & Paris, 1974.

11. Holmes argues that the inductivist-positivist method has its origin in nineteeth century social and political science and was promoted by such men as J.S. Mill, Auguste Comte, Saint Simon, and Karl Marx, who all induced general laws about human society from a knowledge of European bourgeois early capitalist society (Holmes, 1981, chapter 2). Holmes's methodological argument illuminates the present author's contention that contemporary social theory is perpetuating the ethnocentrism of nineteenth century European social, and political-economic theory. See Chapter 1 of this thesis. Holmes will be quoted at length in the following, especially from his Comparative Education: Some Considerations of Method, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1981. This is a compilation of his methodological views since they were first expounded in his Problems in Education: A Comparative Approach, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1965, where he introduced his problem(-solving) approach. Over the years, Holmes had repeatedly warned against the expediency of educational solutions (to social problems) based on inductive generalisations.

12. See E.M. Harik & D.G. Schilling, The Politics of Education in Colonial Algeria and Kenya, Papers in International Studies, Africa Series No. 43, Ohio University, Centre for International Studies, Africa Program, Athens, Ohio, 1984. The settlers in colonial Algeria and Kenya strongly opposed the expansion of European education to the colonised peoples, and would only agree to the provision of basic vocational training. There was a difference however between the policies followed in Paris and London. The former advocated 'assimilation' so as to 'civilise the Arab', while the latter recommended 'adaptation', in order to 'communicate with the native'

through 'the raising up of capable, trustworthy, public spirited leaders of the people, belonging to their own race'. This came in Educational Policy in British Tropical Africa,(1925), cited by A.R. Thompson, "Ideas underlying British Colonial Education Policy in Tanganyika", in I.N. Resnick, Tanzania: Revolution by Education, Longmans of Tanzania Ltd. 1968, pp. 17-18.

13. The Phelps-Stokes commissions inspired British educational colonial policies of adaptation from 1925 till 1960, and this came out in a whole series of memoranda and reports. These reflected the colonial administration's concern for the provision of basic education for eventual 'self-government'. Four memoranda expounded the philosophy of 'adaptation': the 1925 Educational Policy in British Tropical Africa, the 1935 Memorandum on the Education of African Communities, the 1943 Mass Education in African Society, and the 1948 memorandum on Education for Citizenship in Africa. See Thompson in Resnick, op. cit., pp. 17-28.

14. See Chapter 3 of this thesis.

15. Cf. Althusser L., "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses", in Cosin B.R. (ed.), Education, Structure and Society, Penguin Books, 1972, (reprinted 1977), pp. 242-280. Althusser developed the concept in his Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, New Left Books, 1971. The bulk of his argument rests on Marx's discussion of the 'reproduction of the means of production' and on the dominance and reproduction of bourgeois capitalist values. Marx's 'superstructure' (state and ideology) becomes Althusser's 'ideological apparatuses' as they serve

in the 'social and cultural reproduction' of bourgeois values. However the concept of reproduction has been more thoroughly developed by P. Bourdieu (see note 16 below).

16. Cf. Bourdieu P., 'Cultural Reproduction and Social Reproduction', in Karabel J. & Halsey A.H., Power and Ideology in Education, Oxford University Press, New York, 1977, pp. 487-511.

17. The example of Education for Self-Reliance is a striking case in point if one compares it with the colonial principle of education for 'self-government', elaborated in the 1943 and 1948 memoranda. See Thompson in Resnick, op. cit., pp. 21-2, and note 13 above.

18. Cf. Carnoy, M., Education as Cultural Imperialism, David McKay, 1974; M. Carnoy et al., Can Educational Policy Equalise Income Distribution in Latin America?, Saxon House, 1979. The overall argument is that the 'productivity' thesis of educational provision is more of an ideological and political decision [to maintain the bourgeoisie in power]. The expansion of schooling is found to be associated with greater inequality in the distribution of economic benefits to individuals.

19. In problem-solving, Holmes was inspired by the hypothetico-deductive method put forward by Karl Popper as an alternative to the holistic and causative tradition in Western social science. Cf. K.R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1957, and his Conjectures and Refutations, The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1969.

Quoting Popper from The Poverty of Historicism, Holmes (1981: 50) noted for instance that:

> For Popper 'to give a causal explanation of a certain specific event means deducing a statement describing this event from two kinds of premises; from some universal laws, and from some singular or specific statements which we may call specific initial conditions'. In practical terms failure to take into account these initial conditions (or the societal context) leads to unconditioned prophecies about the future of education as opposed to conditional scientific predictions.

Popper's proposition that theories should be falsifiable is an interesting contrast with the kind of educational panacea reviewed earlier. These respond to Popper's criticism of the conventional scientific posture which seeks to test a theory in order to confirm it, not refute it. In Conjectures and Refutations, op.cit. p. 37, he remarked:

> Some genuinely testable theories, when found to be false, are still upheld by their admirers, for example by introducing ad hoc some auxiliary assumption, or by re-interpreting the theory ad hoc in such a way that it escapes refutation. Such a procedure is always possible, but it rescues the theory from refutation only at the price of destroying or at least lowering its scientific status.

No better statement can summarise the methodological process followed by international organisations and accepted by national governments in educational (and 'developmentalist') theorising over the last three decades. Indeed, ad hoc assumptions have been made on UPE, then human capital, then non-formal education, in order to prove or confirm that development is attainable through education, (under all circumstances).

20. The notion of 'national character' was developed by a number of Western comparative educationists earlier this century. The temptation to borrow from 'successful' educational systems among European nations and between Europe and the USA, led some educationists to warn that

such 'cultural borrowing' was highly suspicious. For each national entity presented cultural specificities which marked its own traditions in educational organisation. People like Michael Sadler (England) spoke of 'living spirit', I.L. Kandel (USA) and N. Hans (England) thought 'national self-consciousness' necessarily marked each national system of education (Holmes, 1981: 24-5). Vernon Mallinson (England) linked 'national character' with 'deeply held sentiments' and 'the totality of disposition to thought, feeling and behaviour', Cf. Mallinson V., An Introduction to Comparative Education, Heinemann, London, 1957, p. 14. However, the stereotypical connotations of 'national character' led Holmes to propose that 'ideal typical models' of the cultural traditions which inform social protagonists be drawn. The advantage of this method lies in its concern for the variety of traditions that are likely to inform mental states, and not for a presumably fixed mentality. The latter might lead to the establishment of stereotypes, such as those elaborated by the colonial literature on the so-called 'natives', or even national figures from former colonies, such as Leopold Sedar Senghor with his notion of 'Negritude'.

21. The Experimental World Literacy Programme (EWLP) was launched by Unesco and supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1967. The programme was based on the idea of 'functional literacy' as opposed to mass literacy and the teaching of the 3Rs. Candidates were to be made literate in relation to their jobs so as to become more 'productive'. Eleven countries benefited from the programme, including Algeria and Tanzania. Cf. Unesco, The EWLP: A Critical Assessment, The Unesco/UNDP Press, 1976.

22. Paulo Freire became an international authority on 'revolutionary' methods in adult literacy after his experience in North Eastern Brazil prior to the 1964 coup. Freire devised the method of 'conscientization' which purports to develop the candidate's critical view of his/her environment, and particularly of the conditions of economic and social exploitation. Hence his vision of 'education for liberation' as opposed to conventional literacy methods which he claims 'domesticate' the learner into accepting the social status-quo. The bulk of Freire's argument can be found in his Cultural Action for Freedom, Penguin Books, 1974; and Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Penguin Books, 1978; Education: The Practice of Freedom, Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative, London, 1978. For a practical experiment of his methods in Africa, see his Pedagogy in Process, The Letters to Guinea-Bissau, Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative, London, 1978. For a general study of Freire, see Mashayekh F., "Paulo Freire: the man, his ideas and their implications", in Literacy Discussion, Spring 1974.

23. Cf. P.I. Hajnal, Guide to Unesco, Oceania Publications, 1983, p. 112. The founding conference of Unesco held in London in 1945, mentioned the 'detrimental social and economic effects of the scourge of illiteracy'.

24. Cf. Unesco, Fundamental Education, Macmillan, New York, 1947.

25. Consult recommendation no. 47 in International Conference on Education, Recommendations 1934-1977, Unesco, Paris, 1979. The recommmendation was made to the Ministries of Education concerning Facilities for Education in Rural Areas.

26. Cf. P.I. Hajnal, op. cit., p. 113

27. The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1677 (XVI) of 18 December 1961, and the 1963 Resolution on the World Campaign for the Eradication of Mass Literacy (11 December). See Hajnal, op. cit., p. 113.

28. See J.C. Aggarwal & S.P. Agrawal, Role of Unesco in Education, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1982.

29. The countries which benefited from the programme were Ecuador, Ethiopia, Guinea, India, Iran, Madagascar, Mali, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, and Algeria. For details on the results of the project, see Unesco, The EWLP: a critical assessment, The Unesco/UNDP Press, 1976.

30. See note 19 above.

31. See Chapter 1.

32. Cf. Ivan Illich, Deschooling Society, Harrow Books, New York, 1971.

33. Following the 1959 revolution, the new leadership launched a mass literacy campaign over a period of nine months in 1961. Unprecedented popular mobilisation was organised as all formal educational institutions were closed, and literate adults as well as children sent to the countryside where they became 'brigadistas' to their fellow learners. Students of Cuba's campaign were impressed by the atmosphere of social solidarity which prevailed throughout. But most astounding of

all were the results attained. The national illiteracy rate was reduced from 20 percent in January 1961 to 4 percent in December the same year. See J. Kozol, "A New Look at the Literacy Campaign in Cuba" in Harvard Educational Review, Vol.48, no.3, August 1978.

34. Cf. Kozol, op. cit.; M. Carnoy & J. Wertheim, Cuba: Economic Change and Educational Reform 1955-1974, World Bank Staff Working Paper No.317; and R. Jolly, "Contrasts in Cuban and African Educational Strategies" in J. Lowe, N. Grant, & T.D. Williams (eds.), Education and Nation Building in the Third World, Scottish Academic Press, Edinburgh & London, 1971.

35. Kozol for instance speaks of 'exhilaration' as the driving force of the campaign and points out that this latter "was launched before Cuba attempted any consistent ideological consolidation", op. cit., p. 345; while Carnoy and Wertheim contrast it with East European socialist revolutions, noting its 'enthusiasm' and lack of ideological dogma.

36. In 1897, only 28 per cent of the population of the 'Russian Empire' was literate; in 1939, twenty years after the Soviet Revolution, 87 per cent were literate. Literacy rates among women increased from 17 per cent to 82 per cent for the same time span. Cf. Wasyl Shimoniak, Communist Education: Its History, Philosophy and Politics, Rand McNally and Company, USA, 1970. As for revolutionary China, anti-elitist education did not necessarily lead to swift mass literacy campaigning but rather to a more comprehensive socialisation of all the population into communistic behaviour. Cf. J.N. Hawkins "Educational Reform and Development in the popular Republic of China",

in Altbach P.G. et al, (eds.), Comparative Education, Macmillan Publishing Co., New York, 1982.

37. The Nicaraguan mass literacy campaign, Crusada Nacional de Alfabetizacion (Great National Literacy Crusade) was organised in 1980. Illiteracy rates were reduced from 50 per cent to 23 per cent in 5 months, and to 15 per cent in 9 months. See R.F. Arnove, "The Nicaraguan National Literacy Crusade of 1980" in Altbach et al., 1982, op. cit., pp. 433-450.

38. See note 22 above.

39. Freire's basic philosophical position in adult literacy is existentialist. He gives particular attention to what he calls the process of 'dehumanisation' of man through the dialectical mechanism of 'oppression'. 'Dehumanisation' affects both 'oppressor' and 'oppressed', and 'humanisation' is possible only when the 'oppressed' are engaged in a social and pedagogical process by virtue of which they become aware of their critical and active role as 'subjects' and not 'objects' of their living conditions. To be complete this process should also liberate the 'oppressors' and all temptation for the 'oppressed' to become oppressors themselves. This biblical vision is best rendered in Freire's own terms which are worth quoting at length (Pedagogy of the Oppressed: 20-21):

> Concern for humanization leads at once to the recognition of dehumanization, not only as an ontological possibility but as an historical reality. And as man perceives the extent of dehumanization he asks himself if humanisation is a viable possibility. ... But while both humanization and dehumanization are real alternatives, only the first is man's vocation. This vocation is constantly negated, yet it is affirmed by that very negation. ... Dehumanization, which marks not only those whose humanity has been stolen, but also (though in a different way) those who have stolen it, is a distortion of the vocation of becoming more fully human. ... Because it is a distortion of being more fully human, sooner or later being less human leads the oppressed to struggle against those who made them so. In order for this struggle to have meaning, the oppressed must not, in seeking to regain their humanity (which is a way to create it), become in turn oppressors of the oppressors, but rather restorers of the humanity of both. This, then, is the great humanistic and historical task of the oppressed: to liberate themselves and their oppressors as well.

According to Freire, this redeeming vision could be attained through a 'liberating pedagogy' (ibid: 30):

> No pedagogy which is truly liberating can remain distant from the oppressed by treating them as unfortunates and by presenting for their emulation models from among the oppressors. The oppressed must be their own example in the struggle for their redemption.

The emphasis is added so as to mark Freire's strong biblical bias, which is unlikely to serve as an effective analytical basis for concrete social problems. Indeed the evasiveness of his categories of 'oppressors' and 'oppressed' ultimately recovering together their lost humanity in the hazy ecstasy of a liberating pedagogy, seems to rely more on a messianic vision, rather than the organisation of concrete, albeit imperfect solutions. Indeed, Freire himself has been hailed as a 'messiah' in the field of adult literacy. See Denis Goulet in the introduction to Freire's Education: The Practice of Freedom, and Richard Shaull's Foreword to Pedagogy of the Oppressed.

40. See Freire's Cultural Action for Freedom, p. 16, and part two.

41. See Education: the Practice of Freedom, p. 5, and Cultural Action for Freedom, Chapter 1.

42. A detailed description of the method of 'generative word' can be found in Education: the Practice of Freedom, pp. 63-84.

43. Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 60.

44. The stages of 'conscientization' are:

> intransitive awareness: men struggle for life not as subjects but objects under the influence of magical forces;
>
> naive transitive awareness: there is an initial perception of problems;
>
> critical transitive awareness: there occurs freedom from alienation, rational perception of the world, dialogue with fellow men.

Cf. Education: the Practice of Freedom, pp. 17-20.

45. See Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Chapter 3.

46. See Cultural Action for Freedom, p. 37.

47. See Freire's discussion of the 'banking concept' of education whereby learners are taken as recipients of the dominant values of the oppressors. In this case education is used to 'domesticate' the learners into adapting to the status quo, (Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Chapter 2).

48. Freire's conception of 'oppression' and the 'oppressed' has been inspired by the revolutionary writings of Franz Fanon, in particular The Wretched of the Earth, Penguin Books, 1968, and Albert Memmi, Colonizer and the Colonized, Orion Press, 1965, on the oppression of the colonised. These latter had made socio-psychological studies of the transformation of the colonised under severe conditions of deprivation and exploitation. The observed context was colonial North African society, and in particular Algeria, where French policies of pauperisation and assimilation dramatically dismantled the local social organisation. Indeed, the dispossession of the local Algerian population was so total, and the dismantlement of its educational and cultural networks so ruthless, that observers such as Franz Fanon and Albert Memmi perceived a vast 'dialectics' between oppressor and oppressed. However, the present author insists that mechanisms of defence and resistance exist among the 'oppressed', and that the latter should be more rigorously delineated as active social actors, and not as victims of some wicked immoral social order. See later in this Chapter, the discussion of the local population's response to France's attempts of cultural assimilation.

49. Since the Déclaration du 1er Novembre 1954, which marked the launching of the war of liberation, the official rhetoric dicloses a preoccupation with the creation of a modern scientifically and technologically minded model of man for Algeria's future citizen. Basic literacy was only paid lip service. The 1976 Charte Nationale sums up the technocratic nature of the Algerian 'Socialist Revolution'. Indeed, one of its chief pillars would reside in the achievement of a 'Cultural Revolution', assigned with the task of "constantly raising

the level of schooling and technical competence" (Charte Nationale, 1976: 64). The preoccupation of Algeria's ruling elites with the expansion of modern science and technology can partly be explained by the poor legacy of the French *mission civilisatrice* in terms of skilled manpower: in 1953 for 8.5 million Algerians (native population), there were 99 doctors, 5 surgeons, 17 dentists, 44 pharmacists, 161 lawyers, 193 notaries, 185 secondary and higher education teachers, 27 engineers (mainly in textiles), 5 architects, and 8 senior administrators. Cf. Harik & Schilling, The Politics of Education in Colonial Algeria and Kenya, op. cit. Subsequently at Independence, there was a genuine yearning for technical skills, as well as an urgent need to fill the technical posts deserted by European experts.

50. Very little information was available on the *Campagne*. References found in the archives of the *Centre National d'Alphabetisation*, were not always classified, and the present author had to carry out the painstaking task of systematically consulting all internal documents. These latter were sometimes undated, and not always referenced. For the *Campagne* the only available information was found in La Lutte contre l'analphabétisme en Algérie de 1962 a 1966, undated mimeographed internal document.

51. See Chapter 3 on the polity's internecine struggles.

52. See notes 33, 34, 35, this Chapter.

53. The *Centre National d'Alphabétisation* (CNA) was created in August 1964 and was assigned with the "task to eradicate illiteracy in the

shortest period of time, in a scientific manner, and to provide culture for evey citizen so that [he or she] participates in the economic and social development of the country". Cf. CNA, Textes Officiels concernant la création et les attributions du CNA, art.2, Decree of 31.8.1964, no. 64-352, Alger, 1964. However, the CNA was not operational before 1966 (Decree no. 66-352), just before the launching of EWLP in 1967.

54. See the data below on Algeria's formal educational system.

55. Cf. République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Ministère des Enseignements Primaire et Secondaire, population à alphabétiser pendant le Plan Quadriennal, 1970-1973, Centre National d'Alphabétisation, Alger, Juin 1971, mimeo.

56. Cf. Centre National d'Alphabétisation, Plan Quadriennal (1970-1973), Alphabétisation d'un million de personnes. Alger, Septembre 1970, mimeo.

57. The complete literacy cycle should correspond to fourth year primary level in the acquisition of the 3Rs. Candidates should be able to write and read messages, read a newspaper, and solve simple arithmetic problems, in order to be considered as functionally literate.

58. Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), Commission de l'Information, Avant-projet de rapport sur la politique d'alphabétisation, 1983, mimeo, p. 4.

59. Cf. CNA, Aperçu sur l'alphabétisation fonctionnelle dans les secteurs agricoles et industriels en Algérie, Juillet, 1970, mimeo, p. 120.

60. See this Chapter below.

61. Cf. République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Ministère de l'Education Nationale, Rapport sur le Mouvement Educatif, 39eme Conférence de l'Education, Genève, Octobre 1984, mimeo.

62. Ibid., p. 2.

63. Ibid., p. 5.

64. Concern for the technological and scientific orientation of education has been consistent in all the main blueprints of the 'Revolution'. Cf. la Platforme de la Soummame, (1956); le Programme de Tripoli (1962); La Charte d'Alger (1964); in Ministère de l'Information et de la Culture, Textes Fondamentaux du Front de Libération Nationale (1954-1962), Dossiers Documentaires 24, Alger, Janvier 1976.

65. Cf. Unesco, Statistical Yearbook, from 1966 to 1986. The early 1970s are marked by a notable increase in government expenditure on the formal educational system as the Reform of Higher Education, *La Réforme de l'Enseignement Supérieur* ,was launched (1971-72) in order to expand the basis of higher education. This resulted in the abolition of yearly selection and the establishment of a flexible system of graduation on a semester basis.

66. The proportion of female pupils and students increased to reach 43 per cent of total enrolment in the primary cycle, 41 per cent in the secondary, and 33 per cent of total university enrolment in 1983-84. Cf. Rapport sur le Mouvement Educatif, op. cit.

67. Agence Press Service, (APS), Bulletin Economique de l'APS, no. 71, Alger, 1981.

68. Classical Arabic, or as is more commonly called today 'standard Arabic' (a modernised version of the more Qur'anic based classical form) has been the national and official language of Algeria since Independence. However, French has been retained for use in decision-making processes as well as an educational medium. Consequently in setting up standards of literacy one has to take into account whether these are in French or Arabic. This linguistic complexity has implicitly hampered the launching of systematic programmes of adult literacy, in addition to the technocratic stance of the polity.

69. The *Ecole Fondamentale* was launched in the early 1980s both to establish a full educational cycle of nine years, and inculcate a polytechnical training. With its establishment, a radical rupture with the previous academic French legacy was made.

70. Ministère du Plan, Statistiques sur l'analphabétisme dans les wilayates: évolution 1966-1977, undated mimeo.

71. The policy of 'cultural assimilation' of the local Muslim population of Algeria was a subject of controversy. While the metropolitan authorities wished to extend the *Ecole Laique* (the 1882 Bill of Jules Ferry on free, secular and compulsory primary education for children of both sexes) to the colony (1883 educational law), the settlers lobby fought the initiative. They argued that no more than a basic education should be given to the 'natives' so that they become efficient labourers. Further education would give them the same opportunities open to the European population. This was categorically refuted by the settlers. Hence the Decree of 1892 and the Programmes of 1890 and 1898 limiting the schooling of boys and emphasizing agricultural skills. Nevertheless, the metropolitan administration never gave up on the policy of assimilation, and had to meet effective resistance on the part of the local population who had hitherto used the network of *medressah*. People deliberately kept their children away from the colonial schools, lest they were proselytised. Cf. F. Colonna, instituteurs algériens 1883-1939, presses de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques, Paris & Alger, 1975, pp. 15-48; and Y. Turin, Affrontements Culturels dans l'Algérie Coloniale, Maspero, Paris, 1971.

72. Cf. C.R. Ageron, les Algériens Musulmans et la France (1871-1919), Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1968, Vol.1; and J. Melia, Le triste sort des indigènes musulmans d'Algérie, Mercure de France, Paris, 1935; as well as Y. Turin, op. cit.

73. The *jami'ah* comes etymologically from the word *jama'a* which means gather. The Islamic universities were created between the eighth and twelfth centuries AD. These institutions were both religious and

secular as knowledge, or *'ilm* in Islamic epistemology, designates both secular science and religious knowledge or *'ilm al din* . Hence the comprehensive curricula ranging from theology, to philosophy and mathematics as well as astrology.

74. The most popular centres were those of al Azhar in Cairo, al Zaituna in Tunis, al Qayrawan in Morocco, and the universities of Damascus and Baghdad.

75. In 1948 the rate of illiteracy among the Muslim population (aged 15+) was 93.8 per cent and in 1954, 92.3 per cent; compared to respectively 8.2 per cent and 7.0 per cent for the European settlers. In 1966, 81.2 per cent of the total Algerian population were illiterate. Cf. Unesco, Literacy 1969-1971, Paris, 1972, and Literacy 1967-1969, Paris, 1970. In contrast, historical evidence showed that Algeria's population was relatively more literate than France's when it was colonised in 1830. See Etienne B., and Leca J., "La Politique Cuturelle de l'Algerie" in Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, 1973, CNRS, Aix en Provence.

76. The rates of schooling for the Muslim population were astonishingly low, but increased gradually form 2 per cent in 1889, to 8.9 per cent in 1930 and 15 per cent in 1954. See Merad A. "Regards sur l'Enseignement des Musulmans en Algérie 1880-1960" in Confluent, juin-juillet, 1963.

77. The *Ulamaa* movement of the 1930s evolved around the slogans "the people of Algeria is Muslim and to Arabity it belongs" launched by its

leader Sheikh 'Abd al Hamid Ibn Badis. This latter was a by-product of the Arab Islamic Renaissance movement or *nahdha* which had shaken the Arab world since the end of the 19th century. Cf. Abdel Malek A. et al., Renaissance du Monde Arabe, Duculot-SNED, Alger, 1972. In Algeria, the *Ulamaa* movement was crucial in reviving the scripturalist tradition through the re-creation and expansion of the *medressah* network. Its main concern was to reassert orthodox Islamic teachings, and expand the use of standard Arabic. The movement was anxious to denounce the colonial assimilationist policies, as well as fight the proliferation of 'religious brotherhoods' or *mourabitin*. These latter were treated as saints and were largely the product of the non-scripturalist tradition which thrived as illiteracy pervaded. Despite relentless harassment by the colonial authorities, the *Ulamaa* movement managed to create hundreds of schools and train thousands of youngsters. Out of these was to emerge the future Arabophone political elite of Algeria. Cf. Merad A. Le Réformisme Musulman en Algérie de 1925 a 1940, Mouton & Co., The Hague & Paris, 1967; 'Amar Talbi, Ibn Badis: hawatuhu wa atharuhu, (Vol. 4), Dar al yaqadhah al 'arabiyya, al-Djazair, 1968, wizarat al shu'un al diniyya, athar al imam 'Abd al Hamid Ibn Badis, (Vol. 4), al-Djazair, 1984.

78. Most of this rhetoric was ironically produced in French, by Francophone members of the political elite who had been entrusted with writing the blueprints of the new nation. However, the champion of 'Arabisation was Boumediene who tried to strike a balance between his Francophone technocrats and his Arabophone party members with relative success. But future clashes proved inevitable.

79. The dispute was epitomised in the late seventies by the exchange between two prominent members of the intelligentsia, Mostefa Lacheraf (then Minister of Education), and Abdallah Cheriet, professor of philosophy at the University of Algiers. The first denounced the policy of Arabisation as being expedient; while the second thought that despite its drawbacks, it was a necessary step towards the full recovery of the Arabic language, and the expansion of its use. Both were secularist 'Citizens', but Lacheraf was Francophone and Cheriet Arabophone, and their exchange of views through the national press showed the 'tactical' divergence of opinion due to their initial training, despite their common allegiance to the progressive nationalist ideal. Cf. Lacheraf M., "Le problème de l'arabisation" in El Moudjahid, 9, 10, 11 Aout 1977; and Cheriet A., "Ara' fi Siassat al-Ta'lim wa al-Ta'rib" in al-Sha'b, 15-30 Aug. 1977, translated and compiled in French as Opinions sur la Politique de l'Enseignement et de l'Arabisation, SNED, Alger, 1983.

80. Cf. Decree on the Organisation de l'Enseignement Religieux en Algérie, 1964, in Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, 1963, p. 545.

81. See note 68 above.

82. In addition to the adjacent *medressah*, mosques provided adults with informal literacy classes. But no written information is available on this activity.

83. The religious *lycées* were part and parcel of the state educational sector, and cannot be seen as denominational institutions.

84. Most administrations and national enterprises were run through the medium of French, despite a forceful Arabisation of the educational process at the primary and secondary levels.

85. Cf. AAN, 1970 on the dissolution of the fundamentalist movements *al qiyam*(Values)and *djounoud Allah* , (Allah's Warriors); and AAN, 1971 on the dismantlement of the *Union Nationale des Etudiants Algériens* (UNEA), reputed for being predominantly left-wing.

86. The move was especially witnessed in the academic world where posts of administrative and prestigious responsibility were distributed to Arabophones throughout the mid-seventies.

87. Cf. AAN, 1982.

88. At the funeral of one of the fundamentalist leaders, Sheikh Abd al Latif (a disciple of Sheikh Ibn Badis) on 12 April 1984, hundreds of mourners gathered. The massive attendance at the funeral was taken as a warning by the government who wished to avoid any open clashes. As a consequence, a number of fundamentalists were released a month later on 12 May 1984. Cf. AAN, 1982, pp. 519-520.

89. The interviews were held during the month of January 1985 in Algiers with the Director General of the Centre National d'Alphabétisation, the Vice-Chairman of the National Assembly and the Secretary General of the *Union Nationale des Femmes Algériennes* , (UNFA), as well as a number of officials from the party *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN).

90. Cf. Ministère de la Planification, Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat, 1977; Hizb Jabhat al-Tahrir al Watani (FLN), al-lajnah al wataniah li-tahdhir milaf siassat tandhim al-usrah, al-Tatawar al-Tarikhi lil Usrah al Djaza'iria hata al-Marhala al Rahinah, undated mimeo. This document is a comprehensive survey on the social trends of the family structure in Algeria. It was prepared by a special commission of the FLN party prior to the enactment of the Family Code.

91. Cf. Fatiha Akeb, "L'Emploi au Feminin" in Algérie-Actualité, no. 1118, Semaine du 19 au 25 Mars 1987, pp. 20-21.

92. Ibid., p. 20.

93. According to the survey of the Office National des Statistiques, (1985), only 326,000 women were active in April 1985, (ie. 8.4 per cent of the total active population). Some 17,000 women were seeking work, and four million women aged 16-64 were homebound and had no wage-based activity. Of women who worked, over 36 per cent were involved in teaching, 20 per cent were employed in the public sector (mainly services), 10 per cent were unqualified workers (mainly cleaners), and 19,000 were 'high cadres'. The latter accounted for 14.5 per cent of the total of 'high cadres' in the country.

94. Voting had immediately been decreed as a universal right at independence.

95. Cf. Vandevelde-Dailliere, H., Femmes Algériennes: à travers la condition féminine dans le Constantinois depuis l'indépendence, Office des Publications Universitaires, Alger, 1980. The research covered the Constantine region in Eastern Algeria, and was based on questionnaires distributed to a sample of approximately 1300 women and men, in urban and rural areas. The survey attempted to investigate "the degree of woman's participation in the Algerian national society" (ibid: 28). Vandevelde-Dailliere rightly points out that "the problem is not posed in terms of political demand on the part of women's movements,... but is expressed in an aura of silence and effacement [of women] which threatens to be a sign of social stagnation" (ibid: 29). This ties in with the present author's argument of a segregated 'City of Women' in the midst of a 'Republic of Citizens' sandwiched between its lower valuations and the pressures of an underlying 'Republic of Cousins'.

96. Cf. Unesco, Statistical Yearbook, Paris, issues between 1966 and 1986; United Republic of Tanzania (URT), Annual Report of the the Ministry of National Education: 1967, Government Printer, Dar Es Salaam, 1972; URT, Recent Educational Developments in the United Republic of Tanzania: 1981-1983, Ministry of Education, Dar Es Salaam, June 1984.

97. Cf. Nyerere, J.K., Education for Self-Reliance, Government Printer, Dar Es Salaam, 1967. Subsequent quotes in the text will be taken from this issue.

98. See earlier in this Chapter for Nyerere's vision of an equal society in Tanzania.

99. Cf. Hawkins, J.N., "Educational Reform and Development in the People's Republic of China", in Altbach et al. (eds.), op. cit.

100. The expression has been used to designate China's educational strategy of formal and non-formal teachings. "Chinese education must walk on two legs" was the motto. "The leg of formal, hierarchical and selective education" as well as "the leg of nonformal, flexible and open education". See Hawkins in op.cit., p. 422. Both were open to a very wide social basis, in contrast with Tanzania's drastic selection at the secondary and tertiary levels.

101. From 1969 onwards, the organisation of adult literacy campaigning in Tanzania was taken systematically in charge by the Ministry of Education. The centralised control of the ensuing national literacy tests (1975, 1977, 1981), did not hamper an effective regional implementation through, District, Regional and Ward Adult Education Coordinators. On the other hand, special training of adult literacy 'educators' was insured regularly through courses for 'Permanent Regional Trainers' Teams' on functional literacy (1972, 1974, 1978) and international conferences were organised in Dar Es Salaam (1974, 1976). But what gave adult literacy campaigning in Tanzania a genuine impetus was the launching of 'Zonal Rural Newspapers' exclusively for adult learners. Between 1979 and 1981, five such newspapers were launched nationwide. See, Swedish International Development Authority, Adult Education in Tanzania, a review by Johnsson A.I., Nystrom K., & Sunden R., Education Division, Documents no. 9, March 1983.

102. The table is based on the results of the 1971 Tanzanian National Urban Mobility Employment and Income Survey (NUMEIST). It was reproduced in Shields N., Women in the Urban Labor Markets of Africa: The Case of Tanzania, World Bank Staff Working Paper, no. 380, April 1980, p. 50.

103. Shields has observed that: "The analysis of differentials in labor earnings indicates that, while African urban women may not suffer appreciably from sex discrimination, either in terms of wage level or as a result of occupational segregation, the urban women's low economic status in the labor force is primarily a result of cumulative discrimination over time in both the provision of and the demand for educational services" (Preamble to her study, op. cit.). Emphasis added.

104. Concern for the integration of African women in the market economy dawned on international and national experts in the early and mid seventies. Thence followed a number of international conferences within the renowned United Nations Women's Decade (1975-1985). Cf. United Nations, The World Conference on the United Nations Decade for Women, Mexico City 1975; Report of the World Conference of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace, Copenhagen 14-30 July 1980; and Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women, A World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace, Nairobi 15-26 July 1985. In the African context, an explicit interest in women's vocational training, especially in rural areas was expressed in the Report of the Regional Conference on Educational Vocational

Training and Work Opportunities for Girls and Women in African Countries, organised jointly by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the German Foundation for Developing Countries, Rabat, Morocco, 20-29 May 1971. Recognition of women's 'strategic contribution to the economy' led to recommendations on the provision of vocational training based on 'appropriate technology' in order to improve agricultural output. In this context Mbilinyi's analysis is accurate, but not when it comes to the specific conditions of implementation of such policies. In Tanzania, for instance, the reproductive role of women is so deeply ingrained (see note 105 below) that it cannot be so automatically offset by a new role of 'producers' in the formal economy, be it in exploitative relations of production. Cf. Swantz M.L., Women in Development: A Creative Role Denied, The Case of Tanzania, C. Hurst & Company, London, 1985.

105. In a field study on the implementation of functional literacy in the Mara region (Lake Victoria), Viscusi M. described the high participation of women as "a curious social phenomenon", and reported that "Project staff were considering if the opening of classes on home economics for women ...would change the male/female ratio in the agricultural programmes". See her study for Unesco, Literacy for Working: Functional Literacy in Tanzania, Educational Studies and documents, no.5, 1971.

106. Cf. Mbilinyi M., The Education of Girls in Tanzania, Institute of Education, University College, Dar Es Salaam, 1969. Mbilinyi points out that parents and especially fathers are reluctant to pay for their daughters' education, especially at secondary level.

CONCLUSION: LESSONS FROM THE 'CITY OF WOMEN'

This thesis has attempted to make a contribution to two major debates: women's position under socialism, and the role of literacy in alleviating their marginalisation from mainstream public processes. The comparative analysis of the position of women in Algeria and Tanzania, two national contexts where the political elites have professed a 'specific' brand of socialism, has indicated that:

a. Unorthodox socialist discourses are not to be dismissed as epiphenomenal, but obtain a rationale of their own which carries the mark of a variety of cultural legacies as a substratum. These, however, convey world views which are at variance with the basic principle of equality of the sexes inbuilt in socialism, and cause normative inconsistencies within the rhetoric itself.

b. Normative inconsistencies bring about a reappraisal of the evolutionary connotations of social change theory, hitherto anxious to depict a contradiction between a positive progressive rhetoric, and a lagging implementation of its principles. The emphasis on normative ambiguities helps to highlight the contingency of social change.

The main theoretical line of argument pursued in this thesis has been to demonstrate the limitations circumscribing development theories of modernisation and dependency, which stemmed from the Weberian and Marxian traditions in their approach to non-western, non-capitalist societies. The most significant drawback of both schools of thought has been identified as their dismissal of the dynamic role of local

social forces in their contact with the western capitalist onslaught through colonialism and imperialism. The critique which advocates of dependency theory have made of modernisation theory certainly illuminated the inductivism of the idea of 'diffusion of modernity' from developed areas to underdeveloped areas. But they established in its stead an equally inductivist thesis by systematically subscribing 'delinking' as a way toward development.

In fact, the whole philosophy of 'development' itself can be a misleading framework within which to probe social change worldwide, for it is unmistakably an evolutionary paradigm. By maintaining the notion of 'development', dependency theorists could only metamorphose it into a negative process; hence their new dichotomy of 'developed centres' versus 'underdeveloped peripheries'. But they could hardly deny that their criteria of development had remained the 'secular' and 'rational' society so shrewdly described by Weber as the by-product of capitalist and socialist organisation of society alike.

Moreover, it was significant that their presumed forefather, namely Marx, had been an enthusiast of colonialism as a ruthless but necessary device to transfer the capitalistic revolution worldwide, and from there achieve the communistic millenium. Marx did not hesitate to consider the new colonies of the French and British empires as non-historical. Indeed, his enthusiasm for colonialism as a way of implanting western society in the colonies was shown to be a precedent for the notion of 'diffusion' in modernisation theory, and not that of 'delinking'. In making these points, the thesis intended to highlight the predominance of the evolutionary paradigm in Western epistemology,

which encapsulated non-western social formations in a pre-historical episode; thus annihilating all other cultural experiences as obsolete.

The vagaries and vicissitudes of the construction of socialist societal programmes in Algeria and Tanzania, and women's social position in particular, have provided a valuable opportunity for the reappraisal of social methodology and theory. These were only hinted at in the present investigation, as expounded above, but further speculations are needed which could result in the elaboration of fresh heuristic tools for the understanding of social change worldwide. Already, the Algerian and Tanzanian experiences have suggested that social change is variegated enough to be treated with the least deterministic approaches possible.

In this thesis, Holmes's problem (-solving) approach helped to highlight the normative inconsistencies of the discourse of 'specific socialism' in Algeria and Tanzania. Indeed, the internal analysis of the rationale of 'specific socialism' disclosed conflicting world views. The simultaneous retention of universalist claims of socialist principles of equality, and the more restrictive views of local ideologies legitimised ambivalent attitudes towards the equality of the sexes in Algeria and Tanzania.

This internal examination of the discourse was made in the light of 'ideal typical models' of the norms which informed 'specific socialism'. The use of ideal typical normative models was proposed by Holmes (based on Weber's 'rational constructs') as heuristic devices and not as representations of reality. It was argued that these models fundamentally differed from the rigid categorisation of

traditional versus modern society, which purports to render the reality of social change worldwide.

The models disclosed that socialism was not a natural heir of local philosophies, claimed to be the authentic inspiration of Algeria's and Tanzania's official ideological discourses. On the contrary, neither Islam in the case of Algeria, nor traditional African communitarianism in Tanzania were imbued with non-hierarchical views, either of society or of the sexes. These unequivocally held men as superior to women, and emphasized the reproductory cycle of society, and the reproductive function of woman; whereas socialism was primarily progressivist in its portrayal of society and individual.

Two legitimations of the proposed societal programmes in Algeria and Tanzania were thus invoked, and constituted the normative inconsistencies of 'specific socialism'. The reluctance to admit that socialism was the product of 'cultural borrowing' by Algerian and Tanzanian ideologues had blurred these inconsistencies; an aspect which ideal normative types helped illuminate. This normative ambivalence had eluded most observers of Algeria and Tanzania; especially early radical enthusiasts who later interpreted failures to implement socialist developmental policies as a retreat from socialism in both countries.

These inbuilt normative inconsistencies of 'specific socialism' provided penetrating clues to the present enquiry, particularly with regard to women's social position. These loomed large among impediments to the realisation of the equality of the sexes, and paved the way for

the legitimisation of family laws which consecrated women's status as minor social subjects.

The construction of ideal types was also used to elucidate the interaction between the modernising leaderships of Algeria and Tanzania, and civil society at large. The conventional dispute over the use of the concepts of 'class' and 'elite' was deliberately avoided in favour of less 'rigorous' models. Indeed, defending the use of 'class' instead of 'elite', and vice versa, seemed to stem from a priori choices, more informed by ideological biases than logically derived motivations. This was illustrated by a discussion of the amendments appended to the Marxian concept of 'bourgeoisie' by Marxist students of non-European, non-Western social formations. They coined the notions of 'state bourgeoisie' and 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' for Algeria and Tanzania respectively, who they proceeded to incriminate for the distorted implementation of socialist policies. Significantly, the present thesis demonstrated that these reformed versions of the bourgeoisie were at odds both with Marx's own concept, which was clearly associated with the private property of the means of production, and his appraisal of the bourgeoisie's laudable mission as a progressive class.

The models used in this enquiry are ad hoc, and have been devised so as to identify the active role of those social agents involved in inducing normative and institutional innovations (ie. the 'Republic of Citizens') and those who resisted them (ie. Algeria's 'Republic of Cousins', and Tanzania's 'Republic of Brothers-in-law'). These models presented a number of advantages. First, they helped to depart from

the controversial dichotomies of traditionality/modernity, and satellite/metropolis, so dubiously linked with capitalist expansion and colonial history worldwide. Other historical contributions in Algeria and Tanzania were thus taken into account, together with the more contemporary colonial and neo-colonial components, in establishing a more open and more universalist 'Republic of Citizens'. Second, they helped to construe the process of change not as the result of the unilateral will of the 'Republic of Citizens' (generally prone to change), but as conditioned by the response of previous formations with their norms and values and social organisation in the shape of the 'Republic of Cousins' and the 'Republic of Brothers-in-law' (generally prone to resist in order to survive).

In the light of these models, it was demonstrated that the persistence of normative and institutional residues pertaining to the two 'conservative Republics', were antithetical to the realisation of the societal programmes of Algeria's and Tanzania's emerging 'Republic of Citizens'. This was illustrated by the difficulties of industrialisation in Algeria, and villagisation in Tanzania. Normative and institutional residues were identified in the form of the resistance offered by the 'Cousins' and the 'Brothers-in-law', in order to preserve social and cultural autonomy in the case of the first, and economic autonomy in the case of the latter.

The resistance was more diffuse among the Algerian 'Cousins' as they largely accepted the technocratic programme of the 'Citizens' in power, but did not internalise the corresponding work ethic. In contrast, in Tanzania the resistance was offered by the peasants at large in order

to eschew the exigencies of a wider market economy which would reduce their own autonomy. Here both men and women were equally involved, since more than half of Tanzania's rural workforce are peasant women.

But while resistance to change was found to be diffuse in the public realm of nation-building, it grew into explicit opposition when the private realm of the family became subject to official reforms. Family legislation in each country impinged directly on the prevailing view of women, held both by the polity and civil society. Where more orthodox analyses have argued that social resistance to women in modernisation processes concerned their access to the public arena, this thesis has demonstrated that a more pugnacious resistance has been expressed against their legal equality in the very domestic realm of the family. The paradox is significant and opens new scopes in women's studies. A promising field of research would be to investigate further the repercussions of legal inequality on the public participation of women, not only in Algeria and Tanzania, but in similar contexts.

In order to retain the interaction between the different social forces at play, it was not sufficient to limit the analysis to the legislation per se. A study of actual debates on the issue was also appropriate and as far as Algeria was concerned, nowhere else could the ideal models have been better illustrated than through the revelations of the 'Cousins-delegates' at the National Assembly in expressing their normative vision of ideal womanhood, and beyond it of society. Indeed, the 'Cousin-delegates' offered an irascible resistance to the modest legal reforms of the Government in family legislation. The challenge was quite novel as it threatened the facade of unitarianism displayed

by the modernising 'Citizens' in power. Ironically, this was not to be in favour of women.

The debates demonstrated the overwhelming strength of 'Cousin-like' valuations apropos women's place, role and status in society. Women were unequivocally regarded as minor social subjects, whose reproductive function and dependence on male kin had to be maintained in order to insure social harmony. Above all, the debates revealed the normative ambivalence of the official discourse of 'specific socialism' which legitimised the adoption of the *Shari'a* in the name of specificity. The principles of the latter were indeed antithetical to the constitutional rights of woman, but they could not be denounced as unconstitutional since the rhetoric of specificity secured their legitimation.

In Tanzania, the legal status of women was also made inferior through the 1971 Law of Marriage Act. The literature on the Tanzanian case demonstrated that the implementation of the Act was riddled with flaws. Despite its conciliatory clauses, which attempted to combine different family codes (Christian, Muslim and Customary), it was opposed by each community comprising the 'Republic of Brothers-in-law'. By and large, people did not resort to the official channels to settle their family disputes, but rather continued their own practices. Here the resistance of the 'Brothers-in-law' was more diffuse and discreet than that of the 'Cousins'.

The most striking feature of the legal status of women in Algeria and Tanzania concerned the regressive measures taken in the field of family

legislation compared with the more daring and aggressive policies in the economic and social spheres. In both countries, the minimal adjustments to existing religious and customary practices, highly detrimental to women's individual autonomy, was a significant withdrawal from the constitutional right of equal citizenry.

The official endorsement of a legal status of minority for women, betrayed the ambivalent position of the 'Citizens' in power *vis a vis* a total equality of the sexes. Indeed the Algerian and Tanzanian leaderships were treading on sensitive ground when they had to grapple with the private realm of the family. It remains bewildering that neither they nor the 'Cousins' and 'Brothers-in-law' shunned women's access to the 'public realm' of institutional change, but that all scorned a *de jure* legal autonomy for women. As indicated, this author could only identify this latter paradox and further research is needed in order to illuminate the dynamics of the private and public realms, especially as highlighted by women's social position in the process of social change.

Total equality of the sexes in the public and private realms was perceived by all social protagonists, as presenting dire consequences for the harmony of the social order. However, the corresponding arguments expressed an almost obsessive indictment against women as potentially subversive social elements by the 'Cousins' in Algeria, and as necessary domestic labourers by the 'Brothers-in-law' in Tanzania. As for the moderate 'Citizens', they were anxious to put forward the argument of the complementarity of the sexes, but nonetheless endorsed women's inferiority by denying them full legal majority.

Alongside such legal conservatism however, the 'Citizens' in power in Algeria and Tanzania enforced aggressive educational policies so as to integrate women in the modern 'Republic of Citizens'. In both countries, female access to the formal educational system gradually became a universal reality, albeit with only modest participation in the secondary and higher levels. Nevertheless, while in Algeria, the formidable expansion of formal education automatically excluded millions of illiterate adult women, in Tanzania, non-formal education in the form of adult literacy campaigns involved more women than men. This drew attention to the specific societal conditions which had permitted such developemnts. The persistence of high illiteracy rates among adult women in Algeria was supported by a powerful tradition of seclusion and domesticity; whereas the active role of Tanzanian women in the agricultural sector encouraged their formidable participation in the country's adult literacy campaigns throughout the 1970s.

However, it was contended that an 'educational solution' to the marginalisation of women should be treated with circumspection in both cases. A comparison of functional literacy as advocated by Unesco's 1967 Experimental World Literacy Programme, and the more revolutionary method of Freire's 'conscientization', further corroborated the paramount importance of specific social conditions in determining the success or failure of policy. Either was found to be highly tributary of specific initial conditions, and neither could be taken as an alternative (panacea) to the other.

While the neglect of adult literacy and non-formal education in Algeria threatened to marginalise women even more in what is gradually becoming

a 'polytechnical society', in Tanzania, the emphasis on basic non-formal education and functional literacy did not appear to make of women 'better farmers', especially as an increasing number of them have been relinquishing their economic autonomy as producers, through the modernisation programmes of *Ujamaa* and villagisation. This particular unsuspected development constituted a significant refutation both of the presumed universal benefits of modernisation, and the drawbacks of traditionality. Here was a case of traditional practices which insured at least one universal right, that of women's economic autonomy.

In conclusion, it has been argued that in Algeria, adult literacy programmes would help to alleviate the severe alienation of women resulting from their debilitating domestic seclusion. In Tanzania on the other hand, the expansion of formal education among women would provide them with the necessary qualifications to further the appreciable asset of basic education that they had gained in the course of their massive participation in the country's adult literacy campaigns.

By shedding some light on the persistence of women's marginalisation in Algeria and Tanzania, this thesis is a departure from more orthodox analyses of women under socialism. The bulk of women's studies had by and large followed an evolutionary line of argument, whereby the persistence of sex inequalities in socialist countries was construed as a gap between the principles of socialist theory and their problematic implementation.[1] Western feminist scholarship of the 1960s and 1970's had however, questioned the holistic approach of Marxian theory towards

the 'liberation of women' (which it deemed secondary to the wider dynamics of class struggle). Feminist writers nonetheless maintained that 'women's liberation' and socialism, were intrinsically linked, the latter bringing forth the former.[2]

In contrast, the findings of the present thesis have suggested that the study of women under socialism depends on the peculiarities of national social contexts. Indeed, the position of women under socialism cannot be investigated outside specific national contexts without reducing the subject to an abstract litany on the ultimate and absolute synthesis of socialism and women's liberation. Such an approach assumes that the millenium of women's liberation is at hand provided an 'authentic' socialist revolution is accomplished. The unorthodox socialist experiences of Algeria and Tanzania have hopefully refuted such holistic claims, hinting that no millenia are to be expected for the segregated 'City of Women' . Instead, the ambiguous position of the latter reflects wider social conflicts, involving a variety of social actors whose ambivalent attitudes towards change and innovation cannot be resolved drastically without leaving yet more unsuspeted ambivalences. The 'City of Women' requires that pragmatic solutions are adopted which will firmly establish women as serious protagonists in the process of social change.

NOTES: CONCLUSION

1. Cf. Rowbotham, S., Women, Resistance and Revolution, Penguin Books, 1972, for a comprehensive panorama on women's position in various socialist systems; Scott, H., Women under Socialism: Experiences from Eastern Europe, Alison and Busby, London, 1976; Lenin, V.I., On the Emancipation of Women, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977; Lenin was against the idea of a separate women's organisation, and suggested that women should join communist parties and trade unions as men's equals. He followed in the footsteps of Marx and Engels in incorporating women's liberation in the wider proletarian class struggle. Cf. Engels, F., Origin of the Family, State and Property, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1981. Engels advocated the complete equality of men and women before the law, and the provision of wage employment outside the home as pre-requisites of women's liberation. Scott (1976: 42) has pointed out that the "fundamentalist interpretations of [Marx's and Engels'] writings encouraged the belief that women would be 'returned' to a position of equality by the destruction of the private property system as part of a kind of natural history process". Not only this belief has fallen into disrepute as women did not attain equality or liberation in systems which abolished private property, but it is utterly untenable in pre-capitalist societies where private property was unknown, and yet women were downtrodden.

2. A number of western feminists have pointed out the specificity of women's liberation and the shortcomings of Marxian theory on the question. Cf. Friedan, B., The Feminine Mystique, Penguin Books, 1968; Mitchell, J., Woman's Estate, Penguin Books, 1971; Millett, K., Sexual

Politics, Hart-Davis, London, 1971. But others have suggested that women's liberation is intrinsically attached to Marxist theory. See, Vogel, L., Marxism and the Oppression of Women: Toward a Unitary Theory, Pluto Press, London, 1983.

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